





































Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of the Science of Law 





























All Rights Reserved 
Abstract 





At the beginning of the 21st Century, conflict-of-laws theory lies in tatters. The 
determination of the applicable law could hardly be more disputed and insecure. At the 
same time, globalization requires a strong basis on which legal systems can be 
coordinated. It is therefore high time to reconsider the theory of choice of law. 
 In my analysis, I have focused on the three major players in the conflicts dilemma: 
individuals, states, and courts. I have tried to show how their roles have changed or 
should change in order to allow for more justice and global coordination. 
 I have started out with the individuals because they suffer most from the application 
of a certain law. Today, it is recognized in almost all legal systems that individual parties 
can choose the law governing their disputes. But this principle does not sit very well with 
traditional theory of conflicts, which is built on connections to states and state authority. 
That is why I have tried to give a theoretical justification for party autonomy. 
 Second, I have turned to the states because the reason we have conflicts is the 
existence of different countries with different legal systems. States claim application for 
their law either because a case arises in their territory, or because it is connected to their 
nationals, or because it touches upon their interest. In the modern world, though, it 
becomes difficult to establish these kinds of connections as social relations are 
increasingly transcending state borders. In my second article, I have shown that the law 
of the states has reacted by “de-bordering” itself. 
 The final actor I have examined is the courts. One of the main problems of conflict of 
laws, in my eyes, is that courts consider themselves as organs of a certain state. I argue in 
my third article that this is a misconception and that their main preoccupation should be 
to render a just decision. If that would be accepted, they could very well turn out to be the 
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Liberating the Individual from Battles between States 
Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws 
 
published in: 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 381-434 (2008) 
 
 
Current theories of conflict of laws have one common feature: They all consider the 
question of the applicable law in terms of a conflict between states. Legal systems are 
seen as fighting with each other over the application to a certain case. From this 
perspective, the goal of conflicts methods is to assign factual situations to the competent 
rule maker for resolution. Party autonomy presents a problem for this view: if individuals 
are allowed to choose which law will be applied to their dispute, it seems as if private 
persons could determine the outcome of the battle between states – but how is this 
possible? 
This article tries to give a theoretical solution to this puzzle. The idea is that 
conflicts theory has to be recalibrated. Its goal is not to solve conflicts between states, 
but to serve the individual, its needs and wants. Through this shift of focus, it becomes 
not only possible to justify party autonomy, but also to answer a number of practical 
questions raised by it. Furthermore, a new normative category, so-called “relatively 
mandatory rules”, will be proposed. Finally, some important implications that the new 
approach may have for conflict of laws in general will be discussed. 







When we think about the conflict of laws, we always think in terms of states and states’ 
relations. Using the traditional method, for instance, we are looking for the state which 
has the closest connection to the situation, in which the case has its “seat”.1 Under a more 
modern paradigm, we analyze whether a state has an “interest” in the case before 
applying its law.2  
While it is certainly true that the issue of conflicts arises from the fact that the 
world is composed of territorial states having separate and differing legal systems3, the 
solution to the problem is not necessarily to be found in seeing every case through the 
lens of states’ territories or states’ interests. What we tend to forget, thereby, is that in 
conflicts we are dealing, as in every other field of the law, with human relations. It might 
therefore be preferable to include other factors as well.  
The idea can be illustrated by the principle of party autonomy. Within the last 
decades, it has taken over a steadily growing field of the law. More and more it is 
recognized that the parties are free to choose the applicable law.  
While writers on conflicts have not overlooked this fact, they have failed to 
provide a theoretical explanation why the parties are allowed to choose the applicable 
                                               
1 See Friedrich Carl von Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws § 346 and § 360 (2d ed. 1880, transl. 
Guthrie, reprint Rothman 1972). This approach is still prevalent in Europe, see, e.g., Gerhard Kegel & 
Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht 310-311 (9th ed. 2004); Pierre Mayer & Vincent Heuzé, Droit 
international privé 83 (8th ed. 2004); José Carlos Fernández Rozas & Sixto Sánchez Lorenzo, Curso de 
Derecho Internacional Privado 399 (2d ed. 1993); Tito Ballarino, Manuale Breve di Diritto Internazionale 
Privato 3 (2002).  
2 See Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflicts of Laws 190 (1963). 
3 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 1 (1971).  




law. The possibility of a choice-of-law clause is mostly remarked as a side-issue, or as 
problematic.4 Although verbally recognized, party autonomy has always stayed a 
maverick within the edifice of conflicts theory.  
Indeed, the freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law must cause 
theoretical headaches to any serious positivist. If the law that governs a legal relationship 
is objectively determinable by legal analysis, how can the parties be free to choose 
another law as applicable? If states’ interests determine the choice-of-law process, why 
can the parties change the outcome? Why are they allowed to deselect even mandatory 
rules of the otherwise applicable law5? Does that not mean that they have legislative 
power?  
Of course, one can try to dissolve these perplexities with the “killer argument” 
that the parties are free to choose the applicable law because the states’ conflict rules 
allow them to do so. But this leaves open the question why the states give them this 
liberty. Also, it is far from clear what it means if a law does not apply by authority, but 
because of a choice by private parties. Does this make a difference as to the application 
of the law, its construction and interpretation? What is missing is an exact explanation of 
party autonomy, as a matter of policy, but also as a matter of legal theory. 
Such reflections, though principally done from an abstract perspective, are not 
only of theoretical interest. On the contrary, they are of highest importance in practice. 
                                               
4 For instance, Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 241 (1995) argues in the context of choice-of-law clauses 
that “standing by itself, consent may not be adequate”. Luther McDougal, Robert  L. Felix & Ralp U. 
Witten, American Conflict of Laws (2001), mention party autonomy only on p. 505 and immediately stress 
that it is subject to important limits. Larry Kramer is equally suspicious of party autonomy, although he 
proposes a canon requiring the courts to honor the parties’ choice of law in contracts, see Larry Kramer, 
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Col. L. Rev. 277, 330 (1990). See also Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary 
on the Conflict of Laws 451 (4th ed. 2001) (“… party autonomy rules either go too far or not far enough”).  
5 See infra, under II 1. 




First, they will help to clear the significance of a private choice of law, its extent and 
effects.6 Second, they might also change the way in which we approach the conflicts 
question when the parties have not chosen the applicable law: If we were to focus more 
on the parties involved in a case and not on the states, we might adopt a more 
individualized approach to the conflicts problem in general.7 
But let us begin from the start. In this article, I will try to show why current 
conflicts theory is unable to account for party autonomy. After having outlined the rise of 
party autonomy in practice (part II), I will study the different concepts and instruments 
that are used in today’s conflicts theory (part III). I will show that they are all based on 
the idea that conflicts of laws are battles between states and are therefore unable to grasp 
the increasing influence of the parties on the applicable law. As a contrast, I will 
propound a theory of conflicts in which the individual takes center-stage and which leads 
to a new category of legal rules, which I will call “relatively mandatory rules” (part IV). 
In the last part, I will try to indicate some implications of the new approach for conflicts 
in practice (part V).  
Before I start, let me briefly say what I will not do in this article. I will not explore 
the limits to party autonomy. Most writers have focused on those limits and tried to 
understand thereby the nature of party autonomy.8 But there are two problems with this 
approach: First, the limits to party autonomy are mostly idiosyncratic to every legal 
system. By focusing on those limits, it is therefore not easy to discern the general nature 
of party autonomy as a concept that is important for conflicts theory. Second, to define 
party autonomy by its limits resembles the definition of a vacuum as being free from 
                                               
6 See infra, under II 3 and V 1. 
7 See infra, under V 2. 
8 See, e.g., Mc Dougal, Felix & Witten, supra note 4. 




atmosphere. But I think that party autonomy is more than a vacuum. It is an important 
legal principle that has its roots in the recognition of individual freedom. That is why I 
will take a different approach and try to explain party autonomy not as being void from 
something, but as justified in its own right.  
But first, we have to explore more in detail the problems of today’s conflicts 
theory. 
II. The Gap in Conflicts Theory 
1. The Growing Acceptance of Party Autonomy 
A revolution has taken place in the conflict of laws. I am not talking about the American 
conflict-of-laws revolution, which dates back to the nineteen sixties and shifted the focus 
from factors such as territory and citizenship to the interests of the states involved.9 On a 
global level, the true revolution has been the growing acceptance of party autonomy as a 
way to determine the applicable law. 
Within the last decades, party autonomy has become the one principle in conflict 
of laws that is followed by all jurisdictions.10 Although there are many precursors to party 
autonomy in history11, the principle has never been as widespread in application as it is 
today. It has been said that “perhaps the most widely accepted private international law 
rule of our time is that the parties to a contract are free to stipulate what law shall govern 
                                               
9 See the writings of its main proponent, Brainerd Currie, supra note 2. 
10 See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, General Report, in: Symeonides (ed.), Private International Law 
at the End of the 20th Century: Progress or Regress? 38-40 (1999).  
11 In France, party autonomy dates back as far as the 16th Century, see Mayer & Heuzé, supra note 1, at 
509. See also Eugene F. Scholes, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of 
Laws 948 (4th ed. 2004). 




their transaction.”12 The Institute of International Law calls party autonomy “one of the 
fundamental principles of private international law”.13 More and more states allow the 
parties to cut the Gordian knot of conflict of laws by choosing the applicable law 
themselves. The spectacular rise of party autonomy can also be seen from the 
development of the Restatement on the Conflict of Laws: While the chapter on contracts 
of the first Restatement did not contain any provision allowing the parties to stipulate the 
governing law14, the second Restatement made it the general principle of this chapter.15 
The principle of party autonomy is far from being applicable to all fields of the 
law. Yet its scope is increasingly extended. It is now applied in areas where it was 
unthinkable before.16 One field that in the history has resisted party autonomy are all 
questions related to the status of a person. The traditional idea is that the status needs to 
be determined objectively and therefore the applicable law cannot be changed at will. 
Today, however, legal systems have allowed private persons to influence the law 
governing such questions as their name17, their capacity to contract18, or the matrimonial 
regime19. Party autonomy is now also followed with regard to successions: Under the 
U.S. Uniform Probate Code, the testator is allowed, within certain limits, to choose the 
law that will be applied with regard to the meaning and legal effect of a deed or will20. 
                                               
12 Russell J. Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts, 187 Recueil des Cours 
239, 271 (1984-IV). 
13 Institut of International Law, Session of Basel 1991, Resolution on the autonomy of the parties in 
international contracts between private persons or entities, 2d consideration, 64 II Yearbook 383 (1992).  
14 See Restatement (First), Conflict of Laws, §§ 311-331 (1934).  
15 See Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 187 (1971). 
16 On the following examples see Symeonides, supra note 10, at 56-57. 
17 See, e.g., Art.  37 (2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act (1987). 
18 See Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws, § 198 (1). 
19 See, e.g., Art. 52 of the Swiss Private International Law Act; Art. 15 (2) of the Introductory Law to the 
German Civil Code (EGBGB). For French case law, see Mayer & Heuzé, supra note 1, at 771. 
20 Uniform Probate Code, § 2-703 (2004). The notion “governing instrument”, which is used there, includes 
deeds and wills, see id., § 1-201 (18). 




Italy, Québec and Switzerland also allow the testator to choose the applicable law,21 and a 
Hague Convention proposes to make this principle an international rule22. 
The will of the individual also has gained significance in another area in which it 
was held to be functionally excluded before: tort law. For a long time, it was thought that 
party autonomy could not play a role in torts because the two sides involved typically 
have no connection to each other. Increasingly however, tort victims are allowed to 
choose unilaterally the applicable law for their claim after the facts arose.23 The same is 
true in products liability cases.24 This is a special kind of party autonomy in two regards: 
first, because the choice is made only after the dispute arose, and second, because it is 
only one party that can choose the applicable law. The possibility of unilateral choice is 
designed to favor one side, the victim. Nevertheless, it is a case in which the will of a 
private individual determines the law that the judge will apply. 
Party autonomy has also become an important procedural principle. In many 
countries, a court will apply its own law if the parties argue their case based on that law, 
even if under the conflict rules of the forum another law is applicable.25 More and more, 
                                               
21 Art. 46 (2) 1 of the Italian law No. 218/1995; Art. 90 (2), 91 (2) of the Swiss Private International Law 
Act; Art. 3098 (2) of the Civil Code of Québec. 
22 Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons from August 1, 
1989, Art. 5 (1) 1. 
23 See, e.g., Art. 40 (1) of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code (EGBGB); Art. 62 (1) 2 of the 
Italian law No. 218/1995. This solution also applies in Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Venezuela, 
see Symeonides, supra note 10, at 58. 
24 See  Art. 63 of the Italian law No. 218/1995; Art. 135 (1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act; Art. 
3128 of the Civil Code of Québec. See also Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 
from October 2, 1973, Art 6.  
25 See for French law: Cour de cassation, Civ. 1re, decision of December 4, 1990, Soc. Coveco et autres c. 
Soc. Vesoul transports et autre, Civ. 1re, decision of December 4, 1990, Revue critique de droit 
international privé 558, 559 (1991); for English law : I Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws 221, para 
9-003 (Lawrence Collins ed., 13th ed. 2000). For U.S. law: Scoles, Hay, Borchers & Symeonides, supra 
note 11, at 953, footnote 4. 




parties are also allowed to explicitly choose the law that will be applied to their dispute.26 
Like in the case of tort law and products liability, this is an after-the-facts choice. Yet the 
peculiarity of procedural choice of law is that the parties can circumvent the normally 
applicable choice-of-law rules altogether. This makes clear how much the solution to the 
conflicts problem has become subject to the parties’ intentions. 
It is true, however, that the parties are often limited in their choice to certain legal 
systems. For instance, in the products liability setting the victim only has the choice 
between the law of the country in which the manufacturer has its establishment or 
residence and the law of the country in which the victim acquired the product.27 In the 
marriage case, the parties typically can choose only between the law of the state of which 
one of them is a citizen or in which both are residing, or for immovables the law of the 
state where they are located.28 In the succession case, the choice is mostly limited by the 
citizenship and the domicile of the deceased.29  
Yet more and more, parties are also allowed to choose legal systems that have no 
connection to them or to the facts of their dispute. That is the case in the classic area in 
which party autonomy applies, i.e. in contract law. The old rule was that the law chosen 
by the parties must have some connection to the parties or the case.30 It has been replaced 
                                               
26 See, e.g., French Cour de cassation, Civ. 1re, Roho c. Caron et autres, decision of April 19, 1988, Revue 
critique de droit international privé 68, 69 (1989). The condition is that the parties can freely dispose of the 
rights that are the subject of controversy. 
27 See Art. 63 of the Italian law No. 218/1995; Art. 135 (1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act; Art. 
3128 of the Civil Code of Québec. 
28 See, e.g., Art. 15 (2) of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code (EGBGB). 
29 Art. 46 (2) 1 of the Italian law No. 218/1995; Art. 90 (2), 91 (2) of the Swiss Private International Law 
Act; Art. 3098 (2) of the Civil Code of Québec. But see § 2-703 of the Uniform Probate Act, which does 
not provide for such a limit. 
30 This view can be found, e.g., in § 1-105 UCC before its revision in 2001. It is still followed by the 
Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 187 (2), but only with relation to issues which the party could 
not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement. For other issues, there is complete freedom of 




with the principle that the parties are allowed to choose the law of a state which has 
absolutely no relationship whatever to either of them or to the case.31  
One particularly salient feature of party autonomy is that it allows the parties to 
deselect even the mandatory rules of a legal system.32 The limits to party autonomy are 
not drawn by mandatory law, but by public policy. Of course it is true that public policy 
puts up some important restrictions. But one could consider those cases as being outside 
the scope of application of party autonomy. Within the field of party autonomy, the will 
of the parties is unrestricted by mandatory law. 
Another important feature of party autonomy is that within its realm, it trumps all 
other conflict rules. Whether under a conflict system a contract would be normally 
governed by the law of the state in which the contractual obligations are to be fulfilled or 
in which one of the parties has its domicile or seat does not matter as long as the parties 
have made an explicit choice. Party autonomy, thus, prevails over other conflicts rules, 
which are denigrated to mere default rules. Within its field, party autonomy is the master. 
The principle of party autonomy is so firmly entrenched in today’s law-making 
that it is even applied to the validity of the choice-of-law clause itself. There are 
considerable logical arguments against allowing the parties to “bootstrap” themselves and 
                                                                                                                                            
choice, see Restatement id., § 187 (1). On the meaning of this paragraph see infra, text accompanying note 
44. 
31 See, e.g., revised § 1-301 (c) UCC, which is explicitly motivated by “emerging international norms” (see 
Summary of Changes); Art. 3 (1) 1 of the European Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome 1980) (hereinafter: the Rome Convention); Art. 7 of the Inter-American Convention on 
the Law Applicable to International Contracts (Mexico 1997). See also for a peculiar field of the law 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), § 109 (a). On the UCITA and the revision of 
the UCC see William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of Party 
Autonomy, 54 SMU L. Rev. 697 (2001). 
32 See Scoles, Hay, Borchers & Symeonides, supra note 11, at 960-961; Mayer & Heuzé, supra note 1, at 
516; Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht 654 (9th ed. 2004). 




determine the applicable law to their own choice-of-law clause.33 Yet such freedom is 
explicitly recognized in European law.34 This shows how important party autonomy has 
become to the legislator. Instead of determining the applicable law objectively in case of 
doubt regarding the validity of the choice-of-law clause, it defers to the latter, presuming 
its validity.  
In sum, party autonomy has become the most important principle in conflict of 
laws. This is underscored by the fact that Article 187 of the Second Restatement on 
Conflict of Laws, which provides for the liberty of the parties to choose the applicable 
law, is followed more than any other provision of the Restatement.35 Why, it may be 
asked then, does party autonomy take such a marginal place in current conflicts doctrine? 
Why is the principle that is most applied in practice not discussed much in theory? The 
reason is certainly not that the concept would be so easy to grasp. On the contrary, party 
autonomy raises some serious theoretical questions, as we will see now. 
2. Theoretical Questions  
Joseph H. Beale, the author of the First Restatement on Conflicts, argued against party 
autonomy that allowing the parties to choose the applicable law would give them 
“permission to do a legislative act”.  Freedom of choice of law would practically make “a 
                                               
33 O. Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law 196 (1976). See also DeNicola v. 
Cunard Line Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 7, footnote 2 (1st Cir. 1981) (this would mean to be “putting the barge before 
the tug”). 
34 Under the Rome Convention, supra note 31, the existence and validity of the choice-of-law clause is 
determined under the chosen law. This is the combined effect of Art. 3 (4) and Art. 8 (1) of the Convention. 
See Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, J.O.C.E. 1980 No. C-282, p. 1, comment No. 1 on Article 8; see also Dicey & Morris, supra 
note 25, Vol. II, at 1222, para. 32-077, and at 1232, para. 32-100. For a different view, see Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Wendy Collins Purdue & Arthur T. von Mehren, Conflict of Laws 325 (1998) and Scoles, 
Hay, Borchers & Symeonides, supra note 11, at 956 (claiming that Art. 3 (4) would refer to the lex causae). 
35 See Symeonides, Purdue & von Mehren, supra note 34, at 318; Scoles, Hay, Borchers & Symeonides, 
supra note 11, at 980. 




legislative body of any two persons who choose to get together and contract”.36 
Consequently, the First Restatement did not include any provision recognizing such 
freedom. The second Restatement took a sharp u-turn and claimed that Beale’s view “is 
now obsolete and in any event, falls off wide the mark”.37 It says that party autonomy 
would be justified because it is the forum which allows the parties, through its conflict 
rules, to determine the applicable law.38 But that leaves open why the conflict rules of the 
forum should give such widespread powers to the parties. Does it not thereby place them 
in a position above the law? Does it not give what the French call “l’autonomie de la 
volonté”39, an autonomy of the will? 
 One possible answer to this question is that there would be a general principle of 
freedom of contract which allows the parties to choose the applicable legal system and 
which precedes national law. This view is not so strange as it may seem at first glance. 
The principle that the parties are free to enter into contracts and are bound by their 
respective choices is so old that it is indeed a prime candidate for a universal principle of 
law. For instance, Justice Mashall called it a “universal principle of law” that “in every 
forum a contract is governed by the law with a view to which it was made”.40 One could 
also cite a famous provision of the French Civil Code which recognizes that agreements 
have a binding force like laws. Article 1134 (1) reads: “Agreements lawfully entered into 
take the place of the law for those who have made them”.41  
                                               
36 Joseph H. Beale, II A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1080 (1935). For a similar view, see Kahn-
Freund, supra note 33. 
37 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 187, comment e. 
38 Restatement, id. 
39 See, e.g., Kahn-Freund, supra note 33, at 195; Mayer & Heuzé, supra note 1, at 511. 
40 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1825). 
41 “Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites”. Translation taken 
from the official web-page of the French government <www.legifrance.gouv.fr> (last visited on November 
29, 2005). 




 It is interesting to contrast this view with the one of Beale. However, such a 
discussion would end up in a typical hen and egg-problem: What was earlier, the freedom 
to enter into binding agreements or the provision of state law that recognizes it? The 
answer is troubling from a logical point of view. Also, a meta-legal principle of freedom 
of choice of law is hard to reconcile with the freedom the legislator has under the view of 
positivism to adopt any law that it wants. It is clear that the state remains free to restrict 
this principle, at least in its own courts.42 
 Another theory is that party autonomy means nothing more than to allow the 
parties to incorporate the rules of law of a state into their agreement. This view once 
prevailed on the continent43 and has influenced Article 187 (1) of the Second 
Restatement44. According to it, the parties can choose the rules of another legal system, 
but only insofar as the rules of the otherwise applicable law allow them to do so. What 
law they designate is not important. Indeed, the parties could as well incorporate the 
standard terms and conditions of an industry’s association or legal rules that are not in 
force anywhere, like the rules of the Roman twelve tables45. But this theory downplays 
the importance of party autonomy too much.46 Especially, it does not elucidate why under 
this principle the parties are free to deviate even from mandatory rules of the otherwise 
applicable law. Moreover, it cannot explain why party autonomy is a conflict-of-laws rule 
                                               
42 A different view might be taken in an arbitral court, see for the specific context of arbitration agreements 
Matthias Lehmann, A Plea for a Transnational Approach to Arbitrability in Arbitral Practice, 42 Col. J. 
Transnat’l L. 753, 770-771 (2004). 
43 See George Melchior, Die Grundlagen des deutschen Internationalen Privatrechts 500 (1932). See also 
Kahn-Freund, supra note 33. 
44 See Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 187 (1), comment c.  
45 See the provocative remark by Pierre Mayer, in: Transnational Rules in International Commercial 
Arbitration 44 (International Chamber of Commerce ed., 1993).  
46 On the difference between reference to foreign law as a choice of law and incorporation of provisions of 
a foreign law into the contract see also Dicey & Morris, supra note 25, Vol. II, at 1226-1227, para. 32-086 
– para. 32-088. 




at all. For instance, the Second Restatement on Conflict of laws underlines that Article 
187 (1) “is a rule providing for incorporation by reference and is not a rule of choice of 
law”.47 However, if that is true, it may be permitted to ask why this provision was 
included in a Restatement on the “Conflict of Laws”? 
 A different view strives to avoid any radical solution, neither recognizing 
complete freedom to choose the applicable law nor denying the existence of party 
autonomy. It views the will of the parties as an element that helps to “localize” the 
contract within a specific legal system.48 Although most of the time party autonomy 
prevails, there might be other factors as well which mandate a different localization than 
the one preferred by the parties. This approach has the advantage of bringing party 
autonomy into line with classic conflict-of-laws theory. Its problem, however, is that it 
cannot explain why it is more and more accepted in legislation that the parties can even 
choose a legal system that has no connection whatever to the dispute.49 To say that they 
would “localize” their contract in these cases is a mere fiction. 
 A very common theory holds that the principle of party autonomy protects the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.50 This theory correctly assumes that the parties 
have a vital interest in the outcome of the choice-of-law process. To cure any 
uncertainties about the applicable law, the theory proposes that parties should determine 
themselves the law that they want to be applied. But the argument is somewhat circular: 
                                               
47 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 187, comment c.  
48 Henri Batiffol, Subjectivisme et Objectivisme dans le droit international privé des contrats, I Mélange 
offerts à Jacques Maury 39, 53 (1960). 
49 See the references supra note 31. 
50 See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 267, 
283 (1966); Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 
37 U.Kan.L.Rev. 471 (1989); Amos Shapira, Territorialism, National Parochialism, Universalism and Party 
Autonomy: How Does One Square the Choice-of-Law Circle?, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 199, 203 (2000). See 
also Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 187, comment e. The need for predictability is also stressed 
by Russell J. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 449.  




if the parties were not allowed to choose the applicable law, than they could not expect 
their agreement to be taken into consideration; they therefore would have no “reasonable 
expectation” that the law chosen by them will be applied. Moreover, predictability could 
be secured also in other ways than by party autonomy. For instance, if courts adopted the 
same choice-of-law rules, parties would also be able to predict which law will be applied 
to their dispute. The applicable law would even be more predictable for two reasons: first, 
because choice-of-law clauses are often subject to questions about their validity, and 
second, because the conflict rules normally applicable from a general point of view could 
not be trumped by some coincidental choice-of-law clause. The theory which 
nevertheless favors party autonomy as a means to secure predictability is of course based 
on the experience that the states are unable to agree on uniform choice-of-law rules. But 
it does not provide an explanation why it is easier for the states to accept freedom of 
choice of law of the parties instead of universal rules on conflicts. Finally, it is far from 
clear why the need for predictability should allow the parties to deviate even from 
mandatory laws.51 States do not ordinarily allow parties to contract out of, let’s say, 
securities law, just to make their private relation more stable. 
 There might be other possible justifications for party autonomy. For instance, one 
could argue that the states would expect not to forgo anything in the process of individual 
choice of law because their law would be chosen as often as the law of other states. The 
idea is to view party autonomy as a kind of lottery in which one state’s law has an equal 
chance to be chosen as another’s. Yet such an assumption, if it was ever held by any 
state, would be wrong. Parties have clear preferences for certain laws. For instance, it is 
                                               
51 For similar doubts, see Kramer, supra note 4. For doubts based on a “rule of validation” see Weintraub, 
supra note 4, at 449. 




well known that in financial transactions choice-of-law clauses regularly point to English 
law or the law of New York as the applicable rules of law.52 In international arbitration, 
parties often submit their dispute to Swiss or French law. In international maritime and 
insurance transactions, parties have a tendency to choose English law.53 Thus some states 
necessarily “lose” in the process of individual choice of law, if one sees non-application 
of their law as a disadvantage to them. It needs to be explained why states would agree to 
such a process. 
 Maybe the state’s common interest in international trade and commerce could be a 
reason. One could argue that states would honor freely negotiated choice-of-law clauses 
in order to secure the conditions necessary for the functioning of international commerce, 
which benefits them even if at times their law is not applied. There are some indications 
for this view in American case law. 54 However, this argument would not explain why the 
parties are given freedom to choose the applicable law even in areas that have no 
connection at all to trade and commerce, like marriage or tort law.55 
                                               
52 See, e.g., Kimmo Mettälä, Governing-Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in International Project 
Financing, 20 Int’l Law. 219, 222 (1986) 
53 See Dicey & Morris, supra note 25, Vol. II, at 1218-1219, para. 32-063 (noting that the choice of English 
law in insurance and maritime contracts has gained worldwide acceptance). 
54 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1912-1913 (1972) (“The 
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn 
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
courts … We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on 
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts”); cited by Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 
506, 519, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 2457 (1975); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 
629, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3355 (1985). Although Zapata concerned the validity of a choice-of-forum clause in 
favor of the English courts, its holding also affects choice of law since the Supreme Court concluded that 
the English courts would interpret the choice of the English forum as a choice of English law, see 407 U.S. 
1, 13, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1915, footnote 15. The case is therefore often cited to support the validity of choice-
of-law clauses. See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1362 (2d Cir. 1993); Bison Pulp & 
Paper Ltd. v. M/V Pergamos, 1995 WL 880775 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 
928 (4th Cir. 1996). 
55 See supra under II 0.  




 Given all the difficulties to justify party autonomy as a legal principle, an 
important German conflicts scholar has described party autonomy as a “stopgap”, which 
applies simply because one would have no other satisfactory conflicts rule to govern.56 
That is indeed an open admission of failure. How can the conflicts rule most accepted all 
over the world be a mere “stopgap”? Should the principle which trumps all other conflicts 
rules be nothing more than a makeshift? The puzzlement with which experienced 
theorists react to party autonomy testifies to the fact that there is something deeply wrong 
with conflicts theory of our days. It is simply not able to account even for the 
fundamental principle that is used most frequently to solve conflicts in practice.  
3. Practical Questions  
As indicated before, to justify party autonomy is not merely of theoretical interest. It is 
also relevant for a number of important questions in practice.  
 First, the scope of the choice of law: Does it also include the mandatory rules of 
the law chosen? This is a question of paramount practical interest. Do parties have to take 
into account the mandatory laws of the chosen legal system? Or can they just exclude 
those provisions, since they would not be applicable otherwise? And if so, are parties to 
be presumed to have excluded the mandatory rules, or not? 
 There is no easy answer to these questions. An old theory held that the chosen law 
applies in toto, including its mandatory provisions.57 Yet one has somehow an 
uncomfortable feeling that, for instance, Swiss antitrust law should apply to a sales 
                                               
56 Gerhard Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht 208 (1st ed. 1960). See also Kegel & Schurig, supra note 1, at 
653. 
57 See Kegel & Schurig, supra note 1, at 155; Anton K. Schnyder, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 248-255, and 
for a critique id., at 255-260. 




contract between an American company and a German company simply for the reason 
that the parties chose to submit their agreement to this law. This uncomfortable feeling 
stems from the fact that mandatory law normally is applicable irrespective of the will of 
the parties. Mandatory law, it seems, is therefore outside of the realm of party autonomy. 
On the other hand, it appears inevitable that the parties must be subject to some 
mandatory rules. If they were free to deselect the otherwise applicable law and at the 
same time needed not to include into their choice the mandatory rules of the chosen law, 
they could avoid mandatory rules altogether.  
 A second question arising from the first is whether the parties are forced to choose 
any applicable law at all. Since they are absolutely free to determine the rules to be 
applied, it is not at all evident that they should have to choose a legal system of a state. 
One could also imagine that they would be able to write a sort of self-sufficing contract, a 
“contract without a law”,58 or that they could resort to some rules not made by the state, 
like a “new law merchant” or “lex mercatoria”59. 
 Another question is what happens if the parties choose a law under which their 
contract, or part of it, is invalid.60 Since the invalidity of a contract is always based on 
mandatory law the question is related to the first; but it is not identical to it because not 
                                               
58 French: “contrat sans loi”, see Mayer & Heuzé, supra note 1, at 514. 
59 From the rich literature on the subject, see, e.g., Clive M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A 
New Law Merchant, 2 Current Law and Social Problems 128-153 (1961); Berthold Goldman, 9 Frontières 
du droit et lex mercatoria, Archives de la philosophie du droit 177 (1964); Ursula Stein, Lex Mercatoria – 
Realität und Theorie (1994); Klaus P. Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (1998); 
Friedrich K. Juenger, Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 60 La. L. Rev. 1133 (2000). 
60 See Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 187, comment e. Cases in which the parties have chosen a 
law that invalidates their contract or a contractual clause are legend, see, e.g., Milanovich v. Costa 
Crociere, S.p.A., 954 F.2d 763, 769 (C.A.D.C. 1992) (invalidating a clause in a cruise ticket under the 
Italian law stipulated in the ticket); Moyer v. Citicorp Homeowners Inc., 799 F.2d 1445 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(invalidating an interest rate-clause under a usury law of Georgia because Georgia law had been chosen); 
Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding a termination clause in a 
dealership contract to be without legal effect on the basis of Wisconsin law chosen by the parties). 




all mandatory rules have the effect of making an agreement invalid. If the contract is 
invalid under the chosen law, we are facing a paradox: The chosen law applies because 
the parties want it to apply; at the same time, the application of the chosen law 
contradicts their intentions because by the very fact of contracting, they have shown that 
they want to be contractually bound. One could argue, of course, that the applicable law 
applies only to the extent that it upholds the contract.61 But this seems to imply a 
backlash on the parties’ autonomy. Thus, rules on party autonomy have been criticized as 
going either “too far or not far enough” because they would sometimes point to a law that 
invalidates.62 
 Party autonomy raises a further question: Can the parties split up the applicable 
law and submit some aspects of their relationship to the law of state A, others to the law 
of state B, and maybe still others to the law of state C? This problem is known under the 
French term “dépeçage”.63 The validity of such choice-of-law clauses is doubtful if one 
sees the legal system as a unity that applies as a whole.  Under such a view, parties could 
submit their agreement to the law of state A, B, or C, but not to a patchwork of the rules 
of these states. 
 Still another question is whether the parties are allowed to agree on so-called 
“alternative” or “floating” choice-of-law clauses. Under such a clause, the parties leave 
the applicable law open; it will be chosen at a later point in time.64 The validity of these 
clauses is subject to serious doubts: the later choice may create considerable problems in 
                                               
61 This is the so-called rule of validation, see infra note 190. 
62 See Weintraub, supra note 4. For a discussion of this statement, see infra under V. 
63 See Dicey & Morris, supra note 25, Vol. II, at 1211-1214, para. 32-046 – para. 32-052. On dépeçage in 
general see Willis L.M. Reese, Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 Col. L.R. 53-75 
(1973). 
64 See Dicey & Morris, supra note 25, Vol. II, at 1225-1226, para. 32-084; Scoles, Hay, Borchers & 
Symeonides, supra note 11, at 951-952. 




interpreting and constructing the agreement. Moreover, it leaves open which law is 
applicable at the time the agreement is made.65  
 A last question concerns the “petrifaction” or “freeze” of the applicable law: Does 
the chosen law apply as it was when the parties have entered into the choice-of-law 
clause, or do later changes affect it?66 The problem is especially relevant with regard to 
contracts between private individuals and states, so called “state contracts”. In those 
contracts, stabilization clauses have been inserted to prevent the effects of a unilateral 
change of the applicable rules by the state party.67 But it can also arise in merely private 
or commercial relationships. The solution seems to depend on why we apply the chosen 
law: because of the choice by the parties, or by the authority of the rule maker?  
 Current conflicts theories leave us with no answer to these questions. Only with a 
good theory of party autonomy can we hope to find a solution. In the following, I will 
therefore not try to devise any easy answer to the specific problems. It has already 
become clear that this is impossible if one is to depart from the current theories of 
conflicts. We have to dig deeper. Therefore, I will analyze why current theories have 
such difficulties in deciding the questions raised here. What is it that makes it so hard to 
come to terms with party autonomy? Why is it so difficult to ascertain the practical 
effects of a private choice of law? In order to answer these questions, we have to go back 
to the very basics of conflicts. We will see that the problems raised are all the product of 
                                               
65 See, e.g., Armar Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Caisse Algérienne d’Assurance et de Reassurance, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 
207, 216 (C.A.) (“… there must be a proper law of any contract – a governing law – at the time of the 
making of the contract”). 
66 See, e.g., Dicey & Morris, supra note 25, Vol. II, at 1227, para. 32-088. 
67 See Georges R. Delaume, The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts, in: Lex Mercatoria and 
Arbitration 77 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed. 1990), at 94-96; Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation 
of International Investment Agreements 214-230 (1995); Wolfgang Peter, Stabilization Clauses in State 
Contracts,  Int’l Bus. L.J. 875-891 (1998). 




a particular attitude towards conflicts of law, one that focuses exclusively on conflicts 
between states and not between private parties. 
III. The State-Centered Perspective of Conflicts Theory 
1. The Notion of Conflict of Laws 
All conflict theories share a common characteristic: They are built around the notion of 
the state. This can already be seen from the name of the field. The expression “conflict of 
laws” creates an impression of a struggle or battle between different states over the 
application of their laws. It has been rightly called a “war like expression”.68 Finding 
rules for “conflicts” seems similar to the attempt to solve controversies between states 
peacefully.69 Governmental interest analysis has tried to appease the tension between rule 
makers by eliminating “false conflicts”.70 But a number of “true conflicts” remain in 
which the battle is fought even harder and in which, like in a war, only the allegiance to 
one or the other power counts.71  
The term “conflict of laws” is therefore clearly impregnated by ideas of state 
relations. This is also true for the name the discipline carries in most other countries of 
                                               
68 Comte de Vareilles-Sommière, La synthèse du droit international privé (1897), cited by Beale, supra note 
36, Vol. I, at 15. 
69 French authors have often described the object of conflict of laws as a “conflits de souverainété”, see, 
e.g., Antoine Pillet, Principes de droit international privé 67 (1903). The same other thinks that courts 
would miss the respect of a foreign sovereign if they would not apply its law to its nationals, see id. At 275. 
Another French author has described the goal of private international law as being to separate sovereign 
powers, J.-P. Niboyet, I Traité de droit international privé français 79 (1938). 
70 See Currie, supra note 2, at 107, 163 and 189. See also Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. 
Jackson – A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 Col. L. Rev. 1233, 1242 (1963). 
71 See Currie, supra note 2, at 190 (arguing that in a true conflict a court has to follow the interests of its 
own state in the first place). 




the world: “private international law”.72 The notion reminds us of international law. Inter-
national law, by its very concept, deals only with relationships between states, although 
there is a modern trend to include private actors as well.73 It is also sometimes called 
public international law, in order to distinguish it from private international law. The 
parallel names create a strong tendency to view private international law as the little 
brother of public international law, in which its principles are applied to private 
relationships. Indeed, this is the approach that has been followed from its inception. 
Joseph Story, an adept of the term “private international law”74, made “sovereignty” of 
the state over a territory the premise of his conflicts theory.75 He departed from the 
“natural principle” that the laws of one country can have no force in the territory of 
another, a principle he derived from the equality and independence of nations.76 Savigny 
also agreed with the assumptions that no state can require the recognition of its law 
beyond its boundaries, although he found it would afford little help to solve the problem 
of conflicts.77 He based his theory instead on an “international common law of nations 
having intercourse with one another”.78  
This is international law-talk. Principles analogous to international law, like state 
sovereignty or a common law of nations, are employed in conflict of laws. State relations 
                                               
72 “Derecho privado internacional”, “Droit international privé”, “Internationales Privatrecht”, “Diritto 
internazionale privato”, „Mishpat Ben-Leumi Pratee“. 
73 On the role of the private individual as a subject of international law see the references infra note 154. 
See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004), footnote 20. 
74 Joseph Story, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws § 8 (2d ed. 1841) (reprint The Lawbook Exchange 
2001). 
75 Story, supra note 74, §§ 18-19, 21. 
76 Story, supra note 74, §§ 7-8.  
77 Savigny, supra note 1, at § 348.  
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from the conflicts between sovereigns toward the “community of law”, see, e.g., Fernández Roza & 
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public law. For instance, he uses the term “local limits of the authority of the rules of law over the legal 
relations” to describe the problem of conflicts, see Savigny, id., Chapter 1, thereby following a typical 
internationalist approach. See also infra, under 2 and 4. 




are considered to be more important than private relations and therefore are superposed to 
them. Although it is recognized today that international law and conflict of laws are 
fundamentally different disciplines79, the term “private international law” is more than a 
simple misnomer. “Name exacts thought”, one could paraphrase Currie.80 Given the 
parallel nomenclature, one does not need to wonder that many attempts have been made 
in history to transfer the concepts from international law to conflict of laws.81 Still most 
of the literature employs terms like state territory, state interests, rights and so on, to deal 
with private relations that exceed the boundaries of one state.82 
Now, you might ask, what is wrong with that? Is not the very question of conflicts 
arising only because we have to choose between different legal regimes?83 And are not 
states the authors of these regimes? Does it not follow necessarily there from that the 
applicable law must be determined by linking the case to one or another of these states? 
Well, the answer to this question is “yes and no”. Indeed it is helpful and in many 
areas necessary to consider which states is the author of a rule to determine the latter’s 
scope of application. For instance, it makes sense to think about which state adopted a 
traffic rule in order to determine the latter’s scope of application. On the other hand, if 
one is constantly to link the applicable law to the power or interests of its author, one 
cannot explain party autonomy. If every set of facts would be objectively attributed to the 
authority of one state and its rules, there would be no room for the will of the private 
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individual selecting between different legal systems. Viewing conflicts as battles between 
states is therefore not wrong. If done exclusively, however, it closes the mind to the role 
of the individual.  
2. When do Conflicts Arise?  
The difficulties to accept party autonomy as a principle of conflict of laws can also be 
traced back to another fundamental problem, the question when conflicts of laws arise. 
As we have seen, current theories see the reason of conflicts in a clash between states 
over the application of their respective legal system. Now a legal system has many fields, 
which can roughly be categorized into private law, criminal law, and public or 
administrative law. Theoretically, it would be possible that conflicts of laws would arise 
in all of these fields.  
Indeed, that is precisely the view of an important line of thought in conflicts 
literature. There is a growing tendency to see conflicts everywhere. For instance, authors 
work in self-defined fields such as “conflict of public laws”84 or “conflict of criminal 
laws”85. Underlying these “discoveries” is the assumption that wherever there are 
different laws made by different authors, there would be a conflict of laws. This conflict 
would have to be solved first before the dispute at hand can be decided. Every single case 
in the world would therefore be preceded by a problem: Which law should be applied? 
Necessarily, the rules applied to solve this problem would be different from the rules that 
                                               
84 See, e.g., Milena Sterio, The Globalization Era and the Conflict of Laws: What Europe could learn from 
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apply to the dispute itself. As a consequence of this view, conflict of laws becomes an 
abstract problem. It is a kind of meta-question that arises before any legal problem can be 
solved. Of course, in most cases the answer to the question is easy because they present 
only contacts to state A, or only interests of state A are involved, so we apply the law of 
state A.86 Nevertheless, from the theoretical point of view, the question would always be 
there. 
Yet historically, the field of conflicts has been much more limited, and continues 
for most writers to be so. A “conflict of laws” in this traditional sense comes up in only 
very specific circumstances. To see when, it is enlightening to use another name that is 
used for the field, which is “choice of law”.87 A “choice” over the applicable law can 
only exist for two kinds of persons: the parties or a judge. As has been seen earlier, the 
parties are free to choose the applicable law under the principle of party autonomy. The 
judge, under certain circumstances, can also “choose” between different legal systems. 
That is the case when a private dispute presents foreign elements and it is therefore at 
least thinkable to apply a law other than the law of the forum. 
To see the particularity of this situation, it is useful to contrast it to others. For 
instance, in a dispute between a citizen and an administrative agency, like e.g. the SEC, 
the court cannot choose which law it will apply. It always has to follow the law of its own 
state. Similarly, a criminal court is not free to choose the applicable law. It has to enforce 
the law of a certain state, its own state. A constitutional court also has no choice but to 
apply the constitution of the state by which it was established. 
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A conflict-of-laws question therefore arises only in a specific area of the law: 
Where the judge has the freedom to choose the applicable law.88 What is this field? The 
classic description has been “private law”, as opposed to public or criminal law. That is 
also the reason for the term “private international law”. But the notion of “private law” is 
laden with so many controversies and uncertainties that it is better to avoid it altogether. 
Instead, we might use a classic metaphor, although it is neither exhaustive nor precise: 
the “transient cause of action”.  
A transient cause of action is one that may be prosecuted anywhere and any court 
can examine it, 89 provided its conditions for jurisdiction are fulfilled. In contrast, a 
“local” cause of action can only be brought to a certain local law court or agency, which 
will pursue it under its own law. An example is a crime. Each criminal court considers it 
only from the point of view of its law.  
Of course, also in those cases a foreign element can be involved. For instance, 
under the active personality principle states can pursue crimes committed by their citizens 
in other states.90 In this context, the judge might face a question of how far he or she 
should apply the national law, especially in light of the fact that other states – for instance 
the one where the crime happened – might also have an interest in applying their law to 
the case. As we can see there from, legal regimes overlap in many areas and the scope of 
application of a particular national law is an issue that arises frequently.91 
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(1904) (using the expression “the theory of foreign suit”).  
90 See, e.g., Oehler, supra note 85, at 70. 
91 That is why it would be too shortsighted to define the problem of conflict as one of drawing lines 
between the spheres of application of different national laws – as a “Grenzrecht”. Yet this view is defended 
by de Vareille-Sommières, supra note 81, at 19-107. 




The typical conflicts question, though, is different. It is not a question of how far we 
should apply our own law. Rather, the judge can apply either the law of the forum or the 
law of state X or state Y. This is totally different perspective. It is the specificity of the 
field which it shares with no other. 
Of course one can ask why the judges can choose the applicable law in those cases. 
We just have to phrase this question a little differently, and it becomes one that is often 
discussed in conflicts theory:  
3. Why Do We Apply Foreign Law? 
The easy answer to this question is the command of the legislator. The judge of state A 
applies the law of state B only if the legislator of state, has told him or her to do so.92 The 
legislator defines both the power and the limits of the judge’s ability to apply foreign law. 
This view is in line with positivism, which sees law as a command by the lawgiver.93 If 
the judge is an organ of the state – and there seems to be no doubt about that – she or he 
can apply foreign law only because the lawgiver has told her or him to do so. Each 
lawgiver therefore determines which law the judge will apply. This is the reason why 
each state has its own conflict-of-law rules. 
The positivist view can, of course, hardly be attacked from the normative 
viewpoint. But a challenge comes from a historical perspective: When courts began to 
apply the law of other states, they were not statutorily mandated to do so. Major impulses 
to the application of foreign law did not come from the legislature, but from science. The 
starting point of modern conflict of laws seems to have been a comment to the Codex 
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Iustiniani by the glossator Bartolus.94 Through writers like Savigny and Story the 
application of foreign law became a basic tenet of judicial practice. In contrast, conflict of 
laws has never been an area of legislative hyper-activity. Indeed, legislation and choice of 
law have often been described in “antithetical terms”.95 Even in countries which tend to 
codify every area of the law, conflicts is often not exhaustively regulated.96  
But regardless of whether it is the judge or the legislator that is responsible for the 
application of foreign law, we are left with the fundamental problem: Why does one state 
apply the law of another at all? Basically, two answers have routinely been given. 
The first is comity of nations. Foreign law is applied for being nice to other states. 
This attitude is grounded in the mutual interest of the states in having commercial and 
other contacts with each other. That was the view of both Story and Savigny.97 They 
relied on the opinion of the Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber.98 Huber had explained that the 
laws of a nation have force only within the limits of a government; therefore, they could 
apply not out of right in another state, but only by its courtesy.99 Although the comity 
theory dates back to the 17th Century, it continues to be relevant. Comity has been cited 
in U.S. case law as the reason for applying other laws.100 It underlies requirements of 
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Huber, in turn, could draw on the work of Paul Voet, De statuis eorumque concursu (reprinted in Savigny, 
supra note 1, Appendix III), who also used the term “comity” (mores comiter), see Voet, id., Sec. IV Cap. 
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369, 370 (1797). 
100 See, e.g., Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669, 13 S.Ct. 224, 228 (1892) (“Laws have no force of 
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reciprocity in the application of foreign law and the recognition of foreign judgments101 
and also such modern approaches as the governmental interest analysis.102  
Again, this view superimposes state-relations to private relationships. What counts 
is only the gesture towards the other sovereign. Certainly, we are not bound to apply 
another state’s law. We do it for the sake of good relations with the other country.  
But is the relationship with other states really the reason for which we apply its 
law? There are certainly areas where concerns for bilateral relations and cooperation with 
other states influence the choice-of-law process. Take for instance public policy. Some 
jurisdictions have enacted special rules to guide their judges when to give effect to the 
public policy rules of other states.103 In this case, the policy of the foreign state and its 
interests will be subject to a special control by the forum before it is applied. These cases 
are special since they touch upon basic interests of the foreign state. But it has been 
argued that the state would take a considerable interest in all private cases.104 As evidence 
it is offered to us that states sometimes file amicus-curiae-briefs in private litigation.105 
Indeed, it is clear that in those cases the foreign state might have a special interest: to see 
its national winning. But precisely for that reason we should ask ourselves whether it is 
wise to pay much attention to the state’s plea for the application of its law. Should the 
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law not be something more neutral, independent of the rule maker? How can we accept 
that a legislator takes the side of one party in a litigation? Paradoxically, in many cases it 
is precisely the special interest of one state in the outcome of a litigation that should lead 
us to disregard its pleading to apply its law. 
Another way to justify the application of another state’s law is to see foreign law as 
a fact. This view was mainly developed in procedural law, because in many countries the 
judge informs himself about foreign law as he would do about questions of fact.106 But it 
has also had an effect on the choice of the applicable law itself. For instance, the theory 
of vested rights is based on the idea that rights are facts which are created in other 
countries and therefore have to be respected as such by the forum.107 The theory has also 
an impact on the interpretation and application of foreign law. For instance, it is often 
held that we have to apply the foreign law as it is interpreted in the other system.108 
According to this view, the judge should behave exactly the same way in which a judge 
of the other system would behave. This position is thought to advance the same result 
regardless of where the transient cause of action is adjudicated. 
Although it is a little bit harder to see, this view is also influenced by considerations 
of international law. To understand why, you need to look at the notion of a “state” in 
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international law. It is a commonplace in international law doctrine that we will not 
inquire into the legitimacy of a state when recognizing it. For a state to exist, it is 
sufficient that a government is ruling effectively over a certain territory and a people and 
has at least the capacity to engage in relations with other states.109 This theory has spread 
into the conflict of laws because we accept, within the limits of public policy, the foreign 
law as it effectively governs a state’s territory and its people, never mind the character of 
the regime that enacted it.110  
The advantage of the theory is that it frees the conflict-of-laws question to a certain 
extent from politics. It avoids that conflicts between states have repercussions on private 
relationships by insulating the latter as pure “facts”. The problem with this view, 
however, is that it denies the normative quality of foreign law. Foreign law, as all law, 
has a regulatory function. It says how things should be, not how they are. It is therefore 
wrong to suppose that if a court follows foreign law in a specific case, it would not apply 
it, but merely take a foreign fact into consideration that already exists in the other state. If 
we render a decision based on foreign law, we follow basically the same intellectual 
process as if we apply our own law. No decision is so easy that there would not be some 
question of interpretation. It would therefore be naïve to expect that we could just look 
into the other legal system which would give us a mechanical answer. The judge always 
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has to interpret rules and regulations and to render a normative decision on how the 
dispute should be solved. 
So if neither comity nor the fact theory hold, why do we apply foreign law then? 
The best answer comes from the often criticized author of the First Restatement, Joseph 
Beale. Beale stressed the need for continuity of the law.111 This need can hardly be 
fulfilled in a world that is divided into different legal systems. While the state is confined 
within the limits of its territory, private individuals are not bound by state limits. They 
can move around or transact over borders. Due to the mobility of civil society, a tension 
arises between the divisions of the law into different legal systems and the need for 
continuity of the law. When people move to another state or enter into transborder 
transactions, it happens that a legal dispute is brought before a court when the facts did 
not or not entirely take place in the state. Now it would be contrary to the interest of 
justice if the court would not recognize the legal relationship created, or would consider it 
only under its laws.  
It is thus not exclusively, and maybe not even primarily, the foreign state and the 
interest of having good relations with it which makes us apply its law. Rather, it is the 
goal of doing justice, which is the ultimate goal of every legal proceeding. The term 
“justice” is certainly a very blurry term. It is used here to shift the focus from the states 
and their relations to the individual litigants who have a stake in the legal proceedings. 
Beale coined the term “vested rights” for their positions.112 This was an unfortunate 
metaphor, because it paints a picture as if legal positions were facts happening in one 
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state and the other state would not have any choice but to recognize it.113 It was a reaction 
to the equally extreme theory that leaves the application of foreign law to the discretion 
of the state, its “comity” with other nations.114 It has to be granted to the latter theory that 
no state is obliged, under international law, to recognize what has happened in another 
state.115 But underlying Beale’s theory is the correct idea that it is the goal of doing 
justice to the private citizens for which we apply foreign law. That makes it also clear 
why private parties can renounce of the application of a certain state’s legal system and 
instead opt for another: “volenti non fit iniuria”. And it also explains the special value of 
party autonomy as a conflicts principle: Given the split into different legal systems, the 
best continuity of the law is achieved if all states stick to the law chosen by the parties in 
advance or after the dispute arises. Party autonomy thus helps overcome the adverse 
effects for private relationships that are caused by the division of the world into multiple 
legal systems.  
4. Which Law do We Apply? 
The central question of conflicts theory is how to determine the applicable law. There are 
a bunch of different methods that have been developed. There is not enough space in this 
article to treat them all. But most of them share a common characteristic: they are state-
centered. This feature is particularly important because it will explain why they are 
unable to give party autonomy the role it deserves. 
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Under the traditional method to solve conflicts, the judge has to apply the law of the 
state to which the legal relationship belongs, in which it has its “seat”.116 The functioning 
of this theory can be described as jurisdiction-selecting117: For every legal relationship 
there is a state which is competent. Private disputes are attributed to the jurisdiction of a 
state. The task of conflict is to “discover” the right state. Of course this is not so easy 
because conflicts cases by definition have connections to different states. The traditional 
method reacts to this by splitting up the legal relationship into a number of partial 
questions. For instance, in a contract case a different law may apply to problems such as 
form, agency, capacity, or damages. For each set of legal questions, there is a special 
conflicts rule. But under each of them, there is always one legal system that is competent 
to govern the question, and only one. Its competence has to be recognized by all other 
states. Since the applicable law is determined with universal validity, authors also speak 
of a “multilateral” approach to conflicts.118 The parallel to public international law is 
clear to see. The methodology resembles the approach from the Westphalian peace to the 
Congress of Vienna: The existence of different states is recognized and competences are 
attributed. But what this multilateral approach cannot explain is why the parties can have 
an influence on the applicable law. How is it possible for them to change the distributions 
of competences of legislators? How can they even choose the law of a state that has no 
contacts at all to their dispute119? The classic choice-of-law method is totally 
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incompatible with such private freedom. This is the reason for the bewilderment with 
which traditional theorists have reacted to the growing recognition of party autonomy.120 
In contrast to the multilateral method of classic conflict theory, governmental 
interest analysis prefers a “unilateral” method. It starts from the assumption that each 
state pursues interests in its lawmaking. In a case where only the interests of one state are 
concerned, there is no conflict or a “false conflict”, and the law of this state has to be 
applied.121 In case of conflicts between the interests of the forum and those of a foreign 
state, the judge has to follow the rules of its own legislator.122 It is claimed that this 
theory is more realistic than the traditional one. But again, it is exclusively built around 
the idea of state relations. The issue of conflicts becomes the subject of a power game 
between the states fighting for their interests. Of course, it is true that the “states’ 
interests” are more often than not interests of individuals that are protected by the state.123 
Even the parties’ interest in enforcing contractual agreements can be apprehended as an 
interest of the state in this sense.124 However, does a court really care for the interests of a 
foreign state when it, e.g., grants a contractual claim of a foreign citizen against a citizen 
of its own state? Or is not the interest of the foreign party in enforcing the agreement 
much more palpable and real to the judge than the interest of the foreign state in 
protecting its citizen? In its ambition to overcome the metaphysical mechanics of the 
traditional theory, governmental interest analysis has largely bypassed the importance of 
the individual. Instead, it has focused on the conflicts between the states. Yet more and 
more, states are paying deference to the individual’s choice of law. This embarrasses 
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interest analysis: Why can the result of the power game between states be changed by a 
simple agreement between private parties? How should it be possible that the all-
important state preferences for certain interests may be trumped by ordinary individuals? 
Interest analyses thus cannot cope with party autonomy. The reason is that it suffers from 
the same weakness as classic conflicts theory: It focuses too much on international 
relations. 
Other theories, less famous but equally ingenuous, share the same defect. For 
instance, von Mehren and Trautman propose to first determine the concerned 
jurisdictions, then to construct for each of them the applicable rule, and in case of conflict 
to apply the law of the “jurisdiction predominantly concerned”.125 If there is irreducible 
conflict between several concerned jurisdictions, they suggest a policy-weighing.126 It 
shall include a look into the relative strength of the several policies, the conviction with 
which the asserting community holds the policy, the appropriateness of the rule to the 
effectuation of the policy, and the relevant significance to the jurisdictions concerned of 
the vindication of their policies.127 This theory is totally focused on the state. It leaves no 
room for the individual and its freedom to choose the applicable law. 
Weintraub’s consequence-based approach equally focuses on the conflict between 
states.128 Under it, one has to analyze the policies pursued by a state as to whether they 
are “real” and then to examine their justification in light of the consequences that may be 
experienced by the state that pursues the policy.129 Weintraub includes the interests of the 
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parties only as a last point by checking whether the application of a particular state’s law 
would be “fair” to the individuals involved.130 This should be determined in relation to 
the number of contacts the parties have with the state whose law requires application.131 
But Weintraub ignores that the application of a state’s law may be “fair” even if there are 
no contacts to that law at all, simply because the parties have chosen it. 
Of the five choice-influencing considerations developed by Leflar, three concern 
the state or state relations.132 True, he also says that the “predictability of results” is the 
first point to look for and cites a rule that permits parties to select the law that governs 
their transaction as a particular example that serves this purpose.133 But overall his 
opinion is that predictability is not “the major consideration” and other arguments have to 
be applied in many cases.134 Although Leflar’s famous “better law” consideration135 is 
designed to achieve “justice”, he thought that could be done only on a case by case basis. 
He closed his eyes to the possibility of doing justice to the parties by applying general 
principles, like party autonomy. 
The rights-based approach of Lea Brilmayer transfers models from political theory 
and constitutional law to conflicts.136 It is especially state-centered because it views the 
choice-of-law problem as residing in the relation between the individual litigant and the 
judge. The litigant should have a “right” that a certain law is applied or not applied, 
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which is directed against the state and its organs, not against the other party.137 Although 
Brilmayer mentions consent as a justification for the application of a certain law, she 
thinks it is relevant only in the relation between the litigant and the state.138 Yet the 
litigant that agrees to a choice-of-law clause gives his or her consent not to the state, but 
to the other party involved. If the consent is induced by fraud of the other side this 
invalidates the agreement, no matter whether the state knew of it or not. Furthermore, 
Brilmayer neglects that private choice of law is relevant also in other contexts than 
dispute resolution in state courts, like arbitration or simple contract fulfillment. The 
chosen law applies because the parties have agreed to it, whether a judge intervenes or 
not. Consequently, the judge that follows the law chosen by the parties does not “coerce” 
one party, but does nothing more than to enforce the parties’ agreement. Party autonomy 
plays in the horizontal relationship between the parties. It is also in this horizontal 
relation that the reason for applying the chosen law has to be found.  
Larry Cramer’s canons of construction for true conflicts include a specific rule that 
the law chosen by the parties should be applied in contract cases.139 But he has serious 
doubts about this canon and only advances it “tentatively”. He submits party autonomy to 
the condition that there must be a “potential for true conflict”. Even under those 
circumstances parties should be allowed to choose only a normally applicable, not any 
law.140 We have already seen that modern legislation has largely bypassed this 
                                               
137 Brilmayer, supra note 136, at 1296 (“One’s choice of law rights are, like personal jurisdiction 
rights, held against the state directly. They are not rights against the other party to the 
lawsuit (although, of course, they will affect one’s legal claims”). 
138 Brilmayer, supra note 136, at 1298. 
139 Kramer, supra note 4, at 329. 
140 Kramer, id. 




restriction.141 Kramer justifies the restriction by the argument that a state has no reason to 
forgo the application of its law other than to accommodate the applicable law of another 
state.142 The idea that a state could also want to accommodate the parties does not cross 
his mind. 
Enough: We have seen that both classical and current conflict theories are not able 
to account for party autonomy. Individual choice of law simply does not fit into their 
systems because they are built around the state and its relations. Indeed, if one starts from 
the assumption that laws govern legal relationships authoritatively, it is no small 
contradiction that the parties should be able to influence the applicable law. How can 
individuals have a say in the international distribution of legislative competences? How 
can their intentions be more important than the states’ interests in a large field of the law? 
This puzzle has never been resolved because all conflict theories are based on the same 
mistake: They are focusing on international relations and consider the individual as being 
a mere pawn in a battle between states. 
IV. A Theoretical Justification for Party Autonomy 
1. The Individual as the Center of the Conflicts Problem 
The justification of party autonomy has to start by recalibrating the problem of conflicts. 
The issue is not, as most theories suggest, a struggle between states. We should get rid of 
the idea that conflicts of laws are first and foremost conflicts between states. Rather, one 
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should think about when and why conflict problems start in the first place: with a dispute 
between individuals. 
 True, in a litigation touching upon more than one jurisdiction very soon the 
question arises which law to apply. The authors of the laws are states. It is therefore 
tempting to see every conflicts problem as a problem in the relation between those states. 
Yet it is the individual parties who will feel the consequences of the application of a 
particular law. It is their interests that are most directly concerned by the outcome of the 
dispute. States have understood this peculiarity better than theory. That is why they have 
allowed the parties to choose the applicable law. This has not caused them any theoretical 
headaches. On the contrary, it is totally in line with the purpose of the conflicts 
mechanism from the practical perspective. As we have seen, the application of another 
state’s law is a pragmatic solution which serves primarily the interests of the individuals 
involved.143 Only the application of another state’s mandatory rules of law is seen as a 
favor to another state and therefore is subject to a policy weighing.144 The goal of the 
normal conflict rules on issues such as the applicable tort or contract law, however, is not 
to favor another state, but rather the parties involved in the dispute. If the whole 
application of a foreign law is designed to serve the interests of the parties, why should 
they not be able to decide on the applicable legal regime themselves? 
 It is possible to justify party autonomy only if one shifts the focus from state 
relations and accepts that the parties are the center of the conflicts problem. They are 
allowed to choose the applicable law because it is their dispute that is in question. The 
state renounces to predict the outcome of the choice-of-law process. His policy is to put 
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its other policies behind the one to allow the parties to design their individual 
relationships according to their wishes and needs. 
 In a way, party autonomy resembles the role of the will in national contract 
law.145 Almost all states give important weight to the intentions of the parties. Most of 
these rules are designed to help the parties in shaping, changing and fulfilling their 
private agreement. Only some rules serve the protection of special groups, like 
consumers, and are therefore mandatory. The goal of the other rules is to enable private 
parties to structure their relationships autonomously.  
 But there is an important difference between freedom of contract and party 
autonomy: Under the latter principle, parties are allowed to deselect even mandatory 
legal provisions.146 The crucial question is why the state allows private individuals to 
disregard the otherwise applicable law of the forum. The answer is plurality. In an 
international situation, the state has to recognize that its views of justice are not the only 
ones, but that they compete with the rules made by other states. It would of course be 
possible for the state to enforce its own laws in every case brought before its courts. But 
it is a wise kind of self-constraint not to do it and to give instead the parties the liberty to 
choose themselves which justice fits their relation best.147 This particular attitude is an 
important building block for the conflict of laws. It is grounded in international relations 
and therefore bears some similarities with the assumptions of the traditional theories.148 
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Yet the important difference is that by adopting a rule of party autonomy the state makes 
the choice-of-law process independent of state relations and lays it in the hands of private 
parties. No longer will state interests or state preferences for certain interests determine 
the applicable law. Instead, it is the parties themselves that decide which law applies. One 
could therefore describe party autonomy as a private solution to a state-made problem. 
 In spite of the tremendous extension of party autonomy in the last decades149, 
there remain many areas in which the states exclude the parties’ freedom to choose the 
applicable law. Interestingly, the field of contract law in which party autonomy is most 
restricted and which the major legal systems agree upon is consumer law.150 In this area, 
the conditions of autonomy, especially equal bargaining power, are not fulfilled. It is 
therefore understandable that the choice of the parties is not given much weight.  
 But there are other fields in which parties are not allowed to choose the applicable 
law themselves: those in which the states take such a predominant interest. A classic 
example is antitrust law. In this field, the interests of the parties to a transaction are 
superseded by interests of the community at large. Self-regulation is not the primary 
concern, because there is more at stake. Therefore the state does not allow the parties to 
choose the applicable law.151 In the area in which party autonomy is excluded, the 
legislator gives clear commands to the judge which law to apply. The judge functions 
here less as an arbitrator committed to the idea of justice, and more like an administrative 
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agency. Consequently, there is a clear dominance of the lex fori in this area, while laws 
of other states to the same effect are viewed very suspiciously.152  
 In sum, we can see that there are two different fields of conflicts: One that is 
largely dominated by state interests, and another in which private parties are allowed to 
choose the applicable law. These two fields form the main strands of the conflicts 
problem. Theorists have so far mainly focused on the first area, and extended the lessons 
from there well into the second. It is of course true that the state might also have relevant 
interests in the resolution of cases which fall into the field of potential party choice of 
law.153 Realistically, almost no law is enacted without some special purpose for the 
community in mind. But it is very important to see that the state, by adopting a rule of 
party autonomy, makes these considerations subject to the choice of the parties. If the 
parties don’t like a law, they are allowed to exclude it by a simple sentence. It can be 
reasonably concluded there from that the state itself considers the public interests served 
by the law to be not as important as the goal to accommodate the parties bound in a 
conflict of laws. Underlying this attitude is the realization that in those disputes, the most 
important is the individual, its needs and expectations. Any parochial considerations 
based on state interests have to stand behind.  
2. Philosophical Underpinnings 
It might be interesting to give some philosophical basis to the results found. The growing 
recognition of party autonomy implies that the individual occupies a more prominent 
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place in the conflicts system than it was thought before. The individual is recognized as 
an actor in choice of law. Its wants and needs are taken into consideration. 
 One could parallel this development with the growing acceptance of the 
individual as a subject of international law.154 Thereby, the traditional alignment of 
conflicts and international law is reestablished on a new level. But there is more. Party 
autonomy acknowledges not only the existence of a person with own rights, but its 
freedom to choose the applicable legal regime. The freedom to choose the applicable law 
is a necessary expression of the autonomy of the individual. In fact, the Greek word 
“autonomy” means just that: to give oneself a law.  
 By adopting the principle of party autonomy the legislator, consciously or 
unconsciously, recognizes the fundamental principle of private autonomy also in choice 
of law.155 No longer is choice of law an abstract, “value-free”156 discipline. Instead, it is 
acknowledged that one of goals of the conflicts-of-law process is to serve the individual, 
its needs and wants.157 The person, as an autonomous being with its own preferences, is 
put at the centre of choice of law. It is in line with the goal of all law from an 
individualistic perspective: The purpose of legal rules should be oriented towards the 
individual, not the state. For philosophical support, one could cite authors that like 
Kant,158 Hayek,159 or Nozick160. The freedom of choice of a law has also been justified 
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from a Rawlsian perspective of justice.161 The idea of the individual as an autonomous 
being with freedom to choose is well-known in national laws. In conflict of laws, it has 
taken time to embrace the same concept because positivism taught that autonomy could 
be exercised only within the state. Slowly, but steadily the idea is gaining momentum that 
a person can also have autonomy on the international – or better: transnational level. 
 But there are counterarguments to that. It is important to bear in mind that many 
countries do not adhere to the “Western” ideals of individual autonomy and private 
freedom. They still restrict the liberty of their citizens in important ways. Indeed, these 
states’ law will also often restrict party autonomy significantly.162 Even in Western states, 
we have numerous exceptions to the liberty of the individuals to choose the applicable 
law.163 
 The lesson is simple: Although party autonomy enjoys growing acceptance, it is 
far from being unlimited. Every state is free to restrict party autonomy by heaving 
mandatory provisions to the level of public policy. There is no natural law principle that 
would stop him to do so. Private liberty only goes so far as the state allows. 
 This does not make party autonomy an unimportant principle. It is just that its 
application is, as any other principle, subject to the states’ continuing power to restrict it. 
Yet it remains that party autonomy is the most universally recognized of all conflict-of-
laws principles. The thrust of the argument made here was not grounded in philosophy, 
but by the tendency to recognize party autonomy in practice.164 
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3. A New Normative Theory: Relatively Mandatory Rules 
The recognition of party autonomy has important implications for normative theory. The 
fact that states allow parties to exclude whole legal systems, including even their 
mandatory rules, creates a problem for the traditional categorization of legal sources. The 
classic dichotomy between mandatory rules and default rules simply does not hold 
anymore. It has already been superseded in other areas of the law. For instance, in public 
international law, a third kind of law has been discussed under the heading “soft law”.165 
In conflicts, we can find another kind of legal rules. They cannot be deviated from in a 
national context, but at the same time they are subject to the parties’ choice when seen 
from an international perspective. The existence of this type of rules is explicitly 
recognized in European law.166 It has now also found its way into U.S. legislation.167 To 
understand this type of rules better, I suggest a parallel to language. 
 One can describe a language as a system of symbols through which persons can 
communicate.168 Each language contains a number of phonological, morphological, 
semantic and syntactic rules. These rules determine how the sounds can be put together, 
how words can be made from morphemes, how meaning can be expressed through 
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words, and how words can be combined to create sentences.169 Now rules on language 
are certainly mandatory from an inner point of view.  For instance, participants to a 
communication in French cannot use semantic or syntactic rules totally unknown in 
French and pretend they are still speaking French (not even “bad French”). On the other 
hand, language is not obligatory from an outer point of view. Obviously, the parties can 
switch to another language if they want to.  
 The latter kind of freedom is similar to party autonomy. To see why, take a look at 
how languages are employed. Mostly they apply within a certain territory. In their 
territorial delimitation, they resemble the law according to the traditional theory that is 
based on the notion of territorial sovereignty.170 But territory and the use of a language do 
not totally overlap. Apart from bilingual or multilingual regions, foreign languages can be 
used within the borders of a certain language territory. For instance, parties that meet for 
a business negotiation in Paris can chose not to communicate in French. They can choose 
to employ the system of another language to do their transaction.  
The functioning of the choice of language bears a number of important 
similarities to party autonomy in choice of law. The parties can choose a language freely, 
as they can choose a law for their contract. The need to choose a language mostly comes 
up if one of the partners is a foreign party. The language the parties choose will often 
have a connection to one of them, but not necessarily. For instance, if one side is from 
France and the other from Argentina, they may choose, e.g., English as a means of 
communication, even though none of them has any connection to the English-speaking 
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world. This freedom to choose a “neutral” language resembles the freedom to choose a 
law as applicable that has no connection to either of the parties or the case.171 
The parallel to language also explains why some laws are used more often than 
others. English is a language that is favored in international communication. English and 
American law are also favored in cross-border transactions that have no relation to the 
United Kingdom or the United States.172 Perhaps this symbiosis of language and law is 
not as surprising if one is aware that it makes no sense to choose a law without an 
intimate knowledge of the language in which it is set out. After all, law is understood 
through language. 
This does not mean that language and law would be the same thing. For instance, 
the language parallel does not work in inter-state conflicts, except if one were ready to 
regard the New York and the Texan dialect as different languages (as indeed linguists 
do173). It is also not implied here that choosing the law and the language would be the 
same thing. There was a rule in old Egypt according to which the parties by choosing a 
certain language to a contract also chose the applicable law.174 This idea seems strange to 
us today. We make a clear distinction between choosing the applicable law and language.  
The parallel between law and language is meant here not as a metonymy, but 
more as a metaphor. Both resemble each other in the way in which they function as a 
system. They are mandatory in the sense that you cannot deviate from their rules once 
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you are in the system. But whether you use one or the other system is up to a private, 
individually made choice.  
I would suggest calling this kind of rules “relatively mandatory”. It signifies that a 
system is mandatory from the inner point of view, but not from the outer. One cannot 
deviate from certain rules as long as one is within the system, but one can choose a totally 
different system instead.  
Relatively mandatory rules therefore make a system optional for the parties’ use. 
It is even more crucial that the autonomous choice of relatively mandatory rules does not 
affect the authority of the rules’ author. The classic view which sees party autonomy as a 
means to decide conflicts between states must arrive at the conclusion that the party’s 
choice of a law would mean that the state whose law is chosen would extend its 
sovereignty to the contract.175 But it is not like that. The rule maker does not get any 
closer to a disputed set of facts by virtue of a private choice of its rules. For instance, 
Italy – or the Italian people, if one considers it in a somewhat figurative sense to be the 
“author” of the Italian language – does not get any authority over a communication 
simply by the fact that is done in Italian.  Similarly, the parties’ choice of Italian law does 
not give the Italian state an authority over them it did not have before. The authority of 
the rule maker is thus not affected by a private choice of its rules. In other words, party 
autonomy does not mean to assign a case to the authority of the state that has enacted the 
rules, but just to use the rules without extending the state’s authority. Where private 
choice works, the international distribution of competences between the states is left 
untouched. You might think of this as just a more complicated way to say that party 
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autonomy does not decide in a battle between states over their respective competences. 
Yet the idea has important consequences for the practical application of party autonomy, 
which will be shown later.176 
4. The Reach of the Rule of Party Autonomy 
Every rule has its restrictions. So does party autonomy. As said from the outset, this 
article does not focus on the limits that are drawn to the principle by public policy.177 
Those limits exist, and most of them are defined by each state in its own, peculiar way. 
But there is a fundamental condition for party autonomy to apply, which is the same all 
over the world. This condition is that the case is possibly subject to the laws of more than 
one state. If there is no choice-of-laws situation, parties are not allowed to discard the 
mandatory law of their jurisdiction. 178 They are, of course, free to incorporate the law of 
another state into their agreement.179 But such a choice is not a conflicts rule. It is a pure 
case of freedom of contract under national law.  
Before the application of the rule, we have thus to ask whether there is a potential 
for application of at least two laws. Now you may be confused and ask: Does this mean 
that the state-centered view of conflicts is right, according to which every conflicts 
problem arises from a battle between states over the application of their respective legal 
rules180? The answer is that party autonomy is indeed based on the divergence between 
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different legal orders. But party autonomy allows the parties to dissolve the links of the 
case to particular states and determine the applicable legal rules freely. It uses a private 
perspective to get rid of the eternal quarrels between states.  
When, you might further ask, is a case sufficiently international to justify party 
autonomy? This is an important question. To solve it, think of an ideal purely domestic 
case. How do we know that it is domestic? You will say because it does not have contacts 
to any other state. But think again: are there really such cases? For example, it is not 
improbable that a contract for the sale of a high-rise in Manhattan between two New 
Yorkers will be written on a computer that was manufactured in China or Malaysia.181 
We would not say for this reason alone that it is an international transaction. 
Nevertheless, there is a contact to another jurisdiction – we just don’t think that it is an 
important one. What this example teaches us is that almost all cases in the world have 
links to more than one state. Yet it would not cross our mind to apply the law of another 
state in many of them. Whether we regard a case as purely domestic or international 
depends on whether it raises a choice-of-law question – i.e., whether we would seriously 
think about applying the law of state A or B.182 Now when this is the case cannot be said 
with absolute certainty. It depends on how we value the importance of the contacts to 
other jurisdictions. This, in turn, is largely a function of the rules of our domestic law and 
the weight it attaches to certain facts. 
It can thus be said that the reach of party autonomy is insecure because it depends 
on a condition that is neither objectively nor uniformly determined. But this insecurity it 
shares with the whole discipline of conflicts. There is simply no precise criterion to 
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determine when there is a “conflict of laws”. We can live with this problem, because we 
intuitively know in most cases whether there is a conflict or not. In the borderline cases, it 
is up for each legal system to decide: Is the insecurity about the applicable law big 
enough to raise the issue which law should be applied? Only if the answer is yes will the 
legal system possibly allow the parties to decide the issue themselves. This means that 
the reach of party autonomy is ultimately in the states’ hands – but how could it be 
otherwise? It also means that the applicability of party autonomy depends on the fact that 
there is a collision of laws at all. But the important point is that party autonomy allows to 
solve this collision outside the conflict between states by taking it to the level of the 
private relationship between the parties, where the consequences will most clearly be felt.  
V. Practical Effects of the New Paradigm  
1. Effects on the Validity and the Reach of Choice-of-Law Clauses 
Where does the new paradigm lead us with regard to the practical questions mentioned 
above183? It would be wrong to suppose that the theory developed here would solve them 
all at once. The ideas of individual autonomy and relatively mandatory rules of law are 
not talismans that just need to be touched to provide the answer to all questions. Yet they 
make it easier to understand why some solutions that have been intuitively reached by 
courts and writers can also be justified theoretically. 
 First, there is the question whether the mandatory rules of the chosen law apply. 
From the perspective of the individual, it is wrong to assume that by choosing a certain 
legal system they would automatically need to follow all other mandatory rules of this 
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law. It would be like thinking that by choosing to speak Chinese, you would submit 
yourselves to all commands of the Chinese government. Party autonomy does not change 
the authority of the rule makers.184 Therefore, a choice of law does not have the 
consequence that you would place yourself completely into the legal system chosen. The 
implication of the theory of relatively mandatory rules is that the parties may use foreign 
law as a source for constructing and interpreting their agreement, without submitting 
themselves to the legal regime of the state as a whole.  
 The second question was whether the parties should be free to refer to some 
system that is not state-made law.185 If one focuses on conflicts between states, then of 
course it makes sense to restrict the parties’ choice to one of the laws that are at 
variance.186 By dropping the idea that party autonomy is meant to resolve a conflict 
between states, it becomes understandable that the parties should also be able to choose 
principles that are not state-made. To use the parallel to language: the parties could also 
create their private language and choose it as a code in which to communicate. This 
possibility has been recognized in international legal texts.187 It does not mean that the 
parties would be allowed to free themselves from state-law completely. Public policy 
rules remain of course applicable. But there is simply no reason why one should allow the 
parties to use the contract rules of Burma and not the rules of a business organization like 
the International Chamber of Commerce. The parties should also be able to choose a 
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religious law if it contains provisions on contract law.188 Of course, a problem occurs if 
the system chosen by the parties does not provide exhaustive rules to cover all questions 
of the dispute. In this case, the court has to supplement the chosen rules with those of 
another system. But this system should be chosen carefully by taking the choice of the 
parties into account. 
 The third problem concerns the effect of the choice of a law that invalidates the 
agreement. It is clear that the parties’ intention will most likely be to have a valid contract 
and to disregard the choice of law insofar as it leads to a contrary result. The one thing 
that you want at the moment of entering – in good faith – into a contract is that your 
agreement is binding.189 This result is so important that some authors have summarized it 
under a special name: the “Basic Rule of Validation”190. Weintraub suggests that this rule 
was even more important than party autonomy.191 However, this would mean to “put the 
barge before the tug”. Two issues have to be distinguished: The liberty of the parties to 
choose the applicable law, and their willingness to enter into a binding contract. One 
should not be played against the other. Party autonomy stands as the main principle 
because it is important not only for the validity of a contract, but also for its construction 
and interpretation. Yet the choice of the parties also has to be interpreted. Their goal of 
validating the contract can most easily be achieved if one overcomes the idea that conflict 
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of laws means to attribute competences to states. If one dissolves the rules from the rule 
maker, it becomes easy to see that the parties, through a choice of law, do not need to 
completely submit themselves to a legal system, including its invalidating provisions.  As 
in choice of language, the private conception of choice of a law leaves room for some 
deviation if both parties at least implicitly agree to it. If they used, for instance, some 
term of a foreign language in a wrong sense, but would both want the same, then the 
judge would have to follow their will. The Romans described this with the expression 
“falsa demonstratio non nocet” – The false designation does not hurt. The same applies to 
a choice of an invalidating law with the goal to enter a binding agreement. The theory of 
relatively mandatory rules of law explains why it is possible to submit the contract to a 
legal system without simultaneously applying its rules that invalidate the contract. 
 The fourth question was whether the parties can split up the applicable law to the 
contract. Under most conflicts theories, such a possibility is not easy to explain, because 
it would mean that more than one state would be competent to rule on the same or a 
related question. But if one follows the theory that focuses on the individual and not on 
the state, there is no reason to think that the parties should not be able to split the legal 
regime. Since choosing the law does not mean to assign the case to the competence of a 
rule maker, it is possible to combine the laws of different states. The language parallel 
suggests the same result: As in conversations or in poems sometimes expressions from 
different languages are employed, parties can use rules of different legal systems to apply 
to their contract. This solution has been recognized by legislation.192 However, a limit to 
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dépeçage is intelligibility: if the notions and rules of the chosen laws cannot work 
together, the judge has to think about deviating from the parties’ choice.  
The fifth question was whether the parties can agree on an alternative or floating 
choice-of-law clause.193 The focus on the individual suggests that they could. Yet the 
parallel to language creates some doubts: Obviously you could not draft a document and 
leave open the language in which it is written. But you could write a text in a language 
that has two very similar versions, like Serbo-Croatian, and determine later in which 
version you want it to be interpreted. This comparison does not provide any response as 
to the validity of an alternative or floating choice-of-law clause. But it shows at least why 
this question is so problematic: If the language is to be determined later, how is the 
document to be constructed and interpreted in the meantime? What if the ex post-choice 
has the effect that the text does not make sense anymore because its terms cannot be 
understood under the chosen language? For much the same reasons, one could imagine 
that a court finds itself unable to understand the agreement under a floating or alternative 
choice-of-law clause. The limit to validity of this clause is thus again intelligibility, not 
the dogma that the competent state law must be determined from the creation of the 
agreement.  
 Lastly, the question was asked whether the parties can “petrify” or “freeze” the 
applicable law. From the standpoint of individual autonomy and in line with what has 
been said earlier with regard to the validity of the contract there is no doubt that they can. 
This is because by choosing a certain system of law, the parties can use its rules on 
validation, construction, and interpretation, without submitting themselves to the 
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authority of the rule maker. Abstracting the rule of law from its author, as it has been 
suggested here, makes it possible to render the law immune from any later changes. The 
language parallel works to the same effect: As you can choose to speak in French of the 
17th Century, you can freeze the applicable law to a former time. Yet everything depends 
on the intention of the parties. As language, law is a living animal. Parties should 
normally not be presumed to have the intention to cut themselves from any future 
changes, or improvements, of the law that they have chosen. For the petrifaction or freeze 
of the applicable law, you need a specific clause. Without it, the chosen law applies as it 
is at the time of the judgment.194 
2. Effects on Conflict of Laws in the Absence of a Choice by the Parties 
Although the new paradigm was developed for party autonomy, it could also have an 
effect on how we deal with conflicts of laws in general. In the majority of conflicts there 
is neither a public policy limiting party autonomy nor an explicit or implicit choice of law 
by the parties. This is the classic area of conflicts, and the one that arguably raises the 
most problems in practice. The question is how this middle field should be dealt with: 
more from the view of the parties or from the view of the states involved?  
The traditional answer has been the latter. Absent any choice by the parties, 
theories look for “connecting factors” to states, for states’ “interests”, the “predominantly 
concerned jurisdiction”, and so on.195 But the approach could also be different: Since 
party autonomy trumps all other conflict rules, except for public policy, it might also 
influence the default rules that apply in absence of an autonomous choice. For we could 
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see the cases in which neither the parties have agreed on the applicable law nor public 
policy stops them to do so as an area of possible choice of law. Instead of looking on this 
field from the point of view of states’ policy, we could also look at it from the 
individuals’ perspective who were able to choose the applicable law, but failed to do so. 
Through this shift of perspective, we would see the question of conflicts very differently. 
Considerations related to the preferences of the parties would no longer be a mere 
maverick of conflicts theory, but become a central idea.  
 The justification for such a different approach lies in the fact that the states 
themselves have allowed the parties to choose the applicable law in these cases. By doing 
so, they have implicitly recognized that the convenience and needs of the parties are more 
important in this area of the law than the jurisdiction, interests or policies of the state. 
They have subordinated their other policies to the idea of the autonomy of the parties. 
Only in the field of public policy states are overriding a choice of law by the parties by 
their own interest preferences. In all other fields, they accept that the parties can deviate 
from their policies by an express choice. If this is so, is it not more sensible then to give 
the parties’ intentions and needs a prominent place even if they have failed to make them 
explicit? 
 One could argue against such an approach that it would force the judge into a 
complicated and futile investigation of the parties’ hypothetical intentions. This result 
would be the most undesirable.196 It is hard to find out the will of the parties if they have 
not expressed it themselves. Such a method would necessarily substitute the parties’ 
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intentions by what the judge thinks they would prefer. That is not what is proposed 
here.197 
 Instead, what is meant is that the shift to the parties gives the judge more liberty 
than the focus on the states that have connections to the case. For instance, he would not 
be bound to apply the law of the state where a particular tort occurred. Instead, he could 
focus on the parties to a tort action. In what law does it make sense to address them? Is 
there a particular law that fits them best? If they are both from the same state, it makes 
sense to apply the law of that state, because that law both parties know well and can 
identify with. This law is not strange to them. Both would understand if the judge applied 
it since they can best argue on the bases of it. Like their language, it fits their culture and 
their background.  
 The result is, of course, not new: it is the same as the New York Court of Appeals 
under Judge Fuld reached in the famous decision in Babcock v. Jackson.198 The 
difference is that Judge Fuld relied on governmental interest analysis to reach the result, 
while here another method is suggested. It is not the interests of a state concerned, but the 
interest of the parties for which the law of their common domicile has to be applied. The 
advantage of such justification is that it liberates the analysis from more abstract ideas of 
state interests. What the interests of New York are in a private litigation between its 
citizens over a car accident in Ontario is difficult to decide. Yet it is quite easy to see that 
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it is in the interest of two citizens of New York that the law of their state is applied to a 
dispute between them. The focus on the individuals replaces the fight on the inter-state 
level with a bottom down approach that focuses on the interests of the parties. 
 This approach can equally explain the result of the decision in Dym v. Gordon199. 
In this case both parties were residing in New York, but had teamed up to go as summer 
students to Colorado. Since they lived together in this state and their whole personal 
relationship was based on their being together in Colorado, it may have made sense to 
address them under Colorado law. Judge Burke at least thought so. He cited “the general 
intent of the parties as inferred from their actions” to justify the application of the law of 
Colorado.200 As an argument why New York law was not applicable, he stressed that it 
would be a law the parties in “no sense had adopted”.201 But he has given no indication 
why the intentions of the parties or their “adoption” of a law was to be considered under 
the standard he used: governmental interest analysis. It requires at least a number of 
abstractions and intellectual distortions to think that Colorado’s interest as a state could 
be influenced in any way by the decision of some New Yorkers to do their summer 
studies there. Judge Fuld, in his dissenting opinion, had every reason to be puzzled over 
the application of its own doctrine.202 In reality, Burke relied not on states’ interests, but 
on the argument that the application of Colorado law would neither be “unfair” nor 
“fortuitous”.203 But unfair or fortuitous to whom? Can the application of the law of one 
state be at all “unfair” to another state? Is it not the parties that could have considered it 
“unfair” or “fortuitous” if the judge had not applied the law of Colorado?  
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 It is not possible at this place to include all possible conflicts cases and analyze 
them under the new paradigm. It is likely that the results will often be the same that have 
been reached under the influence of the American conflict-of-laws revolution. The 
difference is that the focus on the individual provides a consistent theoretical framework 
for the results that the revolutionist sought for. Arguments such as “fairness”, 
“fortuitousness” or justice in the individual case that so far had to be hidden under 
alleged state interests, become the center concern of conflicts theory. Even more, the new 
approach can also solve the cases which interest analysis did not provide for: If no state 
has an interest in the application of its laws, governmental interest analysis does not yield 
any solution.204 But the individual approach shows why in these cases a law has to be 
applied: because it is in the interest of the parties of the case. The focus on the parties of 
the case may also show the way to find the applicable law in those cases in which no state 
has an interest. 
 Just for illustrating the flexibility of the approach, one could finally decide a 
hypothetical example, slightly deviating from the fact pattern of Babcock v. Jackson205: 
Suppose that a German and a Spanish tourist have an accident while driving together in a 
rented car in Ontario. Suppose further that the guest statute cited in Babcock v. 
Jackson,206 which excludes any damages, is still part of Ontario law, and that Germany 
and Spain allow for compensation, but would grant a different amount of damages. Under 
the new paradigm, it would be possible to explain why Ontario law should not apply, 
even though the parties do not come from the same state as they did in Babcock. It would 
not be appropriate for the judge to communicate with the German and the Spaniard using 
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Ontario law; it would be strange, unexpected as to its content, and therefore entirely 
“fortuitous” and unfair to apply Ontario law to them. The fact that they both come from 
different countries, which is different to Babcock, would not matter. We could take into 
consideration such facts as their common European culture, which binds them closer to 
each other than to Ontario. It would even be possible to strike a balance between the 
German and the Spanish law by giving some intermediate compensation. Or the judge 
might choose to apply a law of a state that has no connection to one of the parties, but is 
closer to them than Ontario, like Switzerland. Such considerations are totally banned 
under any of the other conflicts theories, which focus on the authority of the rule maker, 
not on the needs and interests of the parties. 
 The private approach to conflicts of law thus provides a large amount of 
flexibility. And it provides a consistent theoretical framework to justify the application of 
a law other than where a contract was made or the facts of a tort occurred. In focusing on 
the private relationship, it allows the judge to consider the parties, their background and 
understanding, when choosing the applicable law. He or she is not restricted by any 
geographical or other connection to a certain state. 
 One might worry about such widespread discretion of the judiciary. Does it not 
put too much power into the hands of the judges, contradicting the need for 
predictability? One can replicate here answers that have been given by the proponents of 
interest analysis: First, predictability, as seen from the parties’ point of view, is more 
endangered by the traditional methods than by an increase in the judge’s control over the 
applicable law.207 Second, legislation is inherently inept to deal with the problem of 
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conflict of laws.208 It takes a view from within the system and normally does not overlook 
the consequences in lawsuits that involve foreign parties. The judge is in a better position 
for doing justice in the individual case than a legislator. 
 Of course, legislation is thereby not excluded from the conflicts realm. There 
might be policies that influence the applicable law even in the absence of mandatory 
laws. The state could, for instance, adopt a policy to favor the victim of torts and point to 
the law that provides the larger amount of damages. The approach suggested here should 
not be understood as being isolated from such legislative directions. It can overlap with 
policies, and even be superseded by them. The inclusion of considerations regarding the 
parties was not meant as general rule for all conflicts cases, but rather to as a general 
reminder that we should focus more on the individual, and less on the state as the author 
of the rules when deciding on the applicable law. 
VI. Summary 
Traditional conflicts theory is not able to cope with a new phenomenon: the growing 
importance of party autonomy. Although freedom of individual choice of law is more and 
more recognized in legislation and is the one principle that is most applied in practice, it 
takes only a marginal place in conflicts theory. Through this article, it has become clear 
why this is so: because all theories view choice-of-law problems as disputes between 
states over the application of their legal system. The parties’ power to choose the 
applicable law cannot be squared with this perspective. It is impossible to explain why 
the parties would be able to influence the relations between states, their competences and 
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interests, and why they can even make the law of a state applicable that has no 
connection to or interest in the dispute.  
 The solution suggested here is to radically shift the focus from the state that has 
connections to the case to the parties involved in the dispute. It is their needs and wishes 
that have to be accommodated by the choice-of-law process. Thereby, it becomes clear 
why the parties can choose the applicable law, within the boundaries only of public 
policy. If we put the individual in the center of the conflicts analysis, we are able to 
justify the possibility of private choice of law. 
This new method could also have an effect on how we deal with conflicts of laws 
in general. For we could see the cases in which neither the parties have agreed on the 
applicable law nor public policy stops them to do so as an area of possible choice of law. 
Instead of looking on this field from the point of view of states’ policy, we could also 
look at it from the perspective of the individuals who are able to choose the applicable 
law, but failed to do so. Considerations related to the parties would no longer be a mere 
maverick of conflicts theory, but become a central idea. I have hinted to this possibility, 
without having enough space to put the idea further.  
 Another result of this study is a new normative category: relatively mandatory 
rules of law. I have compared these rules to those of another system that applies flexibly 
on the transnational level: language. Relatively mandatory rules of law and language are 
similar because both are binding from an inside view, but the parties are free to choose 
another system to apply. The rise and the effects of this new category of legal rules are 
related to the changing position of the individual in the choice of law.  




 Finally, I want to emphasize again that I left outside the analysis the rules of 
public policy, which limit the parties’ power to choose the applicable law. These rules are 
related to the authority of the state over a certain territory and persons, the state’s 
interests, and so on. They pose intricate problems, which are very different from the ones 
raised by party autonomy. I feel justified in not treating them because they have been 
intensively debated by others. The goal of this article was to establish the idea that 
outside of these problems another field of “conflict” of laws, or choice of law, exists: It is 






De-Bordering of the State and Conflict of Laws 
Territory, Population, and Governmental Interests  
in the Age of the Mobile Society 
 
It is generally accepted that the state has fixed limits. From that, it is derived that the 
applicability of a legal rule depends on the reach of authority of the state that has 
enacted it. National law, it is thought, must have some limits and these limits must 
coincide with those of the state that is its author. 
The object of this article is to challenge these traditional assumptions. It will be 
shown that society has developed in a way that has deprived the limits of the state of their 
sense. As a consequence, legal rules are applied to cases even if they have little or no 
connection to their author, be it territorial, personal, or interest-wise. This fact, it is 
submitted, reflects a change in the function of the state: No longer is it correct to view it 
as exclusively governing over a limited territory and a defined people, or as pursuing 
selfish interests. Instead, the state has become a “rule provider”: It supplies rules that 
can be used by individuals all over the world.  
 




I. The De-bordering of the State 
A. The Metaphor 
Imagine a house with many rooms. Each of the rooms houses a different group of people, 
loosely connected by family ties. Let’s say people in room number one usually go to bed 
early. Accordingly, they have agreed on a rule that after 10 PM there shall be no noise. 
People in room number two love to listen to music. Their rule is that until 12 AM it is 
allowed to play instruments. People in room number three are very lively so they have no 
rule about when to go to sleep at all.  
Everything is fine as long as everybody stays within his or her room. There will 
be occasional noise coming from a room that might disturb the others. But the house is 
well built, and its walls are generally thick enough to withstand most of the sounds. 
Suppose now that the people start to visit each other and stay overnight. For 
instance, people from room number one visit room number two. At first, they are 
fascinated by the different customs and the way of living. But then they might get a little 
disturbed by the fact that the music continues after 10 PM. If they visit room number 
three, they will most probably not only be disturbed but deeply shocked and irritated by 
the noise that continues throughout the night. 
Now let’s imagine that not only do people from the different rooms visit each 
other, but that they also bring down the walls, maybe to be closer together. As brick after 
brick is taken away, it becomes obvious that the three rules are not compatible. Either 




you go to bed at 10 PM, or you are allowed to play music until 12 AM, or you party all 
night. Inevitably, the question comes up: Which rule applies?  
B. The Borderless Civil Society  
This story is, of course, a metaphor for the world and the law as they stand today. The 
globe is divided into different spheres, called states, with different people each living 
under their own rules. The states might agree on some policies for common areas. But in 
its domain each state is the “master” that determines what rules are to be followed.  
In recent years, however, important changes have occurred. People are 
increasingly mobile. They move from country to another. Of course, people have always 
traveled regardless of borders. Frédéric Chopin spent his youth in Poland, but made his 
career in France and died there; the German-born Albert Einstein immigrated to the 
United States. But what is different in modern society is that means of transportation 
make it possible, at least for those that can afford it, to be on virtually any place in the 
world in less than 24 hours. There is a global workforce that is searching for jobs across 
borders. Some people can live in one country and work in another. People also mix with 
each other. Bi-national marriages are on the rise. As a consequence, the link of a person 
to a specific state is getting more and more ambiguous. While this is not true for 
everybody, it is true for an ever increasing number. 
At the same time, states come closer together than ever before. What happens in 
one country has direct consequences in others. Just think of the environmental dangers 
that do not stop at national borders.1 Or political upsurge that spreads through media from 
                                               
1 International courts repeatedly had to deal with transboundary environmental problems. For an early 
example, see the famous Trail Smelter Case (United States of America v. Canada), III Reports of Int’l Arb. 




one country to the next. Products of global brands will be sold all over the planet.2 
Financial instruments developed in one country are finding their way to investors in 
others. Information flows over the world in quantity and with a speed that was 
unimaginable a few years ago. 
Political theory has depicted the phenomenon under the term “de-bordering” of 
the state.3 It is part of the more general trend of “globalization”.4 However, the essence of 
the de-bordering thesis is not that the economies are intertwined or that societies and life 
styles are approaching each other. It is a little more specific: De-bordering means that the 
frontiers written on maps do no longer matter the way they used to. Borders become more 
and more meaningless. The result is that states are no longer enclosed units that can be 
neatly separated from each other. The once clear division of the world starts to dwindle. 
In the words of our metaphor: You can still see where each room is supposed to end, but 
the walls have become porous. 
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C. The Legal Side of the De-Bordering of the State 
Although lawyers generally are familiar with the phenomenon just described, they do not 
leap to the conclusion that it has any important legal implications. They still cling to the 
traditional conception of the state as a unit with a fixed border. Lawyers have not given 
up the old concept of the territorial state, no matter the rhetoric about globalization.5 
Although a change of the function of the state and the emergence of global government 
networks has been advocated in the literature6, this has not called into question the 
meaning of borders as delimiting the field of legal influence of the state. According to the 
classic doctrine of international law, a state is an entity composed of a determined 
territory and a population over which a government exercises effective authority.7 These 
three components also set the limits to its legislative authority. 
The object of this article is to challenge this model. It will be shown that the 
concept of the state as we know it is not cast in stone. Rather, it is nothing more than a 
snapshot of a particular time. Like all concepts, it has developed over the course of 
history and will one day become history itself. It is suggested here that we are about to 
witness such a change. The state is becoming borderless.  
The most promising route to test this assertion is to examine when and how legal 
rules that are emanating from a certain state are applied. If they were to extend beyond 
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the state’s territory or citizens or anything that affects its interests, then one could indeed 
say that the state has become unbound. This article therefore focuses on the discipline in 
which the reach of law in the international sphere is most crucial: conflict of laws, also 
called choice of law or private international law. Conflict of laws deals with the 
application of a state’s law over that of other states. It attributes cases to legal systems by 
using certain connecting factors. Basically, there are three: territory, citizenship and 
governmental interest.8 It is no coincidence that they parallel the three elements of the 
state under the traditional doctrine of international law: territory, population and effective 
government.9 Since the latter three elements delimit the scope of the state’s legislative 
authority, they are also used to determine the applicable law.  
It has often been argued from an anthropological and sociological perspective that 
this classic methodology needs to be adapted to reality.10 I will show that such a change 
has already taken place. While the public has taken little notice of it, a new conflict-of-
laws revolution has occurred: Although superficial deference is still paid to the principles 
of territoriality, personality and governmental interests, they no longer determine 
exclusively which law is applicable. Instead, they have been gradually relativized and 
superseded by other ideas. Conflicts lawyers increasingly accept that legal rules have 
effects beyond the state’s geographical limits, its citizens and the interests of its 
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government. This is their way to come to terms with the phenomenon of the de-bordering 
society.  
In making my point, I will not restrict myself to any particular legal system of 
choice-of-law rules because that would obviously undermine the universal validity of the 
argument. It is also not my goal to try to criticize one these conflict systems as offering 
superior results than another from a consequentionalist perspective.11 Rather, I will 
analyze to what extent they have become estranged from the traditional model of the 
state.  
I will expound each of the three traditional conflicts criteria (territory, personality 
and governmental interest) in turn and show why they are outdated under today’s 
conditions of the de-bordering (II-IV). Afterwards, I will analyze alternative ways that 
have been found to determine the applicable law (V) and the ensuing implications for the 
concept of the state (VI).  
II. Do Laws Have Borders? 
A. Territory as a Connecting Factor in Private International Law 
Most conflict-of-laws rules are based on geographical criteria. For instance, if one wants 
to know which law applies to a car accident, the traditional starting point is the law of the 
place where it took place.12 When the question arises whether a marriage is formally 
                                               
11 That has been done elsewhere. See, e.g., for a critique of governmental interest analysis Lea Brilmayer, 
Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev, 392, 402-417 (1979-1980); Gerhard 
Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 Recueil des cours de l’Academie de droit international de la 
Haye 91, 180-207 (1964-II); Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Conflict of Laws, 85 Col. L. Rev. 1585 
(1985). 
12 On the lex-loci-delicti rule, see, e.g., Art. 3 of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic 
Accidents, done at the Hague on May 4, 1971; Art. 4 of Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European 




valid, U.S. conflict rules refer to the law of the state in which the marriage was 
celebrated.13 In order to determine who is the owner of a certain piece of land or chattel, 
we apply the law of the place where the immovable or movable good is situated.14 
Territorial criteria are ubiquitous in conflict of laws; they can be found in nearly every 
conflicts system. 
B. Joseph Story and the Doctrine of Territoriality 
Territory as a connecting factor has a long history. The first to set out a complete doctrine 
of territoriality was Joseph Story, the father of the theory of conflict of laws in the 
English speaking world.  
1. Sovereignty as the Basic Tenet 
Story’s main argument for territoriality was sovereignty. He started from the “first and 
most general maxim” that every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and 
jurisdiction within its own territory.15 From this, he derived that “no state or nation can, 
by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons not 
resident therein”.16 Similar arguments have been made before by the Dutch jurist Ulrich 
                                                                                                                                            
Parliament and of the Council of 7/11/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome 
II”), Official Journal of the European Union (O.J. EU) 2007 L 199, p. 40. In the U.S., where the rule has 
come under severe criticism, it nevertheless continues to be important, see Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay, 
Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, 4th ed., Thomson, St. Paul (Minnesota) 
2004, pp. 713-722. See also Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws (1971), § 145(2)(a), (b). 
13 See Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws (1971), § 283(2). 
14 See on the so-called situs rule Scoles, Hay, Borchers & Symeonides, supra note 12, pp. 1056-1057; 
Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws (1971), Intro., ch. 9, top 2; Art. 43 of the Introductory Law to 
the German Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB). 
15 Joseph Story, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 25 (§ 18) (2d ed. 1841) (reprint The Lawbook 
Exchange 2001). 
16 Story, id, at 36 (§ 20). 




Huber, who in turn drew on the work of another Dutch lawyer, Paul Voet.17 Huber set out 
three axioms, which he thought could “not be disputed”, the first of them being that the 
laws of every empire have force within the limits of that government, and are obligatory 
upon all who are within its bounds.18 Joseph Story not only accepted this premise, but 
derived from it that “no nation is bound to respect the laws of another nation”, and that 
“the obligatory force of such laws of any nation cannot extend beyond its own 
territories”.19 Every nation would have “an exclusive right to regulate persons and things 
within its own territory according to its own sovereign will and public polity”20. He built 
his whole conflicts theory on this assumption. 
2. Collision with Reality 
Story’s theory is fascinating for the sharpness and dryness with which it depicts the 
modern realities. We are in front of a powerful vision of the state as the beholder of the 
monopoly to legislate and use power within its realm. Yet the idea of neatly enclosed 
territorial units stands in sharp contrast to reality. Today, laws are frequently applied to 
events outside of the borders of the state that is their author. For instance, a New York 
court will apply New York law to an accident in Ontario involving only New York 
residents.21 A court in Switzerland will allow the Portuguese parents of a baby to select 
the name according to Portuguese law, even though the baby was born on Swiss 
                                               
17 See Paul Voet, De statuis eorumque concursu, and Ulrich Huber, De conflictu legum in diversis imperiis, 
reprinted in Friedrich Carl von Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1880, transl. Guthrie, 
reprint Rothman 1972, Appendix III and IV). Alan Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors (1992), 
contends that Story has misunderstood Huber. This claim does not need to be verified here, since I am not 
analyzing ideas for their historical correctness, but for their content. 
18 Huber, id. 
19 Story, supra note 15, at 29 (§ 22). 
20 Story, supra note 15, at 30 (§ 22). 
21 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 




territory.22 A judge in the European Union will subject a contract for the sale of a 
machine by a company based in Paris to a Czech company to French law regardless of 
the fact that the contract has been concluded in Prague and the seller has to perform 
there.23 We are living in a world in which legal rules are no longer confined to the 
frontiers of the country in which they were enacted, but are applied in other states as well. 
The result is a global muddle of different laws. This is due precisely to the conflict-of-
laws rules that Story has developed. They demand the courts to respect and apply foreign 
laws to cases that have occurred in their circuit if there are good reasons to do so, for 
instance because the event is more closely connected to the other state. Paradoxically, it 
was the success of Story’s theory that has led to the demise of territoriality of laws. 
However, Story and the other authors did not object to the actual application by 
laws in foreign countries, which they thought of as some benevolent act out of comity.24 
What they meant was rather that a state cannot force the application of its laws to things 
and events situated outside of its territory, simply because it has no power over them. The 
question they care about is thus one of power to enforcement, not one of the actual 
applications of laws in the international sphere.  
One might doubt the correctness of Story’s view, however. As a sociological fact, 
law actually is influencing events that happen outside of the state that is its author. It was 
already remarked by Walter Wheeler Cook that while the law of a given state or country 
can be enforced only within its territorial limits, this does not mean that the law of that 
                                               
22 See Art. 37(2) Schweizerisches IPR-Gesetz (Swiss Private International Law Act) (1987). 
23 See Art. 4(1)(a) Rome I Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual situations (“Rome I”), O.J. EU 2008 L 177/1).  
24 On the role of comity, see Story, supra note 15, § 38; Huber, supra note 17, Appendix IV). Voet, id., Sec. 
IV Cap. II No. 17. 




state cannot affect the relations of persons outside its limits.25 States often impose their 
laws with regard to persons in other countries. Some recent events illustrate the point: In 
2009, U.S. tax authorities compelled a Swiss bank to turn over about 250 names of U.S. 
clients that have accounts in Switzerland.26 Earlier, SWIFT (Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication), a company incorporated in Belgium, was 
“asked” by U.S. counterterrorism officials to transfer the data of suspicious transactions 
and “complied” with that demand.27 Another example is provided by corporate law: Due 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many non-American companies have against their will been 
forced to structure their organization in conformity with U.S. law.28  
Legal rules of this kind are often depicted under the term “extra-territorial 
legislation”.29 It will not go unnoticed that they mark a significant departure from Story’s 
concept of the state as a simple territorial unit. What he neglected, it seems, was the 
ambiguity in the use of the notion of “force”. It is true that no state can deploy its police 
or other power in the territory of another country. Yet there are other, more subtle 
enforcement mechanisms. A state can use assets that foreigners have in its territory as a 
means of putting pressure on them. Or it can threat a company with the fact that it will 
not get any more commissions from the government. Or it can punish those that are doing 
                                               
25 See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws 41 (1942). 
26 New York Times, April 1, 2010, section B. 
27 New York Times, June 23, 2006, p. A 1. 
28 See the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. On the extra-territorial ramifications of 
the Act, see, e.g., Chris Charter, What's Good For The Goose - Extra-Territorial Application of The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Mondaq Bus. Briefing, Sept. 9, 2004, 2004 WLNR 12300455 (explaining the most 
important requirements for foreign issuers); Justin Kent Holcomb, Solutions for Regulating Offshore 
Outsourcing in the Service Sector: Using the Law, Market, International Mechanisms, and Collective 
Organization as Building Blocks, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 539, 575  (2005) (noting that many European 
Companies are quietly adhering to Sarbanes-Oxley); Larry Cata Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley-Act: 
Federalizing Norms for Officer, Lawyer, and Accountant Behavior, 76 St. John's L. Rev. 897, 929 (noting 
that Congress expected the Act to have broad extra-territorial effect). 
29 See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 643; Karl M. Meessen (ed.), Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory 
and Practice, Kluwer, London, 1996; Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: 
The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (1992). 




business with the company. In sum, even if a state has no enforcement facilities outside 
of its territory, this does not mean that they have no compulsory effect there. Especially 
in a globalized world, the vision that laws of a state would have no “force” beyond its 
borders is false. It is true that the state’s exercise of legal power is limited to a certain 
geographical area, but its factual powers are much broader.  
3. Territoriality not Demanded by International Law 
Against such a view, it could be objected that the enforcement of laws beyond borders 
might be possible in practice, but that it would not comply with international law. 
Specifically, it could constitute a flagrant violation of another state’s sovereignty under 
international law.30 Yet surprisingly, international law does not equate territorial 
sovereignty and territoriality of the law. As early as 1927, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice dissociated the two in the famous Lotus case.31 It held that Turkey 
could legally institute criminal proceedings, based on Turkish law, against a French 
officer that was involved in a ship collision on the high sea with a Turkish steam ship. 
The court said explicitly that the power of a state to apply its law was not confined to its 
borders. Rather on the contrary, the state would be free to apply its law to every set of 
facts that it pleases, absent any specific limitation by international law. In the opinion of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, the principle of territoriality of law, 
although universally recognized, would not constitute such a limit.32  
                                               
30 On international law’s influence on the extraterritorial application of competition law, see, e.g., 
Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 653-666 (describing the role of international law relative to the scope of German 
competition law). 
31 Permanent Court of International Justice, judgment of September 7, 1927, Series A, No. 10. 
32 Permanent Court of International Justice, id., at 20. 




The successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the International 
Court of Justice, implicitly confirmed this view in a judgment rendered in 2002. The 
dispute was about an arrest warrant that was issued by Belgium against the Congolese 
Minister of foreign affairs for the violation of human rights. In its decision, the majority 
of the court dodged the question whether a state has so called “universal jurisdiction” to 
prosecute such violations regardless of where they happened.33 But a considerable 
number of its members thought the court should have dealt with the problem and 
discussed in their opinions the import of the Lotus decision. Only a part of the Justices 
took the view that some territorial link to the state – if only the presence of the offender 
within the territory – is a necessary condition for a state’s jurisdiction34. A considerable 
number were of the opinion that no such limit exist35.  
The case law of the international courts leaves us with an important distinction: 
the power to use force in a territory is different from the power to legislate extra-
territorially. The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case had identified 
only one “first and foremost” restriction that international law imposes on the states: not 
to exercise power outside of their territory. In this sense, the Court said, jurisdiction was 
certainly territorial.36 But it did not prohibit to legislate on events outside the borders of 
the state and to enforce this legislation within its borders. By adopting this lenient 
position, the Court has in fact paved the way for so-called extraterritorial legislation and 
                                               
33 International Court of Justice, judgment of February 14, 2002, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. 3. 
34 Separate opinions of Justices Gilbert Guillaume, p. 35, at 37-40, Raymond Ranjeva, P. 54, at 58, and 
Franzisco Rezek, p. 91, at 93. The first two specifically invoked the Lotus case. Another judge even took 
the opinion that beyond the confines of national territory “in principle the exercise of state authority, 
whether legislative, executive, or judicial, must end”, see Justice Sayeman Bula-Bula, p. 100, 123. 
35 Separate opinions of Justices Rosalyn Higgins, Pieter Kooijmans, and Thomas Buergenthal, id, p. 63, at 
77-79, and of Justice Christine Van den Wyngaert, id., p. 137, 167-175. 
36 Permanent Court of International Justice, id., at 18. 




acts. The Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law transposes this division with the 
distinction between “jurisdiction to prescribe” and “jurisdiction to enforce”. While the 
latter is geographically limited, the former is not.37 It follows that states can apply their 
law to events outside their territory, but can enforce them only within their realm. A more 
correct concept of the state would therefore be to describe it as a territorial enforcement 
unit with potentially unlimited legislative competences. 
C. Constitutional Territoriality 
But international law is not the only legal field that has to be taken into account. Douglas 
Laycock offers a different rationale for territoriality: In his view, the Constitution limits 
each state’s legislative power to events that occur inside of its borders.38 From this, he 
derives that states can, apart from minor exceptions, constitutionally only rule within 
their territory and that the basic conflicts rule therefore must be territorial.39 
Laycock’s view of the state is one of an inward-looking type of government that 
only cares for what happens within its frontiers. It is doubtful whether it is adapted to the 
times of globalization. For instance, many states care about the behavior of their nationals 
in other countries. Child abuse laws frequently permit the prosecution of events that took 
place elsewhere.40 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits issuers registered under 
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act from bribing foreign officials.41 States also care about 
human rights violations that occur in other countries and give victims the opportunity to 
                                               
37 Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), § 402 and § 431. 
38 Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial states: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of 
Law, 92 Colum. L.Rev. 249, 259 (1992). 
39 Laycock, supra note 38, at 321. 
40 See, e.g., §§ 6 No. 6, 184 b German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB) (punishing the production, 
publication and dissemination of pornographic material relating to minors in other countries). 
41 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) (Pub.L. 95-213, Title I, Dec. 19, 1977, 91 Stat. 1494), 15 
U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (a). 




sue before their courts.42 Such attitude can hardly be demonized as unconstitutional. 
Rather, it seems correct to say that the modern state is open to take account of and deal 
with the reality around it. 
The point shall be illustrated by two cases decided by the United States Supreme 
Court that deal with the scope of application of the U.S. Constitution. In Rasul v. Bush, 
the Court had to consider whether it could apply to review the legality of detention of 
aliens outside of the territory of the United States. The problem came up because of a 
writ of habeas corpus that had been filed by prisoners detained at the Guantánamo Bay 
Naval Base in Cuba. The territory of the Base had been leased by the United States, but 
Cuba retained “ultimate sovereignty” over it.43 On the basis of an earlier decision44, the 
defendant argued that a writ of habeas corpus could only be filed by aliens detained 
inside the sovereign territory of the United States. The Supreme Court did not follow this 
argument. Although it noted in passing that the U.S. exercises “exclusive jurisdiction and 
control” over Guantánamo Bay45, the issue was not given much importance in the 
decision46. Instead, the writ of habeas corpus was allowed independently of whether the 
aliens were detained within or outside U.S. territory.  
In the wake of Rasul v. Bush, Congress had adopted statutory law that was meant 
to exclude the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to decide on habeas corpus applications from 
Guantánamo Bay prisoners. In Boumediene v. Bush47, the Supreme Court had to decide 
                                               
42 See the case law on the American Tort Protection Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act, e.g. Bauman v. 
Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009) (establishing jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant for alleged human rights violations by a subsidiary in Argentina). 
43 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
44 Johson v. Eisentraeger, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
45 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004). 
46 This was heavily criticized by Justice Scalia, see his dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas joined, 524 U.S. 466, 501 (2004). 
47 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 




whether this legislation is constitutional and, more specifically, whether it complied with 
the Suspension Clause in the United States Constitution48. The defendant claimed that 
this Clause would not at all be applicable in Guantánamo. He based this claim on the 
argument that the government would not retain de jure sovereignty over the naval base. 
The Court granted that point, but held it was not determinative. In particular, it rejected 
the underlying theory that the Constitution necessarily ends where de jure sovereignty 
ends.49 Not only would such a view be historically unfounded. In addition, it would raise 
troubling separation-of-powers concerns.50 Referring to a decision from 188551, the Court 
made the remarkable statement: “Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its 
powers are not ‘absolute and unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are 
expressed in the Constitution.’”52 
Both cases show that we should not think of the validity of the U.S. constitution 
as being limited to the territory of the United States.53 Rather, it applies even to events 
that take place outside is borders. Rightly so: Any other position would create 
unacceptable routes of escape for the government because it could flee the constitutional 
guarantees by just moving the facts to another territory.54 The Constitution’s validity can 
thus not be limited to actions done within the confines of the United States. Wherever the 
                                               
48 U.S. Constitution, Art. 1 Section 9. 
49 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2253 (2008). 
50 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2258 (2008). 
51 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). 
52 Id., at 2259. 
53 See George P. Fletcher, Citizenship and Personhood in the Jurisprudence of War, 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 953, 964 (2004) (emphasizing that the Constitution applies to any exercise of 
governmental power regardless of where it takes place). See also Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 
73 Fordham L. Rev. 2501, 2550 (2005) (claiming that the Constitution is not presumptively spatially 
limited). But see Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 Colum. L.R. 1831 (2009) (pleading for a 
principle of protection that is based on geographic measure). 
54 See also Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 Wayne L. 
Rev. 1105, 1131-1132 (2005) (drawing a comparison between the government setting up the Guantánamo 
prison in Cuba and corporations moving offshore to avoid local taxation or regulation) . 




military acts, the constitutional safeguards apply. As the exercise of factual power of the 
government is not geographically limited, the power of the Constitution cannot be either.  
What is true for the constitution itself must also be right for U.S. laws. In fact, it 
would seriously limit the powers of Congress to give its acts a purely territorial 
application. They can govern every situation occurring everywhere. Whether and how 
they can be enforced is a different matter. Thus, constitutional territoriality does not hold 
either. 
D. Soft Territoriality 
The mainstream of the contemporaneous conflict-of-laws authors does not rely on a strict 
principle of territoriality based on international or constitutional law. They adopt a 
different concept, which I want to call “soft territoriality”. Soft territoriality means that 
the validity of the laws of the state is not necessarily confined by its borders, but that it is 
nevertheless advisable to apply them only to sets of facts that are connected to the 
territory of the state that is the author. 
1. Friedrich Carl von Savigny and the Seat of the Relationship 
The classic explanation of soft territoriality stems form Friedrich Carl von Savingy, 
Story’s counterpart on the continent. Savigny admits that no state can require the 
recognition of its laws beyond its bounds, because its sovereignty is limited.55 But at the 
same time, he believes that these propositions “afford little help in the solution of our 
problem”.56 He suggests instead to turn the focus from the applicability of the rules to the 
facts to which they apply. His idea is to consider all facts as “legal relationships” 
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(Rechtsverhältnisse) which must have their “seat” in a certain legal system. In his 
opinion, one has to look for this “seat” in order to find the law applicable to the legal 
relationship.57 Thus, the order is inversed: instead of first analyzing the reach of the law, 
we shall establish the geographical seat of a set of facts and then determine the law 
applicable to it. This has been called the “Copernican turn” in conflict of laws.58  
2. Methodological Problems 
From a general methodological viewpoint, Savigny’s theory is subject to doubt because it 
transfers criteria from natural science – the seat as a certain position in space – to law. 
Legal relationships are not planets in the universe, but the consequence of legal thinking. 
There is no scientific method to find out their geographic position. It is therefore not 
possible to determine the applicable law to such a relationship with the same precision as 
it would, for instance, be possible for the Eiffel tower.  
But one can read Savigny also to the effect that the search for the seat was meant 
only in a metaphorical way. The basic idea then would be that every set of facts has some 
relation to the territory of a state and that its law shall apply. Savigny gave no explanation 
for this preference for territoriality. But underlying his look for the “seat” of the 
relationship is again a certain concept of the state. This concept is different from the 
international and the constitutional model of the state we have already seen.59 At its core 
is the idea that the state, from an internal viewpoint but also in light of the global division 
of competences, would be a unit which is primarily responsible to rule in a certain 
                                               
57 Savigny, id. at 57 (§ 346). 
58 See Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, 6. Aufl.Mohr, Tübingen, 2006, p. 13; Alfonso-Luis 
Calvo Caravaca & Javier Carrascosa González, Derecho Internacional Privado, vol. 1, 5. ed., Comares, 
Granada, 2004, p. 197. 
59 See supra 2 and 3. 




geographic area and that cases that touch upon this area should be submitted to its legal 
system in conformity with the demands of international harmony.60 Although the state 
could act beyond its borders, normally its laws should be understood as being restricted 
to its geographical limits. 
3. Auto-Limited Laws 
There are arguments which buttress this position. States themselves often consider their 
laws should only be applied to facts that happened in their territory. In the United States, 
for instance, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that congressional legislation is 
presumed to have no extra-territorial application unless such intent is clearly 
manifested.61 This view is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned 
with domestic questions.62 Why should it rule on events that happen outside its territory? 
It is none of its business. Thus, the law of states is “auto-limited”, so to speak, by the 
function of the state to govern a specific territory.  
Lea Brilmayer has expressed a similar idea and applied it to the modern context. 
She underlines the continuing importance of territory for instance for conduct-regulating 
norms and provisions that define who should benefit from welfare rules of a state.63 
Indeed, many laws can be thought of as having a territorial limitation built in. As an 
example, one could take traffic rules. It is clear that the rules of the road adopted by state 
A are meant to cover that state only and not state B. Under no circumstances should they 
                                               
60 On the underpinnings of Savigny’s teachings in public international law, see Matthias Lehmann, 
Liberating the Individual from Battles Between States: Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 381, 399-400 (2008). 
61 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949); EEOC v. American Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (2001); Morrission v. Australia National 
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62 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
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be extended to the latter.64 This limitation, one could say, reflects the state’s task to 
provide for security – and wealth distribution – within a certain piece of the Earth’s 
surface.  
Soft territoriality also has important advantages as a conflicts principle: It 
provides for a logical distribution of competences between states. The world being 
divided into different territorial states, there is simply no other clear method of 
determining the applicable law. In this sense, the territoriality is a prime candidate to 
fulfill the condition of a universally applicable conflict of laws rule.65  
4. Problems in Cases with Multiple Connections 
There are hence good arguments for the soft version of territoriality. Yet the argument 
carries only so far. For instance, to say that a state’s sales law would cover its complete 
territory would not be helpful at all to solve even the most basic conflicts case. Let’s 
assume that a resident of state A and a resident of state B enter into a contract in state C 
that is to be fulfilled in state D. This case has connections to the territories of four states. 
The principle of territoriality itself does not provide an answer which law has to be 
preferred.  
One can try to overcome this problem by adopting a more flexible approach. 
Savigny himself demanded in cases which have links to several states to search for the 
so-called “seat” of the relationship66. Similarly standards have been suggested by others, 
                                               
64 This is even conceded by the proponents of interest analysis, who are generally averse to any kind of 
territorial thinking. See Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays On the Conflict of Laws 58 (1963) (calling the 
rule of the road “pointedly local in purpose”). On interest analysis see infra IV. 
65 See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, ‘Vestedness’, and Choice of Law, 96 Yale Law Journal 1191, 1205-1213 
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to determine the applicable law no matter where a case is adjudicated). 
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such as the “centre-of-gravity”67, the “closest connection”68 or the “most significant 
relationship”69.  
The drawback of such malleable criteria is that they require considerable efforts 
from the courts in determining the applicable law. The American case law under the 
Second Restatement on conflicts bear rich testimony. To make the criteria more 
operational, judges have been given stiff rules in other parts of the globe. For instance, in 
European conflicts law the “closest connection” has now been replaced by a rule which 
submits a sales contract to the law of the country in which the seller has his habitual 
residence.70 Obviously, such a rule is based on a fiction. There is no reason to think that a 
sales contract has any closer connections to the country of residence of the seller than to 
that of the buyer. Other rules are equally fictitious, for instance the rule that the 
obligations between two spouses would be most closely connected to the place where 
marriage was held.71 These fictions try to overcome a dilemma: inter-personal relations 
between people from different states are not connected to one or the country, but are 
precisely in between. Finding a “seat” of the relationship or the “most significant contact” 
comes close to trying to square a circle. 
                                               
67 The term was first used by Otto von Gierke, see Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig, Internationales 
Privatrecht, 9. Aufl., C.H.Beck, Munich, 2004, p. 132. 
68 Le “principe de proximité”, see Henry Batiffol & Pierre Lagarde, Droit international privé, vol. 1, 8th 
ed., Dalloz, Paris, 1993, p. 450. 
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5. Problems due to Dematerialization of the Modern World 
Technological and economic advances of our time tend to exacerbate these problems to 
the point where it becomes impossible to determine the applicable law by geographical 
methods. The “de-materialization” of the world around us makes it increasingly difficult 
to establish any visible and meaningful territorial link of a set of facts. The notorious 
cases of torts committed on the internet are legend.72 But there are also many others. 
Where, for instance, is a company located: at the place of its incorporation, its 
headquarters, its most important industrial site or the place of sales activities73? Where do 
financial instruments lie, such as shares or obligations, which are no longer backed by 
documents74? Where is a bank account75? Where is a copyright76? Where do damages to 
the right of privacy occur, such as the publication of compromising photos in a 
newspaper with global distribution77? Where does a loss in income occur that an investor 
suffers due to false advice by a bank78? 
These and other questions put the proponents of soft territoriality under 
considerable pressure. The rules, presumptions and analogies they create as an answer 
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seem increasingly strained and localization a matter of pure determination. They depart 
more and more from the idea of a geographically close connection.79 The territorial nexus 
is sometimes nothing more than a smokescreen behind which quite different 
considerations are hidden.80  
E. A Brief History of the Territorial State 
A conception of the law that binds its application to the territory of the enacting state thus 
cannot be justified from a theoretical viewpoint. This leaves us with a basic riddle: Why 
is the paradigm of territoriality so strong that we are naturally inclined to think that laws 
must have borders? And how can the role that it obviously still plays in the modern world 
be explained? These questions can only be answered by taking a jump back in history. It 
will be shown that the state has not always been considered as a territorial unit, but that 
this concept emerged slowly and for a rather restricted purpose. 
There were earlier times in which state and territory were not identified. The 
Greek City-States were not surrounded by frontiers as we know them. The outer areas of 
Athens, for instance, cannot be understood in a modern, liminal sense.81 Rather, they 
were bursting with social life and there was a constant exchange with the neighbors.82 
The Romans, in turn, erected physical walls (the so-called limes) in order to defend their 
territory. Nevertheless, these did not constitute hard-and-fast demarcations but rather 
zones of transition between the Empire and the rest of the world.83 Consequently, neither 
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the Greek nor the Romans ever thought about applying their laws territorially. Tribunals 
in ancient Greece followed the lex fori, or the law of the forum, but allowed foreigners 
very limited access to court.84 Roman law governed only relations between Roman 
citizens. For all others, a special law was applied, the so-called ius gentium, or “law of 
nations”.85 It was composed of very basic principles of natural law that the Romans 
supposed would be followed by all people of the world.  
After the Roman Empire had broken down, boundaries were unclear because 
people were in constant movement. The law that was applied to disputes was determined 
according to the principle of personality, i.e. dependent on the belonging of the parties to 
a certain tribe or people.86 
It was not until the end of the Thirty Years War that the first border in the modern 
sense was marked on the ground by means of stones.87 Its purpose was to establish the 
frontier between Sweden and Brandenburg in Germany. After that, the doctrine of 
territoriality gradually took hold in the minds of thinkers until it reached its heyday in the 
19th Century. But what were the reasons? 
The ascendance of the concept of territorial jurisdiction is generally associated 
with the feudal system.88 Under it, the ruler to which the property over a certain 
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geographical area was assigned also had the right to govern over the people living in it. In 
other words, property was mixed with the “imperium”.89 Territory became so important 
in people’s life because the ownership of a certain territory gave the power to make laws.  
Feudalism did not mean that the laws of the ruler would apply to all events within 
its fief. Initially, kings and dukes did not care about foreigners that happened to be in 
their territory. For instance, a merchant from one territory could be lawfully robbed in 
another by its residents. That changed slowly as the ruler tried to protect their merchants 
in other countries. Laurent cites a letter of Frederick Barbarossa to Louis VIII asking him 
to “assure peace and security” to foreigners and to force damages from a villain that had 
mugged its merchants, lest he would retaliate against French merchants traveling through 
Germany.90 For these and similar reasons the lawmakers gradually extended their laws to 
foreigners. John Locke concluded therefore that the person who owns property in a 
foreign territory or enters it tacitly accepts to be submitted to the laws of that state.91 
Although this proposition has been very disputed as a matter of moral philosophy,92 there 
is no doubt that it gives an accurate account of the political realities in the 16th Century. 
Everybody that entered the territory was subject to the power of the king.93 
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Still the law was not completely territorialized. States exercised power in the 
realm of other countries, through consuls and representatives, which decided over 
disputes between their fellow countrymen that happened to live abroad.94 Sanctuaries, 
such as monasteries, where carved out from the prince’s territorial realm.95 Such 
exceptions, however, faded after the Westphalian peace in 1648. For the first time 
Western and Central Europe were divided into independent states that recognized each 
other’s absolute authority in their respective territories.96 Sovereignty over a certain 
geographical area was assigned. This paradigm shift was facilitated by military 
inventions such as the cannon and the musket, which allowed the transition from feudal 
hosts to the modern army and gave the state the monopoly of power to apply force in its 
domain.97 
We can see the aspect that played the most important role in the territoriality of 
the law: security.98 The concern for security and peace was the main reason for shaping 
the concept of a unitary, enclosed territory. Michel Foucault  has shown how the idea of 
security gradually raised the awareness for the territory in the 16th Century.99 The task to 
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guarantee the security within a certain area was that of the sovereign. In order to uphold 
peace and safety, it was necessary to extend his power to the whole realm.100  
The beginning of territoriality as a paradigm of legal science is equally connected 
to security, though in a complex way. It is usually dated back to a particular statement in 
the Codex of Justinian that deals with the vexed question which religion one should 
follow. This statement holds that all subjects should adhere to the religion of the emperor, 
which was the Christian religion.101 At first blush, there seems to be little connection to 
the principle of territoriality. But the comments that were put next to the text by the 
glossators in the 13th Century provided it. Their so-called “statutist” theory is generally 
considered to be the origin of conflicts thinking.102 The glossators sought to combine the 
text with the realities of Northern Italy at the beginning of the 13th Century. In that time, 
a number of independent cities had developed between which commerce flourished. 
Within the walls ringing these cities, a local law applied that was different from the 
Roman law that governed in the rest of the country.103 The reality of these laws and the 
applicability within the Cities’ territory was hard to neglect. The glossators therefore 
strived to explain their existence and reach. In their gloss to the text, they established that 
there are two kinds of laws: real statutes that govern within a certain territory and 
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personal statutes that apply to persons.104 They used the text of the Codex and effectively 
transformed it into a device to recognize territorial rules of law.  
Later, the connection between religion and territoriality was established even 
more blatantly. Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes both recommended that subjects be 
made to practice the religion prescribed by the sovereign as best adapted to the 
maintenance of public order.105 After the wars sparked by Reformation in the 16th 
Century, everybody who lived in a certain territory was made subject to the religion of 
the sovereign. This was translated by the Latin maxim: “cujus regio, ejus religio”, first 
used in the peace of Augsburg 1555.106 
The subsequently dominating French conflicts scholars relied heavily on 
territoriality. D’Argentré made it the most important principle of his theory.107 He 
advocated that the local customs governing in certain regions of France had to be applied 
to everything that happened within these areas. He extended the territorial principles 
introduced by the glossators to the point that territoriality ultimately replaced personality. 
Montesquieu tried to give a philosophical explanation as to why laws had to apply within 
a certain country. He argued that the circumstances under which a particular people lived, 
like the climate and the soil, would influence the spirit of a nation, which in turn would 
have an impact on the spirit of their laws.108 Similar arguments can be found in 
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Rousseau’s treatise on the social contract.109 These reflections make us smile today. But 
it is striking that we find exactly the same thoughts on the first page of Story’s treatise.110 
Clearly, one can see the desire to give a naturalistic explanation to the transformations 
that had shaped the new political reality.  
During the French Revolution, the concept of territoriality was rendered in terms 
of absolute to the point where the idea of the unitary state was identified with the 
territorial application of all legal rules. The Revolutionists abolished Roman law and the 
different customs that had governed in France under the Ancien Régime. The uniformity 
of the law within the limits of the state became the mark of its unity. But as often with the 
revolutionist’s ideas, this was mere symbolism.111 The fact that the old regime had 
existed with different laws clearly showed that the concept of the state does not require 
legal uniformity in all matters. The revolutionist themselves admitted that not all laws 
must necessarily apply territorially. Their main concern was the application of the law 
regarding security within all of France. That concern is reflected in a famous provision of 
Article 3(1) of the French Civil Code, which reads: “Statutes relating to public policy 
[French: ordre public] and safety are binding on all those living on the territory”.112 This 
phrase was used by the courts in France to solve many different conflicts problems.113 
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But originally it means only that: laws about public order and safety apply throughout the 
territory. 
F. The Continuing Legacy of Territoriality in a Globalized World  
As we have seen, the idea of territoriality emerged from the concern for security within 
the states’ borders. This connection obviously has survived to our days. The link between 
territory and the application of the law is closest for all matters that relate to the 
monopoly to use force, to security and peace. That is why criminal law and conduct 
related rules are generally thought to be territorial. As new threats for security have 
emerged that may originate very far from the state territory, it is often strived to extend 
criminal laws beyond frontiers.114 Nevertheless, it remains that the states’ powers to 
ensure security continue to be clearly demarcated, and every transgression of these lines 
will be considered by other governments as an attack on their sovereignty.  
From the area of security, states have extended the concept of territoriality to all 
kind of other domains. They try to territorially control every kind of issue, from the High 
Seas to the internet.115 Yet as was shown, the idea of sovereignty and the territorial 
application of laws are not identical.116 International law clearly distinguishes between 
jurisdiction to enforce, which is territorially limited, and jurisdiction to prescribe, which 
is potentially unlimited. That the state’s enforcement power is limited to a territory hence 
does not justify the conclusion that its laws would end at its geographic borders. 
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Moreover, it was demonstrated that neither constitutional nor soft territoriality are 
convincing as logical conceptions.117  
This does not mean that law could not be limited to a certain space. All that was 
proven was that the territorial limitation of law is neither required as a matter of 
sovereignty, nor by the Constitution or by natural science. It had first been developed 
because of concerns for security and peace. To other issues, it has been applied by 
analogy. It is a solution faute de mieux, because one often could not think of another 
principle to determine which law shall apply to cases that have connections to other 
states. In the modern world, however, territorial connections are often difficult to 
establish, and seem sometimes artificial. That makes territoriality of law as a legal 
principle and the concept of the territorial state increasingly outdated.  
III. Is Law Personal? 
A. Mancini and the System of Personal Law 
The big counter-concept to the territorial character of the law is the theory that a specific 
national legal system would govern only certain persons. The idea was most 
comprehensively expounded in the 19th Century by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini. Mancini 
was an Italian professor of international law and a contemporary of Savigny, with whom 
he was involved in an academic quarrel over the question whether territoriality or 
nationality is the overarching principle of conflict of laws. To understand Mancini’s 
preference for nationality, it is essential to know his particular conception of international 
law. Mancini thought of international law as being based not on relations between states, 
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but nations.118 Not the state, but the nation would therefore be the essential element of 
international law. This is, by the way, also an explanation why the discipline is called 
“international law” or “law of nations”, and not “inter-state law”. To underline his point, 
Mancini drew a comparison between the two perpetual forms of association, the family 
and the nation. He asserted that the family had determined the development of the law 
from its beginning, alluding to the fact that legal rules first emanated within tribes. 
According to Mancini, the nation would in the same way determine international law 
because it is its original unit.119 
Again, we see a powerful conception of the state. This time, the state is conceived 
of as an entity that mainly consists of persons.  
From international law, Mancini extended his teaching to the area of conflict of 
laws. He argued that the applicable law would have to depend on the nationality of the 
person involved, because as a matter of international law, a person could not be submitted 
to the laws of another state. With that argument, he established a direct link between his 
concept of a state and the determination of the applicable law. 
Mancini also offered a substantial reason why a person could only be submitted to 
the laws of his or her nation. That would be so, he argued, because the laws of a country 
would be adapted to the circumstances in which the nation lives, such as the climate, the 
geographic situation, mountainous or maritime, the nature and fertility of the soil.120 We 
find the ideas of Montesquieu that have been mentioned above revitalized.121 But 
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Mancini employs them to a different end: He uses them in order to justify not the concept 
of the territoriality of law, but the primacy of personality as the general connecting factor. 
According to him, because the law was adapted to the particular situation of the nation, 
the individual could ask, in the name of its different nationality, that the laws of its nation 
are applied to it.122 By basing legal decisions on a person’s national law, respect would be 
shown for the individual’s legitimate and inviolable autonomy.123  
Mancini’s ideas had a deep influence on European conflicts theory and practice. 
A number of private-international-law provisions based on nationality were inserted in 
the Italian Codice civile, elaborated under the auspices of Mancini himself.124 Following 
his report, the Institut de Droit international adopted in 1880 a resolution that made the 
status and the capacity dependent on the person’s nationality and submitted succession to 
the law of the state to which the deceased belonged.125 The nationality principle spread to 
countries as far away as Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, China, Japan, Brazil, and Chile.126 The 
first conventions adopted by The Hague Conference on Private International law – 
another creation of Mancini’s thinking – sanctioned the principle of nationality.127 As one 
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commentator has put it: “The whole legal world was at Mancini’s feet!”128 During the 
20th Century, he had many followers.129 Still today, Mancini’s legacy lives on. For 
instance, in many legal systems the applicable law to successions depends on the 
nationality or citizenship of the deceased.130 
B. Terminological Remarks on Nationality, Citizenship, and Domicile 
Nationality and citizenship are often mentioned interchangeably, as has been done in the 
last sentence. Lawyers tend to identify the two.131 But there is a big difference between 
them.  
The term “citizenship” denotes the fact to be a member of a state. It is meant in a 
very technical, juridical sense. “Nationality”, in contrast, is more sociological. It refers to 
a group of persons sharing a common consciousness, which may be based, for instance, 
on a common language, religion, race, customs, or history.132 Nationality may be totally 
independent of any existing political unity.133 Indeed, when Mancini suggested using 
nationality as a connecting factor, he did so in order to promote a common applicable law 
to all Italians, although Italy as a unified state was not yet existent. As Mancini already 
made clear, the notion of the state and the nation are not identical.134 The United States 
Code tries to reflect the distinction between nationality and citizenship by considering as 
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a national a person who, though not a citizen, owes permanent allegiance to the United 
States.135 At the same time, however, the Code considers all citizens to be nationals de 
jure.136 Such a fiction has a benefit: it prevent any discrimination between “national 
citizens” and “non-national citizens”. Nevertheless, from a conceptual viewpoint, 
nationality and citizenship must be distinguished. 
Both nationality and citizenship have to be differentiated from domicile. To be 
domiciled means to have an indefinite residence without the intention to change it.137 In 
the Common law, domicile is of special prominence since if functionally replaces 
nationality and citizenship: Where continental rules of private international law refer to 
one of the latter two concepts, the Anglo-Saxon conflict rules typically use domicile.138 
This is understandable because most Common law countries are immigration countries. 
The use of domicile as a connecting factor is characteristic for states with large numbers 
of foreign nationals and citizens.139 Domicile avoids the chaos that would result from the 
application of multiple laws of different nationals or citizens present within the same 
state.  
Although nationality, citizenship and domicile can thus be distinguished, they 
share at least one characteristic: All of them relate to a person, not to a territory. They are 
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traits of the individual and not geographical facts. A conflicts rule that relies on them is 
following the concept of personality of the law, not that of territoriality. At first sight, it 
seems quite difficult to maintain this claim with regard to domicile. It appears much more 
to be a geographical criterion: After all, it is determined by the territory in which a 
person lives. Yet a closer look reveals that in essence it is personal. For where an 
individual is domiciled does not depend on her current position in the territory of another 
state. The law of domicile remains the same wherever she goes, provided she does not 
establish a new indefinite residence there. Domicile is just another method to attribute a 
person to a certain community and to submit her to its laws. Thus, if a conflicts rule uses 
domicile, it connects law personally. The attention is shifted from facts or acts happening 
in a certain territory towards the person that is involved.  
C. Sociological Facts: Multi-Citizenship, Transnational Communities, 
Global Cities, and Mobile Persons 
Under the conditions of the de-bordering of the state and the mobile society, the concept 
of personal law no longer fits realities. The idea that the state is composed of a 
homogenous group of persons and that its law applies to all of them is not correct. This 
can be shown, for instance, with regard to nationality. People do not belong to one nation, 
but have two or even more nationalities. Instead of “pure” French or Algerians, there are 
more and more French-Algerians or Algerian-French persons. In countries like the U.S., 
people with a mixed background even form the largest part of the population. In some 
areas, clusters of people with several cultural identities have formed. Sociologists have 




long taken cognizance of their existence and call them “transnational communities”.140 
An example is the British-Indian Diaspora that has connections to both the U.K. and to 
other Indian communities all over the world. That social relationships transgress 
traditional states is not a single incidence, but part of a larger trend. Some authors even 
forecast that cosmopolitanism would take the place of citizenship in a Nation-state.141 
They go so far as to speak of a “global citizenship”.142 One may consider this as a fantasy 
for the future. But what is sure is that nationality as a unified concept is obsolete. It 
therefore makes no sense to build a concept of the state around a certain “model 
national”.  
The same loss of meaning affects citizenship. Due to the constant flow of 
immigrants around the globe, an ever increasing number of people have dual or more 
citizenships. The citizens of a country no longer form a uniform corpus of human beings 
that owe an undivided allegiance to “their state”. Instead, they are connected to different 
political entities. As the concept of citizenship falls more and more apart, it loses its 
epistemological value for the science of conflicts of laws. It becomes increasingly 
difficult to use it as a basis for the determination of the applicable law. One particular 
piece of evidence for this fact can be found in a special rule of the Introductory Law to 
the German Civil Code.143 It provides that persons with multiple citizenships are 
submitted to the law of the state to which they are most “closely connected”, but in case 
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that they are also German citizens, German law shall prevail. The first of these rules begs 
the question of what the closest connection is, while the second is nothing else than a 
politically motivated and nationalistic fiction. Thus, the notion of having “a citizenship” 
becomes more and more estranged from reality. 
The more factual domicile is also losing its value as a connecting factor. On the 
basis of the concept of domicile is the old habit to spend a lifetime at one place. This 
habit is, however, outdated. Under today’s circumstances of permanent movement and 
uncertainty, it is unusual that somebody would take an “indefinite residence” at some 
place. More often than not, a person moving to a new home has an intention to change it 
because he has already planned to go elsewhere, the only question being left open is 
when. Moreover, experience in legal fields like divorce and tax law has shown that 
domicile can be easily faked since the subjective intention it depends on does not lend 
themselves to easy control.144 Yet the most crucial deficiency of domicile is that it has 
lost its value as a connecting factor. It no longer indicates much about the domiciled 
person. Once the place where you live said something about your cultural upbringing and 
socialization. For many, this is not the case anymore. This is most obvious for people 
living in cities such as New York, London or Tokyo, in which numerous different 
nationalities dwell side by side. Sociological research calls them “global cities” and 
underlines that they are less connected to the country they are situated in and much more 
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to the global economy.145 The residents of these cities form a colorful bunch that often 
has no relation to the state they happen to live in. They are “mobile citizens” in the sense 
that they move from one country to the other without taking deep roots there. What is 
true for the residents of global cities becomes more and more a reality for others as well. 
The fact that a person lives in a certain country does not really say anything about him or 
her. It is therefore doubtful whether it makes sense to apply the law of that place to them. 
In many cases, they will not have any knowledge of this law and it will not correspond to 
their cultural background.  
Thus, the de-bordering of the state belies the idea of the Nation-state as well as 
domicile as a connecting factor.  
D. Philosophical Justification: The Concept of the State as Social 
Contract  
In spite of all these drawbacks, Mancini’s theory has a lot of attractiveness from a 
philosophical perspective. There can be no doubt that law is addressed to persons, and not 
to territory. The fundamental question why certain legal rules apply to people has 
occupied philosophers for the last hundreds of years. The answer they came up with was 
the theory of the social contract, a real or imaginary agreement between the members of a 
state. This theory has been developed from Hobbes to Rousseau, from Kant to Rawls.146 
If the state is indeed founded on such an agreement, its laws can theoretically bind only 
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those that are parties to the contract. Only who has consented to the contract can be 
bound by it. In other words: a state’s rules are binding on you only if you are the member 
of a club.  
In order to determine who belongs to the club, it is necessary to use some 
criterion. It seems obvious that this criterion must depend on the person, and not on the 
outer geographical limits of the state, since only persons can agree to the social contract. 
“Nationality” and “citizenship” are therefore perfectly logical criteria to determine who is 
bound by a state’s laws. An apparent problem for the theory of social contract is, 
however, that only the first persons could agree on the contract and that their successors 
cannot influence their nationality or citizenship easily: You have no say on your 
nationality, and your citizenship is to a large extent beyond your control. In reality, you 
can therefore not choose whether you are “a member of the club” or not that is based on 
any of these two criteria. But that does not disturb the contract theorists too much, since 
they start from a more abstract idea of a contract, an “original contract” between the 
members of a real or imaginary first state. The rules of this first state are binding on all 
descendants, whether they like it or not. In that, the contract theory resembles a more 
forced association, an inherited personal link. We are reminded of Mancini’s parallel 
between the nation and the family.147 
Even domicile could be interpreted as the acquiescence to become part of the 
“family” of a state. Although domicile creates a bond less strong than citizenship or 
nationality, it is still a connection to the state that may serve as the basis of applying the 
law. It conforms even more to the idea of an agreement because it is based on a voluntary 
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decision. By choosing to live in a certain country, one can indeed presume that the person 
has submitted itself to its laws.148 That does not mean that the person really consented to 
these laws. Instead, it is considered to be part of the community that has established the 
law. 
E. The Rise and Fall of Personal Laws 
It results from the foregoing that the concept of personal law makes perfect sense from a 
philosophical perspective. Nevertheless, this concept has lost its practical value as has 
been shown before. The questions that have to be asked are: 1. what are the reasons for 
the spectacular demise of personal law, and 2. what is the proper place of personal laws 
in conflicts theory today? Once again, an inquiry into the history may be helpful to find 
the answers.  
The principle of personality is in fact much older than Mancini’s theory. It goes 
back to the first state. Although it is hard to trace the state’s beginnings, one would 
certainly agree that the Greek cities, or poleis, were states in the modern sense of the 
word. Now it is an interesting feature that they applied their law not to a certain territory, 
but using personal criteria. Only citizens of the polis enjoyed the protection of the law. In 
contrast, foreigners had no rights. They were just “barbarians” considered to be outside of 
the legal community.149 The best proof is that they could be made slaves.150 They also 
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had no right to appear in court.151 If they wanted to bring a claim they had to appoint a 
special representative, a proxenos, which would appear for them in court.152  
As the Greeks, the Romans did not extend their law, the ius civile, to foreigners, 
or peregrini. It was reserved as a privilege to Roman citizens. To disputes among the 
peregrini, and between a peregrinus and a Roman citizen, the Romans applied the so-
called ius gentium. These were principles of justice which are so basic that it was 
assumed that they must be followed and known by all peoples of the world.153 The ius 
gentium was not a conflict-of-laws rule in the modern sense. Instead, it made such rules 
obsolete by replacing them with special substantive rules.  
When Rome collapsed, the system changed. The German tribes that invaded the 
Empire each lived under their own laws. The Lombards would apply Lombardic law to 
their disputes, the Visigoths Visigothic law. This method of assigning the applicable legal 
rules has been called the system of personal laws.154 The Teutonic conquerors applied it 
even to the defeated Romans, who were allowed to continue to live under Roman law.155 
This kind of tolerance of a victor is strange indeed. Even more strange was the split in the 
applicable law that was the result. Montesquieu described it in the following terms: 
The country was common, the government peculiar; the territory the same, and the nations different.156 
People governed by diverging laws often lived side by side. This lead to the 
famous sentence of Argobard, the Archbishop of Lyon, according to which it often 
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happened that five men would be walking or sitting together and each of them would own 
a different law.157 Obviously, this created fantastic conflict-of-laws problems. In disputes 
between people from different tribes a choice had to be made. Special rules had been 
developed to solve this situation. For instance, in a murder case, the law to be applied 
was the law of the slain, not of the slayer; the law of the grantor prescribed the ceremony 
to be followed for conveying title to land; legitimate children received their law from the 
father, while “bastards” where governed by the law of the mother.158 The problems were 
even bigger with regard to contracts between members of different tribes. In that case, the 
law of one side could not be imposed on the other lest one was willing to put the equality 
of the contracting parties into question. 
Regardless of these problems, one may feel certain sympathy with the system 
because it seems to be built on an individualist approach. Everyone is different by its 
origin, and these differences have to be respected.159 But it would be wrong to try to 
explain personal law by liberalism in the modern sense.160 Rather, it is a product of an 
under-development: the Germans did not know the idea of the state and its unity.161  
Even after the advent of the territorial state, personal ideas remained relevant. The 
only difference was that the point of reference now became the nation, not the tribe. In 
the 19th Century, the idea gained wide currency. Before Mancini, it had made a sharp 
rebound during the romantic period in Germany, where it was crystallized in Hegel’s 
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term “Volksgeist” (“spirit of a people”)162. Savigny used the similar concept of 
Volksbewusstsein (“conscience of a people”) in his publications.163 Remarkably though, 
he did not apply it in his treatise on the conflict of laws, in which he preferred territory.164  
Indeed, when Mancini defended the principle of nationality in the 19th Century, it 
was a kind of anachronism. It had already been overcome by the raise of the territorial 
state, in which persons of different origin were fused in one community.165 The 
importance that the nationality principle gives to ideas of “blood” or even “race” is 
contradictory to the reality of the modern world in which peoples are increasingly mixed.  
The system of personal laws is a conflicts rule which is essentially fitting tribal 
societies.166 The system came about as a way to deal with conflicts inside of a tribe. It has 
no place where members of different communities get in closer contact. This is most 
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apparent for international business, in which personal law is completely outdated. In 
transactions between enterprises, nationality hardly plays any role.167 De Winter remarks:  
One has to be devoid of nearly all sense of realism still to attribute decisive importance to the 
nationality principle in international commerce and with regard to the transactions giving rise 
thereto.168 
 
A last but not least important reason of the retreat of personality of the law is the 
growing importance of human rights.169 Through the basic liberties applicable to 
everybody, the focus has shifted from the concept of the citizen to that of the person.170 
Each human being is attributed rights regardless of its origin. When the same rights are 
attributed to everyone, the concept of personal law loses its importance. 
F. The Remaining Importance of Personality 
Today, nationality, citizenship and domicile continue to play a role mostly in one respect: 
in the relation between the individual and the state. One could summarize this relation 
with the terms loyalty and solidarity.  
                                               
167 As early as 1930, Cassin remarked: “When it is a matter of determining the law applicable to the 
relations between the leaders of industries or trading enterprise and their employees, their financiers, their 
suppliers and their customers, it is surprising to discover to what extent the concept of nationality is useless 
on account of the intense interpenetration of international elements that business life nowadays brings into 
play.” René Cassin, La nouvelle conception du domicile dans le règlement des conflits de lois, 34 Recueil 
des cours à l’Academie de droit international à La Haye, 655, 760 (1930-IV). The translation is taken from 
de Winter, supra note 126, at 413. 
168 De Winter, supra note 126, at 413. 
169 In fact, other states accept the application of interest laws, see Article 7 (1) of the European Convention 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 1980) (Rome Convention); Article 19 of the Swiss 
Private International Law Act (1987). Both encourage the courts states to apply mandatory rules of laws of 
other states provided that the interest they serve are considered legitimate and that it seems necessary to 
apply them regardless of territorial and other connections. 
170 See George P. Fletcher, Citizenship and Personhood in the Jurisprudence of War, 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 953, 954 (2004). 




1. Loyalty and Solidarity 
Loyalty means that nationals and citizens have a number of duties towards the state. For 
instance, Blackstone speaks of “perpetual or natural allegiance” which is due from all 
men born within the king’s dominions immediately upon their birth, and he calls it “a 
debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered by any change of time, 
place, or circumstance, nor by anything but the united concurrence of the legislature”.171 
The loyalty that the state requires can be seen in many instances. For example, citizenship 
determines whether you have to serve in the army. Together with nationality, citizenship 
is also crucial in the law of war. It distinguishes friends from foes.172 The crime of 
treason only applies to nationals.173 Finally, the influence of loyalty is visible in tax law. 
Although the advent of the territorial state has introduced a geographical element, it is 
still true that citizenship and nationality play an important role here. Many tax statutes 
apply to all revenues of a national or resident, regardless of where they are earned.174  
As a counterpart to the many duties that are imposed in the name of loyalty, the 
members of a state also have certain rights. Citizenship allows you to enter the state’s 
territory and stay there. It also is decisive for the right to vote in a national election. Many 
other important consequences flow from nationality, citizenship and domicile. One of the 
most significant is the right to receive welfare. Personal allegiance to the state is the basis 
of the redistribution of wealth between the members of the club. It is also crucial for the 
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right to receive an education. From that, it becomes clear that personal criteria reflect a 
certain amount of solidarity amongst people. They live together, decide together on the 
rules under which they want to live, and support each other mutually. Another way to call 
this phenomenon is “the social bond”,175 or the “cohesion of society”176. 
2. Challenges and Limits 
While these ideas play a vital part in the relation between the state and the individual, 
they are of much less use in transnational relationships. Modern conflicts situation 
involve more and more persons from diverging origins. In those situations, neither the 
loyalty nor the principle of solidarity to one nation is of any help when deciding which 
law is to govern. For instance, in a marriage between a German and a U.S. citizen, it 
would be equally unfair to apply only German or only U.S. law. The reason is simple: on 
the inter-national level, the idea of social contract does not work. Since there is no world-
community, there is also no common law that is governing world citizens. The split of the 
world into different nations makes it impossible to follow Mancini’s idea of personal law. 
The more transnational relations there are, the less the personality principle works.  
Regardless of these drawbacks, we still apply personal conflict-of-laws criteria. 
For instance, citizenship or domicile are used in order to determine a person’s capacity to 
contract or the law applicable to his succession in movables.177 But this has nothing to do 
with loyalty or solidarity. Personal criteria are used here for a very different reason: They 
have an important advantage over territorial criteria because they avoid a split of the 
applicable law regarding all questions related to one person. For instance, in the case of 
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succession, applying the territorial principle would divide the applicable law if the estate 
of the deceased is scattered over the territories of different states. In contrast, applying the 
personal law of the deceased allows for a single legal regime to apply. All issues related 
to one person therefore are preferably regulated by a single personal law.178 
These considerations are important ones, but they do not have the same quality as 
the ones that were made in the context of citizens’ rights and obligations. They have been 
used for determining the law to be applied, but that does not mean that it would be 
logically necessary to do so. There is a great deal of discretion whether to employ them 
or others. As with territory, the application of personal law in conflict of laws today is a 
matter of policy, not of necessity.179 Factors such as domicile or citizenship do not 
“determine” the applicable law, but are voluntarily chosen in order to find a solution that 
works on the transnational level. Once again, the de-bordering of the state over its 
traditional forms has rendered the application of law in space more difficult. It is not 
possible to cling to the old concept of the state as an enclosed unit to solve conflicts of 
laws. 
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IV. Is Law Bound to Interests? 
A. The “Ptolemaic Turn” by Interest Analysis 
Traditionally, territorial and personal factors served as limits in the application of a 
state’s law. The advent of governmental interest analysis in the U.S. in the 1960’s marked 
a sharp u-turn. Its main proponent, Brainerd Currie, suggested that courts facing a 
conflict of laws should inquire whether the application of a legal rule of their own state 
would further the policy underlying the statute. If so, the court should apply its law, 
regardless of any territorial or personal connection of the case to a certain state.180  
That was a true paradigm shift. For the first time, law is considered independent 
of objective concepts like territory or citizenship. Instead, its scope of application 
depends exclusively on the policy that the lawmaker pursues with the statute.181 One 
could compare the importance of this change of perspective to the switch from the 
Ptolemaic to the Copernican system, just the other way around: instead of taking a global 
viewpoint, Currie put the state into the center. He was strongly convinced in the state’s 
far-reaching powers over the courts, which could mandate them to apply its laws 
irrespective of abstract and academic concepts like the principle of territoriality or 
personal law. 
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The prime goal of Currie was quite modest: He wanted to exclude “false 
conflicts”.182 By this, he meant situations in which a law had to be chosen under the 
traditional theory, but in which the policies of the different legislators involved did not 
clash with each other. These cases should be simply eliminated from the conflicts 
mechanism.183 Only in cases in which there was a true conflict, Currie told the judge to 
follow the rule of its own state. This view was based on the argument that the judge is 
nothing else than a servant of its community and has to apply its rules whenever its 
legislature demands it. For Currie, whether and in what way a case is “connected” to a 
state’s territory or to the persons living there is a question of second order. What counts 
in the first place is to push through a certain policy.  
B. Separation of Powers and Democracy 
There are serious constitutional arguments that speak in favor of governmental interest 
analysis. In particular, the principles of separation of powers and democracy seem to not 
only support but even require this conflicts theory. Separation of powers demands that the 
task of the judiciary and the legislature are distributed in a clear fashion. Democracy 
means that this distribution is done in a certain way: The elected legislature has a 
command over the courts, which have to apply the rules that the former has enacted.  
Both separation of power and democracy have been frequently invoked by Currie 
as a justification of his theory.184 Interest analysis does nothing more than drawing the 
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consequences from these principles in conflicts cases: The judge is obliged by the 
commands of its own legislature, which will reflect the interests of the majority of people 
of the state. Therefore, it seems to make sense to determine the scope of the law by taking 
these interests into account and to disregard the interests of other constituencies in case of 
a real conflict with those of the forum. 
Moreover, this kind of selfishness is allowed under international law, because it 
sets no limit to the application of domestic law. As was shown earlier185, states are free to 
apply their legal rules to any event they wish. Hence, they are at liberty to pursue the 
interests of their constituency regardless of territorial or personal factors. 
C. The Discontents  
In spite of these advantages, Currie’s theory has come under heavy attack. Many authors 
have reprimanded the “unilateral” or “parochial” approach that they think is characteristic 
for governmental interest analysis.186 To illustrate the point of their criticism, let us apply 
governmental interest analysis to the metaphor of our house.187 If one were to go by the 
interests, one would not be able to determine objectively which law governs a certain 
case. Each group could claim that it is in its interest that there has to be music or silence, 
and interest analysis would support both claims. That is because governmental interest 
                                                                                                                                            
merits of the laws and policies of the respective states…”), at 182 (noting that the assessment of respective 
values of competing interests is “a function that should not be committed to courts in a democracy” but is a 
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185 See supra, under II 2 c. 
186 For a critique, see Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 
Ohio St. L. J. 459 (1985); see also Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 47-67 (1995); Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 
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European perspective, see, e.g., Henri Batiffol/Paul Lagarde, I Droit international privé 406 (1993); 
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analysis takes a completely different view of the conflicts problem than the previous 
theories. It does not pretend that the applicable law could be determined in some 
objective way that would be valid always and everywhere. Instead, it introduces an actor 
that we have neglected in the metaphor: the decision-maker. The applicable law is no 
longer dependent on objective criteria, but on who is deciding a particular case. Conflict 
rules become subjective. 
In that sense, governmental interest analysis does not provide an answer to the 
question which law applies from a global viewpoint. On the contrary, it supports 
mutually inconsistent positions and justifies conflict with other lawmakers. Yet to 
criticize the theory for this reason as “unilateral” and “parochial” is shortsighted. The 
peaceful regulation of international conflicts has never been the object of this theory. It is 
a problem it is just not trying to solve. Instead, it gives an accurate account of what the 
legislature demands from its courts. It says how the rooms will define the scope of 
application of their rules in order to maximally satisfy their interests. In that sense, 
interest analysis gives a correct description of how states behave in reality. It is therefore 
true to its roots in the teachings of the legal realists. 
Another argument that has been made against Currie and his theory is that he 
would not be true to his own statements. The herald of this criticism is Lea Brilmayer, 
which belongs to the “second generation” opponents of governmental interest analysis.188 
In a series of articles, she has claimed that Currie’s methodology would in fact be fake. 
He would accept the policies of the legislature only insofar as they were in line with his 
concept. Where the legislature had explicitly given a direction for the resolution of 
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conflicts cases that would follow the classic territorial connections, Currie and his 
followers would balk at following the state’s command claiming that these connections 
were too formalistic and sterile.189 Currie would thus have abided by the legislature’s will 
as long as he liked them, but not beyond that point.  
While this observation is as such correct, it is not likely to convince adepts of the 
new theory, for on the basis of the criticism lies a misunderstanding of the word “policy”: 
When Currie claimed that legislative “policy” has to be followed, he did not simply want 
to say the commands of the legislature have to be followed – that would be in and of 
itself a pure truism. Instead, he meant that the best way to solve conflicts cases is to 
analyze the policy underlying a substantive law statute and then to implement it to the 
extent that is best possible on the international level.190 What governmental interest 
analysis says, essentially, is that the application of a law on the international level should 
hinge upon the same consideration as the ordinary construction of substantive law.191 
This idea was also recommended to the legislature itself who should abstain from using 
the “metaphysical irons” that were forged by the classic theory when determining the 
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reach of its laws.192 The defects of governmental interest analysis do not lie there, but 
elsewhere. 
D. Disinterested Law and the Disintegration of State Interests 
Although much time has passed and many articles have been written, it seems that the 
true deficiency of the theory has yet to be spelled out. This deficiency lies in the concept 
of the policy of legal rules. Currie started from the – unexplained – proposition that the 
policy of every legal rule is to serve a certain “interest” of the community. Yet many 
legal rules are not inspired by some interest of the community. Instead, they are the 
product of the quest to find the most just rule to a certain case. The “policy” of this rule 
can hardly be expressed in terms of an “interest”.  
The most striking examples of such rules that do not serve the interest of a 
particular group are those that are conveniently summarized under the category of 
“human rights”. Take the right of religious freedom that foreigners and immigrants are 
enjoying to the same extent as citizens. How can this right be integrated in the rhetoric of 
governmental interest analysis? Does the government indeed have an “interest”, in the 
palpable and inward looking sense in which Currie used the expression, to promote 
freedom of religion of foreigners? Or, to take a different example, think about the right to 
live. Does such a rule merely serve the members of our community? Would we apply it 
only if the interests of the community are affected? Would we not look in every legal 
regime for such a rule, and in case it does not provide for it supplant it with our own rule?  
                                               
192 See Currie, supra note 64, at 131-132 (congratulating a California law reform commission for not having 
intervened in the California Supreme Court’s case law that followed interest analysis). 




I would like to call such rules “disinterested law”. These legal rules do not serve 
any direct purpose of the community. Rather, they are an expression of a certain idea of 
justice that the state, its legislature and courts believe in. Indeed, not all legal rules are 
based on parochial and nationalistic concerns as Currie would have liked to have it. Often 
they are committed to more abstract ideals. In these cases, the legislator goes beyond the 
simple defense of local interest and remembers a more universal function of the law: to 
create justice. Interest analysis is not able to cope with this dimension of the law. 
Even if laws are made to serve the interests of certain parts of the constituency, 
they are not necessarily only favoring a single interest. Rather, they seek to combine the 
diverging interests of the different parts community and strike a balance that is acceptable 
for everyone. It is therefore often hard to state the policy behind a legislative provision in 
a sentence that refers to only one single interest. For instance, a rule according to which a 
seller is liable if he intentionally or negligently destroys the good before it is received by 
the buyer does not benefit exclusively the buyer or the seller. Rather, it aims at finding a 
reasonable compromise between the two different positions involved. It is therefore 
impossible to say that this rule aims at protecting either the buyer or the seller and should 
thus be applied in case that one of them is a domiciliary of the state that has enacted the 
rule. It is a compromise rule that takes into account the positions of both sides. Most 
other provisions of sales law, but also of the law of leasing, factoring, lending, products 
liability or unjust enrichment are intended to strike a balance between the interests of the 
parties involved. These rules cannot be classified into purely protective of one side or the 
other. Instead, they aim for the just resolution of the case. That is because they have been 
drafted for satisfying the needs of an electorate that has diverse interests.  




It is therefore much more realistic to look at law as a kind of compromise or 
“deal” that has been struck by the representatives of a certain state in order to balance 
different interests within the community. The law comprises diverging positions at a 
time. Hence, the ultimate error of Currie’s theory is that it is based on a false concept of 
the state: It views the state as an enclosed unit having common preferences. Yet the 
interests of the community are not unitary. The country is split up into divergent camps, 
none of which has a permanent majority. In order to adopt a law, solutions must be found 
which serve the interests of more than one fraction of society. The reason why members 
of Parliament vote in favor of a law is particular for each of them. There is therefore no 
such thing as an unequivocal “governmental interest”. It is as much an abstraction from 
reality as to say that a law would reflect the “will of the people”.193 The way in which 
Currie had to speculate about legislative intent194 bears testimony to the difficulty to 
discern a coherent interest that the law serves. 
This criticism also holds true when the domestic situation is left and replaced with 
an international one. To speak of the fact that a law would serve the interests, e.g., of the 
“Americans”, is an ideal that often does not hold up to reality. It may have been on point 
in a situation such as the war, where all citizens can be supposed to stand on one side. But 
it is not true for the individualistic relationships we are involved in on a daily basis. In 
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these situations, not all citizens of one state have the same interests. It is therefore 
impossible to state a coherent policy that would benefit all of them. 
One could try to escape this problem by the admonition that the courts should 
apply in trans-boundary disputes only those rules that are favorable to the citizens of their 
state. The task of the courts would be to get “the best deal possible” for their residents195 
or to decide every case in favor of their citizens.196 But such a result is even shied away 
by proponents of interest analysis.197 Indeed, it would hardly be in conformity with the 
rule of law to apply a statute only if it helps the members of the community to win a case. 
And it would contradict its proposition that internal and international cases have to be 
treated on the same policy as a footing.198 
E. Historical Framework and Concept of the State 
Since we have been examining in the context of the other theories the historical 
background against which they have been developed, it might be interesting to do the 
same for governmental interest analysis. Methodologically, the theory is closely 
associated with the movement of legal realism in the United States.199 But though the 
teachings of legal realism have long been overcome, governmental interest analysis 
continues to be influential. Hence, there must be something more that explains for the 
tremendous success of the theory in the second half of the 20th Century. One major 
                                               
195 See Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 409. 
196 See Berman, Towards A Cosmopolitan Theory of Conflict of Laws, supra note 10, at 1846.  
197 See Posnak supra note 188, at 1146 (noting that Currie did not assume that a state has an “interest” only 
when the application of its law benefits a resident). See also Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study 
in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Ch. L. Rev. 227, 237 (1958) (rejecting the possibility that the courts 
must decide every case in favor of the state’s residents). 
198 See supra 1. 
199 The groundwork was laid by Walter Wheeler Cook in his seminal article The Logical and Legal Basis of 
Conflict of Laws, supra note 25. 




reason, it is submitted here, may be found in the concept of the state that was underlying. 
Currie portrayed the state as being “self-interested”.200 He encouraged the courts to think 
of their legislator as selfish and to apply its law to whatever circumstances in which it can 
help their interests. Although Currie focused on cases inside the United States, he painted 
a certain picture of the state that fitted in the international arena as well.201 That his ideas 
were so widely accepted and applauded was due to the fact that they were coinciding 
with particular developments that made them plausible. Over the last decades before 
Currie set out his theory, the view of the state had essentially changed. Far from the peace 
and justice-seeking entity that was bound by a “common Christian morality”, which 
Savigny took as a model for his private international law202, states had started to be 
involved in deep conflicts. Even neighboring countries with a common heritage 
recklessly tried to further the interests of their communities, or rather what they thought 
to be such interests. The two world wars had deeply shattered the sacrosanct model of the 
state as a disinterested arbiter that is committed to the ideals of justice, peace and world 
harmony. The ensuing period of the cold war showed that even countries which once 
shared a certain common ideal could turn into enemies when it came to their national 
interests. Therefore, the new paradigm of the state was one of a selfish unit that was 
following its interests brutally. In a way, the state had achieved the ultimate level of 
sovereignty in that it was only to serve the will of its constituency. 
Another reason for the spectacular success of governmental interest analysis was 
the technological development that had deeply changed the outer conditions of life. 
Airplanes and nuclear bombs had made it possible that one state could affect the live in 
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others very far from its soil. The telephone, the telegraph and other devices had proven 
any efforts to “localize” events like the conclusion of a contract futile. Modern means of 
transportation led to tort cases in which the application of the local law seemed 
fortuitous. The principle of “territoriality” of the law therefore became increasingly 
obscure, and its application mechanical and sterile.  
Finally, more and more “paternalistic” laws had been enacted in the first half of 
the 20th Century that were designed to protect the citizens and the community from 
certain perceived disadvantages of the new age. The function of private law and of the 
state has undergone a profound transformation.203 Among the chief problems that had to 
be solved were the increasing information asymmetry and difference in bargaining power 
between the contractual partners, the dangers of industrial products and the complexity of 
modern standard terms and conditions. In order to cope with them, the classic principle of 
freedom of contract was more and more restricted by legislative interventions that 
annulled or superseded the agreement made by the parties. In order to achieve their goal, 
these restrictions had to be mandatory even on the international level. They had to apply 
whether the contract was concluded inside or outside the state, with or without the 
involvement of foreigners. 
It may be that Currie did not have these facts in mind when he wrote his article 
about married women’s contracts. But they were clearly “in the air” at the time and 
shaping the ideas about the state and its function. They provided the fertile ground on 
which Curries revolutionary conflicts ideas were given a warm reception.  
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F. The Remaining Importance of Interest Analysis 
The proper area of interest analyses are those laws that do serve a clear, distinguishable 
interest of the state and not some interest mix. This is true for those rules that serve the 
interests of the community at large. When they are confronted with the interests of a 
foreign nation or a situation outside its borders, the state’s courts must apply them 
nevertheless.  
Antitrust law provides an excellent case in point. Most states apply their rules on 
cartels and restraints of competition which affect their market, never mind that the actual 
conduct took place in another country and was done by foreign companies.204 Even the 
European Union, which otherwise rejects governmental interest analysis in its conflict-of-
laws regulations205, follows a tough interest approach when it comes to its antitrust 
rules.206 Similar developments can be found in securities law. Domestic standards are 
applied as soon as the internal securities market is affected in any way.207 Territorial or 
personal factors such as the place of establishment or the nationality of a broker or other 
intermediary offering his service hardly matter.  
There is a similarity between antitrust and securities law, which explains why 
they are a preferred subject for governmental interest analysis: Both fields of law are full 
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of so-called internationally mandatory rules.208 These rules defy the traditional conflicts-
of-laws methodology in that they demand their application regardless of the contacts to 
other jurisdictions. It follows from that the proper field of interest analysis is not pure 
private law, on which its proponents misleadingly started. It is rather those areas that are 
heavily influenced by ideas of public law.209 These areas are actually growing because 
modern legislation is increasingly marked by such legislation.210 The result is that 
governmental interest analysis has considerable importance. It is best able to explain why 
a state may want to apply its law to conduct outside of its borders done by non-nationals. 
This is often the case when its economic interests are involved, but may be more and 
more the case in other fields. For instance, anti-terrorism measures fall into the same 
category.211 
The conclusion on governmental interest analysis is that it is valuable as a 
conflict-of-laws mechanism, but that it would be a mistake to consider it as an 
overarching theory. That is because the concept of the state that is underlying the theory 
is way too particular to be adopted as a general proposition. Governmental interest 
analysis views the state as being a single unity that defends the common interests of its 
members. While this might be true under some circumstances, the reality of the state is 
that the interests of the citizens are rather diverse and antagonistic. The state has 
disintegrated. The application of its law in space can thus no be determined by a coherent 
“policy” that would be underlying the law. 
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V. A New Conflicts Methodology 
The three theories that have been expounded limit the application of the law by certain 
criteria, be they territorial, personal, or interest-related. These criteria are connecting 
legal situations to the state that is the author of a certain legal rule. If a situation happens 
within its frontiers, if it is affecting one of its nationals or its interests, than its rules 
apply. This is the classic methodology of conflict of laws. 
It has been shown that this methodology is far from wrong. In fact, the three 
criteria play a crucial role when it comes to define the scope of application of many legal 
rules. Territorial connections, for instance, are of the utmost importance with regard to 
security issues.212 Personal factors – nationality, citizenship, domicile – are essential for 
voting rights or the distribution of welfare.213 And governmental interests are significant 
in the area of economic regulation, such as antitrust and securities law.214 
A. Transnational Policy Making through Choice-of-Law Rules 
It has also been shown that the principles of territoriality and personality of the law are 
extended by analogy to cases that do not really require their application in a strict logical 
sense. As an example, one can think of the law that is applied to succession: There is no 
necessity to apply the legal rules of the state in which the deceased was domiciled. But it 
is nevertheless done in order to have a unitary law applying.215  
The example shows that choice-of-law theory uses the old connecting factors to 
new ends for which they have originally not been made for. That is by far not a singular 
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case. Conflicts lawyers often “play” with the conventional categories. The same is true 
for legislators that determine the applicable law. Within the last years, they have realized 
the relative value of territory, nationality and governmental interests. They have become 
aware that they are not absolute dogmas that must be slavishly followed because they put 
a definite limit to the state’s competence. Rather, they are now considered as 
considerations that can be employed for a specific end. For want of a better word, I want 
to call this technique “transnational policy-making”. Transnational policy-making means 
that the applicable conflicts rules are chosen in function of a specific goal. This goal is, 
generally, to make the split of the world into different legal systems less harmful. The 
rules in the “house”, which is our globe, shall work together as smoothly as possible. In 
pursuing this goal, different needs of the world citizens and the international community 
may be taken into account. Three examples will highlight this new methodology. 
1. Environmental Conflicts Law 
The first example concerns environmental damage and the ensuing liability in case that 
harm is done to a persons’ body or property. The question is how to determine the law 
that applies to this liability. The so-called Rome II Regulation of the European 
Community, which governs the applicable law in extra-contractual obligations,216 
provides for a special conflicts rule. According to its Article 7, the law that governs is 
that of the place where the damage is sustained by the person or the property. But there is 
an important caveat: The victim may choose instead the “law of the country in which the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred”. This optional conflict rule was introduced with 
a clear policy in mind. Since the Treaty on the European Community (now Treaty on the 
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functioning of the European Union) requires a high level of protection for the 
environment, the legislator chose to discriminate against the tortfeasor and to allow the 
victim a unilateral choice of the law of the place in which the damaging conduct 
occurred.217 Obviously, such a rule cannot be justified by a pure territorial connection, 
because geography could not explain why the victim can choose between different legal 
systems. Instead, what was done was to introduce a policy in the way the conflict of laws 
is solved. Notice the difference to governmental interest analysis: The applicability of a 
state’s legal system is determined without having regard to its substantive rules and the 
policies that are pursued by it. Rather, it is assumed that the protection of the 
environment is a global concern that needs to be furthered generally and that is done by a 
specific provision on the level of private international law. 
2. Protection of the Weaker Party 
A different example is consumer law. It is now almost universally admitted that the 
protective rules in force at the habitual residence of the consumer should have some 
impact on contracts that are entered into by him.218 This conflicts principle was adopted 
not because the country of residence of the consumer would be in any way 
geographically closer to the contract than the state in which the business is headquartered, 
nor because the personal ties were any stronger than those to other countries or because 
the state of residence would have a more important interest in protecting its consumers 
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than the state of the business would have in applying its rules. Rather, the underlying idea 
is that consumers are used to the protective rules of their state of residence, and that they 
could refrain from transacting internationally had they to fear that these rules would not 
govern.219 This means that a certain conflicts rule was chosen in order to achieve a 
transnational policy goal: to make cross-border consumer contracts reliable for the 
consumer. 
3. Making Global Trade Work 
The final example concerns the assignment of receivables. The biggest problem in this 
context is which law shall govern the question of who is the owner of a certain 
receivable. Take the following example: Bank A, which has its main administration in 
state X, has a credit card claim against a client from state Y. It assigns this claim to Bank 
B, established in state Z. Which law shall decide on whether A or B or a different bank is 
owner of the receivables? In the solution of this problem, territorial, personal or interest 
arguments do not yield any palpable result. The problem is just too abstract and too 
complex to employ any of these criteria. When the United Nations’ Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was elaborating a convention on the assignment 
of receivables, different considerations determined the discussion. At the end, it was 
decided that the law at the place where the assignor is located shall govern the priority of 
the right of an assignee in the assigned receivable over the right of a competing 
claimant.220 The primary reason that was given in favor of this rule is that it subjects 
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“priority conflicts to a single law, one that is easy to determine and is most likely to be 
the place in which the main insolvency proceeding with respect to the assignor will be 
opened”.221 This argument is remarkable: It is not even pretended that the law at the place 
where the assignor is located would have to govern, but rather that from a policy 
standpoint it should govern in order to facilitate international credit transactions. 
When one revisits these examples, the paradigm shift that has happened in 
conflict of laws becomes clear: No longer is a situation neutrally checked for its 
connection to the territory of a certain state, to its population or to its interests. Instead, 
the applicable law is determined with a certain policy in mind, which often depends on 
the general policies of the legal field in question. This policy is not a governmental policy 
in the sense of governmental interest analysis. Rather, it is one that is inspired by 
concerns that transcend the single state and that are presumed to be in the interest of all 
citizens or the world-wide community, such as such as the protection of the environment 
or of the weaker party or the functioning of global trade.  
The methodology is a far cry from the old one that was prevailing in the 
discipline. The territorial, personal and interest-related criteria have lost their all-
dominant value. Although they continue to play a role, they are not understood as 
absolute dogmas. They are purposefully employed to pursue certain policies. They are 
used to determine the applicable law so that there is the least friction and tension possible 
between different legal systems and that the global well-being is furthered. Within the 
metaphor: The rules are chosen in such way as to maximize happiness and prosperity in 
                                               
221 See Explanatory note by the UNCITRAL secretariat, No. 4. On this point, see also Harry C. Sigman & 
Eva-Maria Kieninger, Cross-Border Security Over Receivables, Sellier, Munich, 2009, pp. 60 et seq.; 
Spiros V. Bazinas, Key Policy of the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade, 11 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 275 (2003). 




the house. Not jurisdictional questions or the interests of certain rooms are of primary 
concern, but the needs of the individuals.  
Parallel to the new revolution in the methodology, a change in the epistemology 
of conflict of laws occurred. The modern method has turned from mere geography or 
ethnology or legal hermeneutics to a kind of architecture of a global legal order. Conflicts 
theory and practice is adjusting the different national laws in a way that yields the most 
useful results for global harmony and prosperity. Certainly, there is not much publicity 
about this new task of conflict of laws. It is less visible than the big conferences on 
climate change or weapons reduction. Nevertheless, it is a necessary task, given that 
some splits between legal systems will never be surmounted. Without the silent and 
continuing work of conflicts lawyers, the world would drown in the chaos of different 
laws clashing with each other. 
B. Unbound Law 
1. Thesis and Examples 
Transnational policy making employs the classic criteria to determine the applicable law 
– territory, nationality, and governmental interest – in order to achieve new ends. The 
question that remains is whether there are also legal rules that can be used without such 
restrictions. Does law exist that applies even though there is no geographic, personal or 
interest connection to the state that is its author? 
Indeed, there are such rules. A good example is corporate law. Under the theory 
of incorporation that is reigning today on both sides of the Atlantic222, everybody that 
                                               
222 While the theory of incorporation was traditionally followed in Common law countries, it had little 
effect on the European Continent. However, within the last decade, the Court of Justice of the European 




wants to create a company has a choice where to do it: She can incorporate it, for instance 
under the laws of Delaware, or those of California, or those of England. That choice is 
independent of where the founders, the shareholders or the directors reside, or where the 
company carries sells or markets its products. Neither the incorporators nor the business 
need to have any connection to the state of incorporation. Many states require that an 
agent of the corporation has a registered office and a registered agent in the state.223 Yet 
to emphasize this point as a territorial contact would totally miss the reality of 
incorporation. Through freedom of incorporation, the corporate form has become 
available for any individual without any geographical or personal restrictions. Anybody 
can register a company in Delaware, and this company is allowed to do business in most 
states of the Earth. The result of this development is that corporate law is applicable on a 
global basis. From a law that is adopted for the territory and the benefit of citizens of a 
certain state, corporate law has become an easily available set of rules that can be used all 
over the world.  
There are many other cases in which the parties are allowed to use the rules of a 
state even though they have no connection to it. For instance, parties have been allowed 
to do arbitration proceedings under the law of a certain state regardless of the fact that the 
case does involve a resident or citizen of the state or a contract that has been passed there. 
                                                                                                                                            
Communities (E.C.J.) has handed down a series of judgments which require Member states to recognize 
companies in the corporate form of their state of origin. See ECJ, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og 
Selskabsstyrelsen, case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459; Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919; Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken 
voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd, case C-167/01, 2003 ECR I-10155. From the rich literature on the 
subject, see e.g. Wulf Henning Roth, From Centros to Überseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private 
International Law, And Community Law, 52 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 177-208 (2003); Christian Joerges, The 
Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 149, 173-183 (2004); Friedrich Kübler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company 
Law?, 11 Col. J. Eur. L. 219, 226-229 (2005). 
223 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L., 8 Del. C. §§ 131 (a), 132 (a). 




Under international conventions, the result of such arbitration proceedings will be 
recognized in many states all over the world.224 International arbitration has liberated 
itself to a remarkable extent from the restrictions by the law of the seat. For instance, 
awards that have been annulled by the authorities of the state in which it was rendered 
have nevertheless been recognized as valid and binding by other states. In this context, 
one has spoken of the “delocalization” of international arbitration.225 
A similar development can be witnessed in contract law. Formerly the applicable 
law to contracts was mostly determined in relation to the territory of a state where the 
contract was concluded (lex loci contractus).226 That has now changed. According to the 
overwhelming majority of conflict rules in the world, parties can select the applicable 
rules independently of any contact to the state which has promulgated them.227 The 
application of a legal system has become purely and simply a matter of the parties’ 
choice. The principle that is underlying this development is party autonomy. It is now the 
most widely recognized principle in conflict of laws.228  
The phenomena that have been described entail a considerable paradigm shift. 
The applicable law has become independent from either territory, personality or 
governmental interest. It can govern for nothing but a choice of the parties. Another way 
to describe this fact is to say that certain parts of national law have become boundless. 
                                               
224 See, e.g., the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, done at New York 
(1958), 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, which places a chief importance on the choice of the parties. 
225 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached From the Law of Its Country of Origin, 30 Int’l & 
Comp. L.Q., 358, 360 (1981); Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It 
Matters, 32 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 53-61 (1983); Pierre Mayer, The Trend Towards Delocalisation in the Last 
100 Years, in The Internationalisation of International Arbitration: The LCIA Centenary Conference 37-48 
(Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995); Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration 89-93 (para. 2-16 – 2-20) (3d ed. 1999). 
226 See, e.g., Restatement (First) on the Conflict of Laws (1934), § 332. 
227 See Lehmann, supra note 60, at pp. 385-390. 
228 For a justification of party autonomy, see Lehmann, supra note 60, at pp. 413-419. 




They can be used by anybody anywhere in the world. This corresponds to the de-
bordering of the state: rules are governing events that occur outside of the state’s borders, 
that do not relate to its population and in which it has no interest. In the age of the mobile 
society, law itself has become mobile. Since it is increasingly difficult to determine 
where events took place, who is a national of which state and what are the governmental 
interests, lawyers have overcome these criteria and let people choose the applicable law 
themselves.  
2. Exit, Voice, and Choice 
Let us examine unbound law a little closer, because it is extremely important. As an 
analytical tool, it is useful to employ the well-known distinction introduced by Albert O. 
Hirschman between “exit and voice”.229 Applied to the legal context, exit and voice 
means that citizens which are unhappy with the way in which their state exercises its 
power can either use their voting rights during elections or leave the country.230 Now a 
third option has been added to exit and voice: choice. Unbound law creates the 
opportunity to change the applicable law without going the long way through the use of 
one’s voting rights. It is also unnecessary to alter one’s geographical position or 
affiliation to a certain state. Instead, there is a new alternative: People can change the 
legal regime by simply opting for another.  
3. The Limits 
Of course, party autonomy is not possible in any case. In the context of the metaphor231, 
it would make no sense to allow the inhabitants of the different rooms to choose the rule 
                                               
229 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970). id., at 60-61, 83-84. 
230 For an application to conflict of laws, see Brilmayer, 98 Yale L. J. 1277, 1307 (1989). 
231 Supra under I 1. 




when the noise has to stop. Where the state’s function to provide order and security is at 
play, the applicable law cannot be selected. The same is true where the bond between a 
person and the state is concerned, or where overarching community interests are at stake. 
This underlines that the three criteria examined in the first place will continue to play 
their role and that not all law can be considered as unbound. Yet the very fact that there 
are some rules of law that can be considered unbound should make us think about our 
concept of the state. 
VI. The State as a Rule-Provider 
A. A New Concept 
As the discussion of the “classic” conflict principles has shown, in many areas the 
traditional state functions are still crucial. Territorial borders continue to be important as 
long as the state is the hegemonic guarantor of security within its realm. Personal 
connections play a role when the question is who may vote or who is entitled to welfare 
and who must fulfill duties towards the community. Governmental interests must be 
taken into account where the legislator is pursuing policy goals that do not yield to 
foreign law. The state is therefore still the supreme body that is organizing and protecting 
a certain unit of the Earth and its population. In this function, the reach of its law is 
limited. 
But there are many cases in which the state has taken on a different role. It has 
made its rules available to persons that have no territorial or personal or other connection 
to it. And law – its own or foreign – is increasingly applied for the purpose of 




“transnational policy-making” in which jurisdictional or interest considerations are 
subordinated to global concerns. In other words, the state is no longer only governing 
over a certain geographical region and a certain people and protecting its interest. In 
addition, it is part of a process that is contributing to the establishment of a global legal 
order in which the rules of different nations can be employed freely without their being 
any of the traditional connections to the state’s characteristics.  
Although it is difficult to find a general term, one could call this new function of 
the state to “provide rules” that are available in the globe. The government is setting 
normative standards that can be used by individuals all over the world. The state gives a 
framework for relationships between citizens everywhere, a backdrop against which civil 
society can flourish and private persons can rely on. It offers them its national law, e.g. to 
set up companies or enter into contracts, and it allows for the rules of other legal systems 
to apply if they are preferred by the individuals that are concerned.  
“Rule providing” in the sense of offering its law is not new. What is new is that 
states apply their rules not to a specific community, but offer them on a worldwide basis. 
That has conceptually transformed the function of the state. It is no longer the limited 
unity that is responsible only for a certain territory and a certain people. In the de-
bordering world, law is now available without restrictions by the limits of the state that is 
its author. 
B. The Historic Context 
The backdrop against which the state has taken on its new function is the mobile society. 
More and more relationships cannot be “located” within a certain geographical area; they 




exceed the limits of the state. Many people do not live anymore within enclosed frontiers 
and cannot be pinpointed down to a “clear” origin. Interests are not so easily defined in a 
fragmented society. What is needed more and more are individualized rules that are 
available on a global basis.  
Of course, there have always been situations that transcended one state. The 
historical “solution” was to assign the case to the competence of one rule-maker by using 
the classic criteria – territory, personality, interest – as approximations232. Yet more and 
more these factors turn out to be abstract and fictitious. Due to the mobility of civil 
society, the state’s borders have started to become meaningless. The mix between 
different people makes concepts of nationality less and less important. Also, the interests 
within the community itself have become so diverse that a coherent analysis is 
impossible. In the end, the concept of the link of a certain situation to a state has proven 
to be elusive. In a globalized world, a connection to a state can be created in almost any 
case. Therefore, the requirement of a connecting factor is increasingly dropped 
altogether. Private law has become “borderless” in that it has been opened up to 
situations with no connection to the state that is the author; and the applicability of states’ 
legal rules that are not determinative for its security, political organization or 
governmental interests has been made subject to transnational policy concerns. 
C. Other Rule-Providers 
When calling the state a “rule-provider”, it must not be forgotten that there are also other 
actors that fulfill the same function. More and more, rules are provided not only through 
national legislatures, but also through non-state bodies that provide legal regimes for the 
                                               
232 On the value of the classic criteria as approximations, see supra II 6, III 5. 




use of private individuals.233 One could mention, for instance, the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) in Paris with its INCOTERMS or rules on documentary credits. 
These rules can be chosen in the transnational relations, and they are so quite often. 
That’s why they have often been likened to state law.234 Whether they indeed have the 
same legal value as rules made by the state depends in part on whether the states 
recognize such other “rule providers” next to them, a question that cannot be pursued 
here.  
VII. Conclusion 
This article has outlined the major concepts of conflict of laws. It has shown how they 
have developed historically and what their importance is today. The article has depicted a 
development: from the traditional concepts such as territory or nationality, the state has 
gradually extended its law beyond its confines. Today, many rules of national law are 
“unbound” in the sense that they are available for actors all over the world. They can be 
applied even in cases that have no connection to the state that is the author of the rules. 
From this extension of the law a change in the function of the state can be 
witnessed. The state is no longer only the sovereign that is governing exclusively and 
                                               
233 On the importance of this development, see Ralf Michaels, Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-
State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 
1209, 1121-1224 (2005) (surveying the development from state legal pluralism to global legal pluralism); 
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actors in jurisdictional debates); Nils Jansen and Ralf Michaels, Beyond the State? Rethinking Private Law: 
Introduction to the Issue, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 527, 537-538 (2008) (summarizing the conditions under 
which private law can be considered a system separate from the state). 
234 See Jürgen Basedow, The State's Private Law and the Economy-- Commercial Law as an Amalgam of 
Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 Am. J. Comp. L.703 (2008) (describing how business law is rooted in 
both state made and privately made rules); Gunther Teubner, The Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the 
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authoritatively over its territory or citizens. It is also not the self-interested monster that 
governmental interest analysis has suggested it would be. Rather, it has taken on a new 
function: to be a provider of clear and well-defined rules for a globalizing society. 
At the same time, the traditional functions, namely to provide security, to uphold 
mutual solidarity, and to protect other interests of the community, continue to be 
important. That is why most laws are still applied territorially or personally or according 
to the interests of the state. But what is important is that these factors do not fit private 
trans-boundary relationships. The latter are not limited to one state. One can apply 
territorial or personal or interest criteria to select the applicable law for them. But these 
criteria do not apply with the logical necessity as in the other cases. They are 
approximations only. 
The result of this study is that none of the traditional parameters for the 
application of law is right or wrong. They all correspond to different functions of the 
state, and are sometimes extrapolated from them. What has been achieved here is not to 
find the one and only method to determine the applicable law, but to integrate the 
different choice-of-law theories. As for the concept of the state, there is no single formula 






A New Role for the Judge in Conflict of Laws:  




The way in which foreign law is applied today is totally ill-adapted to a globalized 
society. Frictions between different states’ regimes appear everywhere. But seeking a 
new comprehensive conflict-of-laws theory has little chance of success. Some other 
solution has to be sought, one that integrates the existing approaches while making sure 
that the goal of legal harmony is met.  
This article tries to develop such an alternative. Its focus is on the function of the 
judge in the choice-of-law process. It will be argued that the judge should understand 
and apply foreign law not as expressions of a foreign sovereign, but as rules that are part 
of a global legal system. Such a shift in perspective implies a number of far-reaching 
consequences: for instance, judges can apply the law selected by the parties regardless of 
restrictions by their forum law; they are required to follow international treaties even if 
they have not been signed by their home state: they can apply intermediate law; and they 
do not have follow strictly the interpretations of the courts of the country of origin. 
These fundamental changes result from a reinterpretation of the judge’s role: No 
longer is he just the obedient servant of his own state. Rather, judges should see their 
task as one of administering justice in a global system. The salient feature of this system 
is that it is composed of rules made by different states. It is proposed that the judge 
should view them on an equal footing and apply them by using the same methodology. 




Preliminary Question: Is Conflict of Laws Dead? 
If one looks at the structure and curriculums of U.S. law schools today, one can easily get 
the impression that “conflict of laws” or “private international law”, as it is sometimes 
called, would no longer be of any interest. The researchers dealing with the topic are 
mainly old veterans that have taken part in battles fought in the past. Students are not 
particularly interested in the matter. They see no reason to be so as any sophisticated 
knowledge in conflict of laws is not required to become a lawyer. Crucially, the subject 
has been dropped from most state bar examinations in the U.S.1 Some law schools have 
drawn the logical conclusion and do not even offer courses on conflicts anymore, or only 
under disguised names, such as “International Civil Litigation”, “International Sales 
Law” or “International Business Transactions”, in order to attract crowds.  
This development is not fully explained by the sudden disinterest of the bar 
associations. The problem goes much deeper. The main cause is the absence of any clear 
methodology to solve conflicts of laws. Suggestions in the literature abound, but a clear 
guideline that courts could follow to determine the applicable law is missing. Any writer 
who dares to add another theory to the already existent panoply is met with strong 
suspicion by the scientific community.2 This attitude is understandable to the extent that 
the long-standing efforts that have been made in the field have been largely fruitless. The 
increasing fragmentation of the theory could very well be the death knell for conflicts, 
which could be turned into a sort of appendix question of substantive law.  
                                               
1 Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2006, p. 427, margin no. 372 (mentioning that the subject has been 
taken off the bar examinations); Russell J. Weintraub, The Restatement Third of Conflict of Laws: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Not Come, 75 Ind. L.J. 679, 679 (2000) (noting that enrollment in conflict of laws 
courses dropped precipitously when the subject was taken off the bar examinations).  
2 See the references infra notes 113 to 115. 




At the same time, the problem which is at the heart of conflict of laws has not gone 
away over time. On the contrary, it is more crucial than ever under the conditions of a 
globalized society. In the world that we live in, conflicts are constantly arising between 
different laws, and the solutions they receive in the various jurisdictions do not coincide. 
Conflict of laws is therefore not dead at all. The only thing that is dead is the research 
dealing with the issue.  
The object of this article is to lead to a kind of renaissance of the science under the 
conditions of the 21st Century. In order to revive conflicts’ initial goal, it is necessary to 
find a common way to determine the applicable law that is shared worldwide. In other 
words, we must overcome the divergences of conflict rules in different nation-states. This 
effort, it will be argued, has to be undertaken by the judges, which take a central role in 
the solution of conflicts. But a necessary precondition for the start is a clear guideline 
which can serve as an orientation. Judges needs to be told 1) why and 2) how they must 
overcome diverging conflict rules. What is needed, thus, is a new methodology.  
This methodology is what this paper tries to give. It will be argued that judges 
deciding over transnational disputes, i.e. disputes involving a foreign element, shall 
engage in what I call “global legal ordering”. Global legal ordering is an effort to adapt 
different national legal systems to each other in a way that they produce a sensible result. 
The goal is identical to that of traditional conflicts. But the method employed to attain it 
is different. Through the new context of global legal ordering, judges are freed from the 
limitations and restraints by the choice-of-law rules of the forum. This will have dramatic 
consequences. It can lead the judge, for instance, to disregard the internationally 
mandatory rules of its own law or to interpret the law of a foreign state differently than 




the courts of this very state. In this way, conflicts of laws will become yesterday’s 
problem, and a novel discipline will be borne.  
To explain these results, the rift currently going through conflict-of-laws 
methodology will be described first (part I). In a second step, the dilemma that a court 
faces and possible solutions to it will be analyzed (part II). After that, a suggestion will be 
made on how the court should deal with the issue (part III). This proposal needs to be 
explained and defended against objections (part IV). Finally, the implications of the new 
methodology will be detailed (part V). 
I. The (Sad) State of Affairs in Choice of Law 
A. The Rift Going through Conflicts Systems Around the World 
When modern conflict of laws was founded in the 19th Century, its primary goal was to 
overcome contradicting decisions of different states. This goal is known under the name 
of decisional harmony.3 Friedrich Karl von Savigny put it to the fore in his foundational 
book, the 8th volume of the System of Modern Roman Law.4 His main aim was that a 
legal relation must be treated identically in all courts of the world, no matter in what state 
they are sitting in.  
Yet present practice tremendously falls short of the initial idea of conflict of laws. Courts 
of different countries do not reach the same solution in the same case, because they do 
                                               
3 On the history of decisional harmony („Entscheidungseinklang“, „harmonie des solutions“), see Friedrich 
K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, 
London, 1993, p. 39 (tracing the idea back to medieval times). 
4 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Private International Law (transl. William Guthrie, Stevens & Sons, 
Edinburgh, 1869). 




not adhere to the same conflict-of-laws rules. There is even no agreement on the method 
to use when determining the applicable law. 
1. The United States Against the Rest of the World 
Basically, and with abstraction made from all local peculiarities, two approaches to 
choice of law collide5:  
One is the method to be called here the “classic approach”, which is today prevalent 
in most legal systems except for the United States.6 It consists of characterizing the 
disputed relationship in question as belonging to a certain category (e.g. “contract” or 
“tort”) and then selecting, based on this classification, the nation-state to which “it truly 
belongs”, in which it has its “seat” or to which it has the “closest connection”.7 This 
approach consciously abstracts from the differences between the substantive rules of the 
different states. It uses a geographical method to determine the applicable law. The 
objective is to allow for a “neutral” or “objective” choice of law. 
                                               
5 The number of approaches varies in function of the understanding of the term “approach”. A Canadian 
writer for instance has counted four existing “approaches” and added a fifth one. See William Tetley, 
International Conflict of Laws – Common, Civil, and Maritime, International Shipping Publications, 
Montreal, 1994, pp. 7-43. For him, all European and American style conflicts rules are just one approach. 
The other approaches are “private conflicts codes”, such as Dicey & Morris’ book on conflicts, and 
“general texts, commentaries, and essays” as well as “national legislation and international conventions”. 
But at least the latter do not seem to be “approaches” in the ordinary sense of the term, but rather sources of 
conflicts law. 
6 The adherence of most countries of the world to the classic methodology does not exclude that sometimes 
particularities of the legal system do play, see, e.g., Mohamed Charif, L'influence de la religion dans le 
droit international privé des pays musulmans, in : Recueil des cours, 203 (1987), no. III, pp. 321-454, 
Volume 203 (1987-III) (describing the influence of religion on conflict-of-laws rules in Muslim countries). 
7 On that approach, see Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, 9th ed., C.H. Beck, 
Munich, 2004, pp. 311 et seq.; Pierre Mayer & Vincent Heuzé, Droit international privé, 8th ed., 
Montchrestien, Paris, 2004, margin no. 114; Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca & Javier Carrascosa González, 
Derecho Internacional Privado, vol. 1, 10th ed., Comares, Granada, 2009, pp. 233 et seq. 




The other method, which will be called the “modern approach” – no value judgment 
implied – is followed by many, albeit by far not all, courts in the United States.8 There 
are different versions of it, such as governmental interest analysis, comparative 
impairment or better law.9 But what they have all in common, and what distinguishes 
them from the classic approach, is that they insist on the importance of the substantive 
law rules which will be used to decide a case. Courts are invited to not blindly follow an 
“objectively applicable” foreign law, but to analyze the “policies” behind the rules 
purporting to govern and determining on the basis of these policies which of the rules 
mandates its application.10 Thus, under this approach the content of substantive rules 
plays an important role in the determination of the applicable law.  
2. Differences Within Both Camps 
Obviously, if courts are using one or the other approach they will often arrive at different 
results. But the dilemma does not stop there. Two additional facts make matters even 
worse. 
First, within the countries that follow the classic conflict-of-laws methodology there 
is no uniformity in the determination of the law. The primary reason for this lies in the 
codifications on private international law which most of these countries have adopted. 
They are meant to reflect the classic approach and to improve it by making the law to be 
                                               
8 See Symeon C. Symeonides, supra note 1, pp. 63-121, margin nos. 57-103 (including tables for the states 
adhering to one or the other method). See also the yearly chronology by the same author, lastly 
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts 2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 277 (2010).  
9 For an overview, see Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws, 2. ed., Aspen Publishers, 1995, pp. 47-76; Eugene 
F. Scoles, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, 4th ed., Thomson, 
St. Paul (Minnesota) 2004, pp. 79-105, margin nos. § 2.18 – § 2.25; Symeon C. Symeonides, supra note 1, 
pp. 13-30, margin nos. 14-31. 
10 See e.g. Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, Duke University Press, Durham, 
1963, pp. 58-60 (analyzing the reach of Georgia’s and Kansas’ shop keeping laws).  




applied more clear and predictable. In reality, they do the contrary: Since the 
codifications are not identical but diverge from each other, the applicable law will be 
determined differently depending on which country’s courts decide. Thus, conflicting 
solutions will be arrived at. That is true even in the seemingly ideal situation in which 
countries have identical conflict-of-laws rules, because their courts might interpret them 
differently. For instance, they may understand the categories that are used in the uniform 
conflicts provisions (e.g. “marriage” or “succession”) differently and put different 
questions into them – a problem called “characterization”.11  
On the other hand, by far not all courts in the United States are following the modern 
methodology. Many still adhere to the classic approach, while some blend it with 
governmental interest analysis or other methods.12 Thus, even within the United States 
we have a complete divergence of approaches to conflict of laws.13  
B. Consequences for Individuals: The Example of “Limping Legal 
Relationships” 
The different manner in which the applicable law is determined has important 
ramifications for the individual involved in transnational relationships. To see them in 
full, let us consider two examples.  
In the first case, A and B, both citizens of state X, live in state Y where they marry in 
a traditional religious ceremony. This procedure is allowed under the law of state X, 
which claims to be applicable because the bride and the groom are nationals of X. Under 
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International Law, 23 Case W. J. Int’l L. 479 et seq. (1991). 
12 See reference supra note 8. 
13 See references infra note 127. 




Y’s conflicts rules, however, marriages celebrated in its territory must comply with the 
formal requirements of its substantive law, which excludes religious marriages.14 The 
result of this is that A and B are married from the point of view of the law of state X, the 
country of their common nationality, but not from the point of view of state Y, the state 
of their domicile. Such cases really occur.15 They create all sorts of problems for the 
persons involved. Imagine, for instance, A would remarry without getting divorced from 
B. The new marriage would be valid from the point of view of the law of Y. In contrast, 
in state X it would be regarded as invalid and A would even be punishable for bigamy.  
A second example: D and E, both nationals of state V, are married. D falls in love 
with F, another national of the same state. Together they move to state W. Two months 
after she has been divorced from E, D gives birth to a child. F immediately acknowledges 
paternity. Nevertheless, a dispute arises about who is the father of the child. Under the 
law of state V, the former spouse will be considered de jure as a parent because the child 
is born within 300 days of the end of the marriage.16 The law of state W, however, does 
not contain such a presumption, but rather relies on acknowledgement and paternity tests. 
Thus, the crucial question is which law applies to the determination of parentage. 
Conflicts rules around the world are quite diverging in this respect.17 To take just two of 
the solutions: Some states determine the applicable law to parenthood in accordance with 
                                               
14 Such a rule has been adopted in Germany, see Art. 13(3) 1 Introductory Law to the German Civil Code 
(Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB). 
15 See, e.g., BayObLG (former highest court of Bavaria in civil matters), decision of Oct. 29, 1999, 1 Z BR 
79/99, FamRZ 2000, 699. The court eventually held that the marriage was valid because a German official 
had entered it – by mistake – into a register. 
16 This period corresponds roughly to the maximal length of a pregnancy. 
17 See Khalil A Sfeir, Droit international privé compare, vol. 1, Sader Editeurs, Beyrouth, 2005, p. 630-643, 
margin nos. 503-515. 




the nationality of the potential parent.18 According to these legal systems, the law of V 
would determine who is the father of the child, and this would effectively be E. Other 
countries apply the law of the habitual residence of the child.19 These legal systems would 
consider the law of W as being applicable and F to be the father. For the baby, this means 
effectively that it has two fathers: In some countries of the world, it is E, while in other, it 
is F. As one can easily imagine, these situations create a number of difficulties for all 
persons involved. 
The cases just described are sometimes denoted with the figurative notion of “limping 
legal relationships”.20 It means that a legal bond or relation between private individuals is 
recognized in some parts of the world, while not in others. Cases like these are not rare. 
On the contrary, in today’s globalized world in which people ever more often get married 
to foreigners, they occur with increasing frequency. 
The phenomenon of “limping relationships” is not restricted to questions of family 
law. Similar problems also occur in other contexts, for instance in company law. This is 
because some countries apply to companies the law of the state where they have been 
incorporated (state of incorporation theory), while others apply the law at the seat of their 
main administration (real seat theory).21 The co-existence of these two theories on the 
                                               
18 E.g., Belgian, Chinese, Dutch, Egyptian, Finish, Spanish, and Japanese Law. See Sfeir, supra note 17, at 
pp. 633-635, margin no. 506. 
19 E.g. Bulgarian, German, Hungarian, Polish, and Swedish law, see Sfeir, supra note 17, at p. 631 margin 
no. 504. Common law systems often apply the law of the domicile of the child, see id. 
20 See Katharina Boelke-Woelki, Private International Law Aspects of Registered Partnerships and Other 
Forms of Non-Marital Cohabitation in Europe, 6 La. L. Rev. 1053, 1055 (2000); Friedrich K. Juenger, 
supra note 3, at pp. 222, 225. 
21 For an overview, see David C. Donald, Approaching Comparative Company Law, 14 Fordham J. Corp. 
& Fin. L. 83, 170-172 (2008) (describing the replacement of the real seat theory by the state of 
incorporation theory in EU countries); Seth Chertok, Jurisdictional Competition in the European 
Community, 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 465, 510-511 (highlighting the EU’s choice of the real seat theory 
for the Socieatas Europaea (SE)); William W. Bretton, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How 
Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 347, 372-373 
(2009) (analyzing the continuing relevance of the real seat theory after the ECJ’s Cartesio-decision). 




globe creates a quandary: Since a company can be incorporated in a different state than 
that in which it is headquartered, it would have to comply with two different sets of 
corporate laws – a virtual impossibility. As a consequence, the company will be 
recognized in the states that apply the law of its state of incorporation, but may be 
regarded as not existent in others that follow the law of the real seat. This leads to many 
inconveniences for the shareholders of the corporation. To take just one, in the countries 
following the real seat theory they may not rely on their limited liability granted to them 
by the law of incorporation. Again, the problem is exacerbated in a globalized society in 
which companies operate on a worldwide basis. 
Limping legal relationships are by far not the only consequence of the divergences 
between states’ conflicts rules. There are others too, which are more benign, but 
nevertheless unwelcome. Think of the numerous cases in which a claim is granted by the 
courts of one country but dismissed by that of another on the basis of a different law. A 
good example is a libel claim. Here, the choice-of-law rules radically diverge. The 
consequence is that the victim can go shopping for the applicable law in different states if 
the offending publication has been distributed in more than one country.22 
The result reached by the different laws of the world in these cases, when seen from a 
global viewpoint, can be described by one word: inconsistency. This inconsistency will 
be felt primarily by the individuals that are involved in those relations. It is them who 
suffer most from the split of the world into different conflicts systems. From their 
viewpoint, there is no such thing as a predictable outcome or global justice. Rather, the 
opposite is reigning: unfairness and uncertainty. This should not be allowed to continue. 
                                               
22 On libel tourism, see Trevor C. Hartley, “Libel Tourism” and Conflict of Laws, ICLQ 59 (2010), 25-38 
(arguing for a rule that would point to only one law for offending publications distributed in more than one 
country). 




C. Attempts to Overcome the Problem 
There have of course been attempts to overcome these problems, which are going on as 
these lines are written.  
1. Uniform Substantive Law 
The straight-forward approach seems to be the harmonization of substantive law. If the 
material standards would be the same all over the globe, conflicts would no longer arise. 
It would even be superfluous to determine the applicable law.  
Many fora and organizations, like UNIDROIT or UNCITRAL, aim at precisely that 
harmonization. Substantial progress has been made, for instance, in the area of 
commercial law.23 Yet who thinks that we could anytime soon have one and the same law 
is living in a dream world. In areas like family law a globally uniform regime will 
probably never be achieved. The reason is that it seems impossible to reconcile the 
different political and cultural positions: They are just too far apart. Even within states 
like the U.S. or Spain, it is difficult to find agreement on issues such as same-sex 
marriages. Between different countries, it is virtually impossible. The way that family 
law and other areas are dealt with reflects a certain culture, attitude and way of living 
predominant in a region. They are among the main reasons to have different states. States 
do not want to compromise the ability to promote and maintain their own values in order 
to create a global law.  
Moreover, internationally uniform substantive law has a number of other drawbacks. 
Not the least of them is that it cannot be changed as easily as domestic law because every 
                                               
23 For an overview, see Matthias Lehmann, The State of Development of Uniform Law in the Fields of 
European and International Civil and Commercial Law, 7 European Legal Forum 266-270 (2008) 
(describing conventions for the harmonization of civil and commercial law). 




amendment requires consent by all signatory states.24 Furthermore, even if there are 
uniform substantive rules, this does not by itself guarantee uniformity of decision-
making, for judges of different countries might interpret the same text differently. An 
example of this is the Vienna Sales Convention: The variety in its interpretation by 
national courts has become famous.25 The problem is that there is no global court which 
could ensure a uniform application. Efforts to coordinate the interpretation among 
national courts have been made, but are not as efficient. 
2. Uniform Conflicts Rules  
If it is not possible to achieve uniformity on the level of substantive law, it would at least 
be useful if the states were to determine the applicable law in the same way. That would 
avoid limping legal relationships. 
Conflict-of-laws harmonization efforts have been undertaken since the 19th Century. 
The main forum for that has been the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Its 
achievements are considerable.26 Despite the impressive number of conventions, 
however, not nearly all issues have been resolved. For instance, there is still no 
convention on the law applicable to marriage or to parentage. Moreover, every year new 
issues are emerging, such as surrogate motherhood. In addition, even if all fields of 
potential conflicts were covered by treaties, this would not make the problem of different 
                                               
24 See Juenger, supra note 3, p. 190 (underlining that multilateral treaties are unresponsive to changing 
realities). 
25 See, e.g., John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action – Uniform International Words: Uniform 
Application?, 8 J.L. & Com. 207 (1988) (underlining that the CISG provides “uniform words” but what is 
needed is a “uniform application”). See also Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a 
Decentralized System - Observations on Translations, Reservations and other Challenges to the Uniformity 
Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & Com. 187-217 (1998) (pleading for a “federalist” approach to the 
principle of uniform interpretation enshrined in the CISG).  
26 See the account by Christophe Bernasconi, Some Observations from the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, 101 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 350 et seq. (2007). 




applications disappear as long as there is no court with world-wide jurisdiction to 
interpret these conventions. 
3. A Realistic Evaluation 
Harmonizing the laws of the world is a noble and commendable task for the states. So far, 
they have failed to provide comprehensive common rules on the level of either 
substantive or conflicts law. Thus, the inconsistency between the applicable rules 
continues. 
II. What Should a Judge Do When Faced With a Conflict of Laws? 
A. The Dilemma 
The judge who has to pick between two or more potentially applicable laws to a case 
before him is in a difficult dilemma. He must immediately decide which legal system he 
will follow. He cannot wait for harmonization to come at some far-away point in time. 
The question is what he can do right now to avoid or at least diminish the harmful 
consequences of the world’s split into different legal systems. 
I am willfully making a premise here. That premise is that overcoming the rifts 
between legal systems, i.e. achieving decisional harmony, is indeed the main problem. 
Others might strongly dispute that premise. They might argue that there are much more 
important issues, such as fulfilling domestic policies of the forum in international cases. 
Inconsistencies with other countries would be the necessary costs of legal diversity. As 
the world is split into different legal systems, it would only be logical that different 
outcomes would be reached with regard to the same situation. We do not want, 




apparently, to have those differences go away. Otherwise, we would not live in states as 
organizational units with different laws. Legal diversity is a cornerstone of the current 
setup of the world, and one that has its own virtues. 
To that argument I reply that legal diversity shall continue. The aim of the judge 
could nevertheless be that one and the same relation is treated under the same law so that 
negative results such as limping legal relationships are avoided. Treating the same set of 
facts according to the same law would even strengthen legal diversity since all courts 
would recognize that the relation is governed by a certain law. A universal approach to 
the conflict-of-laws problem would thus not diminish legal diversity. It would just make 
the deleterious consequences of the split of the world into different states disappear.  
B. Possible Solutions 
1. Extending an Existing Conflicts Approach World-Wide 
One obvious way to accomplish the goal of uniform decision-making would be for all 
judges to agree on one of the already existing approaches to conflicts. It would in fact not 
matter which approach they agree on, whether the classic or the modern approach and 
which of their various facets. The important point is that they follow one and the same 
method, so that the applicable law is determined in the same way.  
The problem of this proposal is that it is unrealistic. Given the long-standing and 
entrenched positions of the courts on the subject, it seems far-fetched that they would 
give up their choice-of-law method in favor of another. The question is also not totally at 
their discretion, since legislators in many countries have laid down rules for choice of 
law. The judge is bound by them. Since they are different, conflicts practice will remain 




divergent. We are in the presence of a typical prisoner’s dilemma: Since no one knows 
what the other will do, nobody will agree on the solution that is best for all. It is thus 
more than unlikely that an existing approach will be agreed upon. 
2. Developing a Completely New Approach 
Another idea would be to introduce a new conflict-of-laws theory. Take for example the 
“multifactor approach” that was recently suggested by Lea Brilmayer and Rachael 
Anglin.27 The authors argue that the single-factor or “trigger” approach, which so far has 
been followed in choice of law, should be replaced by a multifactor approach that looks 
for the state having a preponderance of contacts to the facts of the case.  
It cannot be disputed that this suggestion – although it is not as new as the authors 
would like to make us believe28 – has certain theoretical merits. But even if the courts in 
the U.S. were to follow it, it is more than unlikely that it would be accepted in the same 
form anywhere else. Thus, this suggestion would not improve the situation. On the 
contrary, it would only add to the current confusion as the rift to other countries is 
deepened. Developing a new approach therefore does not help. Scores of theories have 
tried to determine the applicable law “in the right way”. It is time to come to the 
conclusion that there is no such thing as an “objectively governing law”, but only 
different approaches that collide with each other, thus creating all sorts of harm for 
individuals. The modern task is not to look for a totally new approach to determine the 
                                               
27 Lea Brilmayer & Rachael Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone 
Trigger, 95 Iowa L.R. 1125 et seq. (2010). 
28 See Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws, § 6. European law also contains a, albeit different, kind 
of “multifactor approach” with rules and exceptions and exceptions to exceptions, see e.g. the Rome I and 
the Rome II Regulations. 




applicable law, but for a methodology that can be mutually agreed upon and that leads to 
harmonious decisions. 
3. Lex Propria in Foro Proprio 
A most radical solution to overcome the conflicts dilemma has been given by Albert A. 
Ehrenzweig.29 He suggests treating cases with international elements just like any other 
dispute, i.e. to apply the law of the state in which the court is situated, or lex fori.  
At first sight, the theory does not help to solve our problem at all. On the contrary, it 
even seems to exacerbate it: if the lex fori were consistently followed, courts of different 
countries would reach a different conclusion in any case, because they would always 
apply a different law. The lex fori-theory only makes sense when it is combined with 
Ehrenzweig’s second proposition, namely that the jurisdictional rules have to be 
improved in such a way as to lead to one and only one “proper forum” that will decide a 
case.30 Such reform could be based, he suggested, on the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.31 Indeed, if each and every case would be assigned to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a single court, then it would not matter which law this court will apply. 
The judgment that is rendered would never be contradicted by other countries, and we 
would have decisional harmony.  
The practical problem of Ehrenzweig’s theory lies in its second part. The worldwide 
harmonization of jurisdictional rules is something that appears to be close to impossible. 
Efforts for a multilateral treaty on jurisdiction have been undertaken at the Hague, but 
their result has been very limited in scope and effectiveness. The new Convention on 
                                               
29 See Albert Armin Ehrenzweig, Private International Law, General Part, A.W. Sjithoff, Leyden, Oceana 
Publications, Dobbs Ferry (NY), 1967, pp. 92-93, margin no. 39. 
30 Ehrenzweig, supra note 29, at pp. 107-110, margin no. 49. 
31 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 29, at p. 108, margin no. 49. 




choice-of-court agreements, which has yet to enter into force, only deals with the 
comparatively rare cases in which the parties have agreed on the competent court.32 A 
more far-reaching treaty was impeded by the different approaches of the United States 
and Europe to questions of jurisdiction and procedure which proved to be an 
insurmountable obstacle during the negotiations.33 The principle of forum non 
conveniens, in particular, is far from being accepted outside of the common law 
countries. The European Court of Justice has even explicitly rejected it for the EU.34 
Thus, world-wide agreement on jurisdictional rules seems to be more improbable than 
ever. 
But even if such an agreement would be reached, it is more than unlikely that 
Ehrenzweig’s theory would always lead to sensible results. Let’s take the following 
example: Assume that A and B have married 20 years ago in their home country X. Since 
then, they have lived in country Y. In case they want to divorce now, it is clear that the 
courts of Y should be available for them. Under Ehrenzweig’s lex fori theory, this would 
imply the following: Whereas at the time of marriage, the courts of state X were 
competent and the law of that state was applicable, now jurisdiction should lie with the 
courts of state Y and accordingly the law of that state should govern. A and B could be 
surprised by the outcome: It is possible that their marriage might be held to be invalid 
from the start since it was not in conformity with the laws of Y.  
                                               
32 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, done on June 30, 2005. 
33 For more details, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the 
Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable Worldwide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 
Am. J. Comp. L. 191 (2001) (citing fundamental discordance between the views of the United States and 
European Union States regarding the role of adjudication in contemporary society); Linda Silberman, 
Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be 
Stalled?, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 315 (2002) (comparing contrasting approaches of the U.S. and Europe to 
judicial jurisdiction).  
34 ECJ, case C-281/02, Owusu, [2005] E.C.R. I-1383, margin nos. 37-46.  




This outcome is a direct result of the lex fori theory’s mixture between the 
determination of the competent court and the applicable law. For Ehrenzweig, both 
questions must receive the same answer. But in reality, they are guided by very different 
considerations: whereas the applicable law should be close to the parties’ cultural 
environment and their expectations at the time a relationship is created, jurisdiction 
depends on matters of convenience when the dispute arises, such as the residence of the 
defendant, the place of service of the claim to him, the location of evidence and so on. 
Thus, it is a fundamental mistake to identify the two issues. This deprives the lex fori 
approach of its sense. 
4. Not Apply Law but Equity 
Another idea would be to decide cases with a foreign element not by the application of 
any state’s law, but on the basis of a sort of global equity. This idea has been propounded 
recently by Koresuke Yamauchi.35 In fact, the guidance by equitable rules is only part of 
Yamauchi’s proposal. He also calls for the establishment of an arbitration court with 
global jurisdiction who should take up all private cases that are referred to it. I am 
skipping over this – central and innovative part – of Yamauchi‘s piece since it requires 
action by governments: they would need to cooperate with the court to make it 
workable36. I only consider his statement with regard to the applicable law. Yamauchi 
suggests that judges should decide the private cases brought before them disregarding 
                                               
35 Koresuke Yamauchi, Das Globale Internationale Privatrecht im 21. Jahrhundert – Wendung des 
klassischen Paradigmas des IPR zur Globalisierung, Beiträge zum Internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, No. 88. 
The paper can be downloaded from http://www2.jura.uni-halle.de/tietje/html/publikationen.html (last 
visited August 5, 2010). 
36 See Yamauchi, id., at pp. 14-15. 




substantive rules of national law.37 Their objective should be a “reconciliation” of the 
parties. To that end, they should refer to general concepts such as bona fide or equity.38 
They should also take into account international conventions and uniform law.39 If they 
think it fits, they should be allowed to give priority to a national law, but they do not need 
to justify which rules they apply.40 Their preference for one or the other solution should 
not be questioned. His argument culminates in the claim that the conflict-of-laws 
paradigm has to be given up.41  
These are strong words, especially if one takes into account that they come from the 
chairperson of the distinguished Private International Law Association of Japan, the very 
task of which is to elaborate and refine conflict-of-laws rules. They testify to the despair 
in which many people familiar with the problems of global choice of law have fallen. A 
lot of Yamauchi’s considerations deserve a more specific treatment, in particular his 
suggestion to establish a global arbitration court. But let us take here just the point on the 
applicable law and transfer it to national courts: Would it be better for them to solve cases 
with an international element by following equitable principles instead of national law? 
Indeed, it is tempting to do away with the different national laws since they are the 
source of the inconsistencies that were criticized.42 However, there are serious counter-
arguments for applying a sort of “global equity”. Such a system would open the doors to 
arbitrary decisions. The judge could determine the outcome just as he pleases. It is true 
that after some time, a new system of substantial law applicable to transnational 
                                               
37 Yamauchi, id., at p. 13. 
38 Id. 
39 Yamauchi, id., at p. 14. 
40 Yamauchi, id., at p. 13. 
41 Yamauchi, id., at p. 15. 
42 See supra, I B. 




relationships could be developed on a case-by-case basis. But until then, one would have 
to accept a kind of khadi-justice, in which the judges would be all powerful.43 In addition, 
it seems unlikely that courts, even if they were entrusted with that task, could create a 
whole global legal system from scratch. The modern way of life calls for many 
sophisticated rules. Consider not only of securities law and corporate law, but also non-
economic fields such as the law of maintenance. States have answered this need with 
complex legislation. It would be a step back to forget about these rules and create 
everything on a case-by-case basis. In the best of circumstances, it would take decades to 
build a global legal system. In the worst, this goal would never be achieved, and we 
would be stuck with chaos. 
III. A New Proposal 
Given that the alternative avenues which have been examined do not lead anywhere, it is 
time to make a new proposal on how the court shall deal with conflicts of laws. The goal 
of this proposal is clear: The judge should decide cases such that divergences with other 
courts are avoided as much as possible. We also know some more things: Neither 
extending an existing approach or developing a new one would work. The application of 
the lex fori is also not possible, nor can the judge ignore the substantive laws of the states 
and resort to mere equity. 
                                               
43 The notion “khadi-justice” was used by Max Weber to describe a system of non-formal adjudication in 
which decisions will be determined by ethical or political considerations or by feelings oriented towards 
social justice. See Weber, Economy and Society (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds.), vol. 2, University 
of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1978, p. 813 (claiming that theocratic and patriarchal-
authoritarian groups would be better served by khadi-justice than by formal justice). See also the rejection 
of “cadi justice” by Currie, supra note 10, at p. 153. 




So how should the judge decide? In order to answer this question, it seems necessary 
to think over the problem of conflicts once again from the “fundamentals”.  
A. The Triangle Between the Parties, the Court, and States 
Basically, one can say that every conflicts situation involves three kinds of actors: the 
parties, a court, and states. The parties are the ones that bring the dispute to court and that 
have to suffer the consequences of the law’s application. The court is deciding the issue 
between them. To do so, it has to choose between the laws of different states that are 
available. The situation can thus be represented by the following chart.  
 
Not all situations involving two or more different national laws have to be decided by a 
judge. On the contrary, it is probable that most of them will be contractually or otherwise 
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possibility in mind that the case might go to court. Thus, it seems fair to assume that a 
court would be present as the final decision-maker.44 
B. The Answer by Current Conflicts Methodology 
The current method to solve the conflicts problem looks like this: In order to find out 
which national law applies, the judge uses the conflicts rules of its forum. Such rules 
exist everywhere. In the United States, they often take the form of judicial precedent, but 
they are no less binding than in those countries in which private international law is 
codified in special legislative acts. Their binding force results from the rule of stare 
decisis, while in the other countries it follows from legislative command.  
The conflicts rules will point to the applicability of one specific national law. The 
judge has to apply this law. He is not allowed to resort to a mixture or to intermediate 
law, since it is assumed that for every situation in the world there is one legal system that 
is competent to rule on it.  
In a chart, the current methodology’s structure looks like this:  
                                               
44 See also Juenger, supra note 3, at p. 163 (noting that it seems fitting to look at the conflicts problem from 
the “judicial vantage point” because “adjudication is the crucible for testing the soundness of choice-of-law 
approaches”). 





As can be seen, the conflicts rules of the forum function like an interface between the 
court and foreign law. They determine when it has to apply foreign law and which law to 
apply.  
Putting the conflict-of-laws rules of the forum to work can often be a complex task. 
For instance, judges in classic approach-countries need to follow the so-called renvoi, i.e. 
if the foreign legal system that would normally be applicable from the viewpoint of the 
forum refers the case to another legal system or back to the forum law, this reference 
must be obeyed.45 That requires the court effectively to take cognizance not only of the 
conflict rules of its own law, but also of those of the foreign jurisdiction to which these 
                                               
45 On renvoi, see Lawrence Colins (ed.), Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, vol. 1, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, margin nos. 4-001 et seq., pp. 73 et seq.; Kegel & Schurig, supra note 7, pp. 389-
414; Mayer & Heuzé, supra note 7, pp. 157-166; Calvo Caravaca & Carrascosa González, supra note 7, at 
pp. 288 et seq. Proponents of the modern approach claim that it would eliminate the problem of renvoi, see 
Currie, supra note 10, p. 184 (emphasizing that under interest analysis there can be no question of applying 
anything other than the internal law of the foreign state). It is disputed whether this claim really holds, see 
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rules refer, and to those to which the latter refer, and so on. Theoretically, this chain has 
no end. 
Not less are the demands of the modern approach. Under governmental interest 
analysis, for instance, the judge has to determine the policies of all national rules that are 
potentially applicable. He has to find out whether they demand the statute’s application to 
the present case, or whether there is only a “false conflict” because in reality only one 
law requires its own application.46 In case of a “true conflict”, the decision is easy: the 
judge has to follow the rules of his own law.47 Much more difficult is the decision in the 
“unprovided for-case”, i.e. when no statutes requires to govern.48 But at any rate, to 
analyze the policies of all potentially applicable laws requires a formidable amount of 
energy and time.  
If the judge comes to the result that a foreign law is applicable, the problems are far 
from over for her. As a next step, she has to inquire into its content. Current methodology 
requires her to decide the case exactly in the way a foreign court would decide it.49 Many 
times she will not be familiar with that way, so she needs to make use of the special 
instruments available to her to inform herself, such as appointing an expert. Current 
methodology asks her to respect the foreign law as far as possible, even if its application 
should strongly contravene the values of her own legal system or of the international 
community. There is only one limit: public policy. As long as the foreign law does not 
                                               
46 See Currie, supra note 10, at pp. 184-187 (claiming that first, false problems created by the traditional 
approach shall be cleared away). 
47 Currie, supra note 10, at p. 184 (“If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application 
of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign state also has an interest in the 
application of a contrary policy …”). 
48 On that special situation, see Currie, supra note 10, at pp. 152-156 (suggesting four different approaches, 
of which he prefers the application of the forum law). 
49 See Kegel & Schurig, supra note 7, at pp. 505-506 (claiming that the foreign sources of law have to be 
respected and that the foreign literature and the foreign case law has to be taken into consideration to the 
same extent as it would be by the courts of the state from which the rule originates). 




contravene the public policy of the forum, i.e. its most fundamental notions of justice, 
judges have to follow it.50 
C. A Critique 
To the uninitiated, it is surprising to which extent this methodology is technical. Laymen 
and even lawyers that are not familiar with conflicts of law are often stunned about the 
complexity of conflict of laws.51 That is true regardless of whether the classic or the 
modern approach is followed. Each of them requires an impressive amount of experience, 
knowledge and resources. For instance, to follow a renvoi or to analyze the governmental 
interests involved in a case demands a lot of expertise, information and time on the part 
of the judge. 
Inquiring the content of the applicable foreign law equally is a very demanding task. 
It is so demanding that it is highly unlikely that the judge will be able to fulfill it herself. 
More often than not, it will be impossible for her to correctly analyze a case under a 
foreign legal system in which she has not been trained. True, she might rely on experts. 
But different experts are often reaching different conclusions when it comes to determine 
how a particular case would be handled by a foreign court. Sometimes, the courts in the 
foreign legal system have themselves reached different conclusions on the same question, 
or there is a gap in the foreign law and no solution readily available. In the end, the judge 
will therefore have to make a decision herself as to the content of the foreign law. 
Inevitably, she will be tempted to escape this dilemma by interpreting the foreign law in 
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51 See Juenger, supra note 3, pp. 162-163 (noting that practioners have compared conflict of laws with a 
“labyrinth”, “tattoing soap bubbles” or a “sealed book”). 




the sense of her own law. Even if she rejected this approach, she will be guided 
unconsciously by the principles of the legal system she has learned in law school. But 
technically, under the current methodology, that is error. 
A further problem is that the conflicts mechanics requires the judge to apply foreign 
law exactly in the sense in which it is interpreted in the country of origin. Many times, 
this will impossible. For instance, it is hard to imagine that a court in a Western country 
could solve a case in exactly the same manner as a Mongolian court would do, taking 
account not only the legislation, but also the relevant cases as well as possible other 
sources of law, such as local custom, and sociological, ideological and political 
influences. Most courts of the world will not dispose of the necessary information and 
time to fulfil that task. Calling in an expert does not necessarily help as different experts 
might come to different opinions. In any case, an expert opinion cannot alleviate the 
court’s task to render its own decision. The judge, who is trained in her own legal system 
but rarely in a foreign, is not equipped for the task of applying foreign law in the manner 
that a foreign court is. The result is that the identical application of the law regardless of 
the forum will often remain a fiction. As Friedrich Juenger put it: “what courts apply in 
practice is all too often but an inferior replica of the foreign law in action”.52 
A further problem is that the conflicts mechanics forces the judge to respect the 
foreign law unless it leads to a result that is outrageous.53 He is called upon to apply 
foreign law exactly in the sense in which it is interpreted in the country of origin. To take 
an extreme example, a U.S. judge might be called upon to imitate a family law court in 
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most parts of the world. 




North Korea. Even if she has severe qualms about North Korean law and the 
interpretation given to it by the courts there, she has no choice but to follow it – provided 
she will be able at all to get sufficient and reliable information on its content. 
The whole process seems to be even absurd if one takes into account that it does not 
produce the result that it intends to produce, namely decisional harmony.54 For all the 
efforts made to determine the correct law and apply it in the same manner have only lead 
to more divergence. As the example of the limping legal relationships55 clearly shows, 
individuals suffer from this. It seems preposterous that for them that more than one law 
should govern the same situation and that they cannot know in advance which law that is. 
To ordinary people, this appears just to be the ultimate example of injustice. 
D. The New Paradigm: Judges as Administrators of Global Law 
The proposal that is made here is that courts should apprehend their task differently. They 
should not view themselves as the instruments of the state they are sitting in. Instead, 
they should understand themselves as administrators of global justice.  
Obviously, there is no agreement between different states as to what “justice” is and 
what it requires. Under the current split of the world into different legal systems each of 
them has his own conception of justice and they are diverging from each other. It is 
suggested here that the judge should respect these differences. But in approaching them, 
he should not look through the lens of his own forum conflicts law and try to determine 
which legal system governs. My proposal is that he should take a more holistic approach 
to conflicts. He shall consider the different legal conceptions and find out which one 
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should, seen from a global viewpoint, apply. There should be no preference for any of 
those systems, not even for the conflict rules of the forum. Instead, the court is asked 
determine the applicable law by using globally accepted conflicts rules. In a chart, this 
would look like this: 
 
At first glance, this methodology looks quite similar to the one currently used. The 
crucial difference is that the judge is no longer bound by the conflict rules of the forum in 
deciding which law applies. He should select the applicable law in conformity with 
world-wide accepted principles of conflicts. He should do so even if he is thereby 
violating the forum’s law.  
The reader might ask how this deviance from the judge’s own legal system can be 
justified. I will try to answer this question shortly.56 Another question might concern the 
existence of global rules of conflicts law. In particular, the reader might doubt that there 
can be such rules given that, as has been shown, there is no agreement between national 
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conflicts rules.57 The short answer to this puzzle is that the global rules lie on a different 
level of abstraction than national conflict rules. They are more general in character and 
less concerned with detail than national law. Their content will be expounded later.58 
Here, it suffices to say that above all the choice of the parties has to be respected and that 
international conventions must be given a paramount role; that in the absence of both the 
court should not rely on the conflicts rules of the lex fori but rather use a comparative 
approach to choice of law; that once the applicable law is determined it should be 
interpreted in line with global values and standards. These rules are still very 
rudimentary. But it is suggested that they lead to more justice than the administration of 
the differences we find today in global practice. If they are followed, then indeed one and 
the same set of facts will receive identical treatment in all courts of the world. 
IV. Justification 
A. Disregarding the Forum’s Conflicts Law, Not Disregarding the Law 
In the foregoing, an extraordinary suggestion has been made: Judges should not view 
themselves as instruments of the state who has entrusted them with their task. In 
international cases, their main concern should be to achieve decisional harmony with 
other courts. They should even disregard the law of the forum if it is necessary to achieve 
global justice. 
These claims must seem outrageous to lawyers, in particular to those with a 
background in constitutional law. In the current organizational framework, the place of 
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the courts is clearly defined: Their task is to interpret and apply the acts of their 
legislature. They are not free to disregard these acts. Any other opinion would impair the 
rule of law. This principle belongs to the very foundation of democracy. It reflects 
Parliament’s primacy, which is justified because of the latter’s backing by the majority of 
the population. The importance of the principle of the rule of law goes even beyond 
democracy, as it also applies to non-democratic constitutional systems. Its history can be 
traced back to 1215, when Magna Carta was drafted.59 It means that judges cannot decide 
cases according to their personal preferences, but have to follow the law.60 
So how can the validity of this long-standing, fundamental principle be challenged? 
In effect, the claim that is made here does not question the rule of law. It is submitted that 
judges are bound by the law – the question is just which law. In cases involving parties or 
facts from different countries, more than one law may legitimately claim its application. 
What is suggested here is that the judge in this situation should not start from a local 
approach to conflicts to advise him on the applicability of foreign law. Instead, he should 
take an internationalist position. That is because in a global legal system, there is no such 
thing as a “foreign law”, strictly speaking. Each of them is as good as the other. The 
judge therefore has to make an independent choice between them, one that is more 
inspired by inter- or transnational principles of law than by idiosyncratic rules of his own 
state. In case that the forum’s conflicts rules stand in the way of harmonious decision-
making on the global level, he shall ignore it and follow the rules that the other courts in 
the world would apply. 
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I have no illusions about the fact that virtually all adherents of the current conflicts 
approach will reject this proposition. That is only natural, as the view expounded here 
questions one of their most basic premises: the supremacy of the forum’s rules in the 
court’s decision-making. This premise is embraced by all conflicts scholars no matter 
what school they belong to. For instance, a mind as elucidated as that of Albert A. 
Ehrenzweig opined that a foreign interest can become relevant only by virtue of an 
interpretation of the spatial reach of the forum law.61 Others that claim to have developed 
novel methodologies equally do not question that the court’s own law has to be applied 
first.62  
The prevalence of forum law was most clearly expressed by governmental interest 
analysis. Brainerd Currie, its spiritual father, wrote that in the event of a conflict between 
the forum’s interests and those of another state, the court should prefer those of its own 
state.63 He even wanted to take away any power of the courts to make conflict rules and 
entrust that task exclusively to the legislature. The reason he gave was that weighing 
conflicting governmental interests would be “a function of a high political order”, which 
“should not be committed to courts in a democracy”.64  
Paradoxically, this view prevails today less in the United States and more in Europe 
where Currie’s ideas are faithfully transposed. The legislators of most continental 
countries give their courts exact indications as to what law they should apply in cases 
involving foreign elements. Recently, the European Union has joined them in the effort 
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of codifying conflicts rules.65 This is very much what Currie wanted, although he 
certainly would have denounced the content of the European rules as “mechanical” and 
“sterile”. 
There are other seemingly strange parallels between governmental interest analysis 
and European law. Although formally Curries’ preference for the forum law is sniffed at 
as being too “parochial”, the same approach is followed in hard case that involve 
“overriding mandatory provisions” of their forum law: The EU explicitly allows national 
judges to apply such provisions of law even if a foreign law would normally govern.66 
Moreover, there is no doubt that the EU Member State courts always have to apply the 
Regulations and Directives of the Union if their policy so requires.67 
Thus, it is correct to say that the forum’s prevalence over other law is the basis of 
conflicts rules on both sides of the Atlantic. It is so widespread that one can even speak of 
it a globally accepted legal principle. At the same time, it is at the root of the currents 
conflicts muddle. Therefore, it is suggested that it has to be overcome. 
B. The Function of the Judge: Instrumentality in the Hands of the 
Legislature or Servant of Justice? 
Before I can go on explaining the notion of a global legal order, it is useful to reflect 
some more on the idea that the legal rules of the forum are automatically binding for the 
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judge. Only if the reasons of this axiom are well understood can we go on and find out its 
limits. 
1. Separation of Powers and Legal Theory 
Underlying the supremacy of the forum conflicts rules is a conception of the judicial 
process that is deeply imbued by constitutional ideas. It views the judge as an organ of 
the state that has entrusted him with his task. He is obliged to follow its rules – conflicts 
or other –, no matter what their content is, as long as the legislator wants him to do so.68  
Obviously, that has something to do with the division of tasks between the legislature 
and the judiciary. It is generally accepted that courts have to follow legislative acts of 
their state. That is part of the separation of powers, a hallmark of constitutional law since 
the times of Montesquieu. Why should the judge be able to disregard the law of the 
forum? Is he thereby not assuming to be above the law? 
The argument is of course powerful. There can be no doubt that the judge must follow 
some rules of law, and that the legislator of his state is the one that has the authority to 
enact them. However, it seems that over all the discussion about separation of powers the 
true aim of legal proceedings has been forgotten. This aim is not to execute the forum’s 
laws. Rather, it is to achieve justice. Legal philosophers from Aristotle to Ronald 
Dworkin have recognized that the goal of judicial proceedings is to render a just result.69 
Applying the commands of the legislature is part of that enterprise, but it is not the 
primary goal. 
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The comment I am making here is of a general nature. Today, we have come to an 
age in which the judiciary is perceived as a mere appendix to the legislative power. 
Courts have lost their independent function. They are viewed as instrumentalities in the 
hands of the legislature – except for those few courts that may in some jurisdictions 
nullify acts of Parliament. Yet the task of the judiciary goes way beyond the mere 
execution of orders by elected representatives.70 It is to do justice in the individual case 
before them. 
This role of the court is epitomized in Justitia, or Lady Justice, the blindfolded female 
figure that is holding a balance in one and a sword in the other hand. It was very clear to 
see in the Roman legal system where the magistrates, were asked to “speak the law” – ius 
dicere in Latin, from which the word “jurisdiction” is derived.71 The process was two-
staged – first, a praetor would determine whether a valid claim had been brought and 
define the legal issue to be decided, then he would transfer the decision of the relevant 
factual questions to a iudex or an arbiter.72 There was no legislation involved. The 
independence of the judicial task from the legislature was also very visible in the original 
Common law, in which judges were endowed with unfettered powers to solve individual 
disputes brought before them. There were hardly any acts of Parliament for the courts to 
obey in order to accomplish their mission.  
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Even Currie admitted that the court should strive to do justice to the parties if there 
are no conflicting interests among states.73 But why only if there are no such interests? 
The interests of state are not the central concern of the judicial process. Rather, it is doing 
justice to the individual litigants. It seems that this goal has been lost sight of. 
Today’s general preference for the state’s rules and interests testifies to a fundamental 
reversal of our conception of the judicial process. This reversal has been caused by the 
advent of the nation-state. Since its firm establishment, the interests of the presupposed 
“common weal” take precedence over those of the individuals. The legislature is free to 
regulate any aspect of private individual’s life, including the law that applies in the 
relations between them. Hence courts have learned to look primarily into statutory law 
when they seek the solution for a private dispute. They get into trouble, however, if there 
is an international element in the situation to be decided, because then often two or more 
different legislators claim that their rules would apply. In such situation, the judge seems 
to be constitutionally required to obey the laws of the forum. Like in war, he has to 
choose his side.  
Elsewhere it was argued that we should overcome the idea that conflict of laws has 
some similarity to battles between states.74 It was also tried to show that the conception of 
the state following a uniform interest is outdated.75 We should certainly not think of 
courts as a theatre in which states take out their differences over conflicting interests and 
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would use for that purpose the parties as their marionettes. In court as in life, the real 
litigants of a dispute are the individuals involved. It is them who are most concerned by 
the procedure’s outcome.76 They act in their private capacity and not as representatives of 
states. Hence rendering justice between individuals should be the primary goal of the 
judicial process, not securing state’s interests. 
2. The Limits of Democracy 
The claim made here that the judge’s task would be merely to render justice, not to 
enforce state laws, could arouse some doubts. Today, justice exists almost exclusively in 
the form of state legislation. What is just and what is not is decided in a democracy by the 
will of the majority. The enactments of the legislature reflect this will. They cannot be 
circumvented by judges in international cases who seek to fulfill their own ideal of what 
justice entails.  
This point is certainly right to the extent that justice, even when seen from a global 
viewpoint, is possible mainly only within the framework of national law. In the absence 
of a global legislator, the definition of what is right and what not must come from nation-
states. There can therefore be no question that courts need to apply substantive national 
law to the disputes before them. That does, however, not answer conclusively how they 
have to select the applicable law. In this regard, it is necessary to face the limits of the 
principle of democracy. In a world divided into different states, one parliament might be 
as well democratically elected than the other. Why does the court have to apply one law 
and not the other? This question cannot be answered by a simple reference to the 
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principle of democracy and the binding force of state law. Since there are different 
legitimated bodies who issue legislative enactments, to say that the court must obey the 
law begs the question which one.  
3. Juxtaposition of Courts and Administrative Agencies 
The claim made here is that the judge is more than a mere instrumentality in the hands of 
the legislature which just has to obey the latter’s commands. This claim can be 
corroborated by a comparison of courts and administrative agencies. Certainly everybody 
agrees that administrative agencies are charged with enforcing the law of their own state. 
Rules of other state may be occasionally looked at, but not “applied” in the sense of 
enforcing them. For instance, the SEC might have to take cognizance of the corporate law 
of a foreign state in order to know the exact powers of the directors of a company 
registered with it. It might also lend a hand to foreign agencies in administering their 
laws. But it will certainly not “apply” foreign securities law as it is exclusively charged 
with enforcing U.S. legislation.77  
With the judiciary, it is all different. Courts usually apply foreign law; for some it has 
become their daily bread and butter. It would be ludicrous to argue before a judge of 
Ohio that he is not charged with enforcing French law and thus could not apply it to a 
dispute between two French spouses before him. Using foreign law to render its decision 
seems somewhat natural for a judge. The difference to the agency is striking. Obviously, 
it calls for an explanation.  
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The positivist would argue that judges apply foreign law because the forum state has 
charged them to do so. According to his view, the legal rules made by another state have 
no intrinsic value of their own. They only bind the court to the extent that the court’s own 
legislature has said that they shall be followed.78 This stance seems to be logical and 
required not only by constitutional law, but also by the principle of sovereignty under 
public international law.  
But on the other hand, it is quite strange that rarely any state so far has prohibited the 
courts to apply foreign law. In all states of the world, the acts of foreign legislatures are 
obeyed. Moreover, in those countries that belong to the common law family and others 
like France, courts have never been legislatively instructed to apply foreign law. They did 
so of their own accord.  
But why? Why do courts all over the world accept to enforce foreign legislation, but 
not administrative agencies? That is because courts are charged with the very special task 
to render justice. To do so sometimes requires application of the laws of another 
legislator. They do it not in the interest of the foreign sovereign or that of their own state, 
but in order to give a just answer to the litigants that have sought their decision. Thus, in 
the triangle between parties, courts and states79, judges are using the rules of the rule-
makers interchangeably to accomplish their special mission. 
It is interesting to note that courts are very wary to follow that recipe when foreign 
criminal or tax law is at stake. For instance, the Supreme Court has found it to be self-
evident that the “courts of no Country execute the penal laws of another”80, while an 
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English court held that “no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another”81. 
The foundation of this “public law taboo” was questioned with very good arguments.82 
But the underlying reasoning is clear: the courts do not want to be mere instrumentalities 
at the service of a foreign state. In other words, they do not want to act as a kind of 
administrative agency through which another government pursues its claims against 
private individuals. But they do not have any qualms about applying foreign private law 
to private relationships, because here this danger does not exist.  
The only possible explanation for the differences between the role of foreign law 
before courts and administrative agencies is that the function to decide disputes between 
private individuals is quite different from executing the law of a state. Thus, the courts 
should not be seen as mere instrumentalities in the hands of the legislator, which would 
have to follow each and every of its commands. Their first and foremost task is to render 
justice to the parties before them. This is the true reason why they do not hesitate to 
follow foreign law, if that is what it takes to give a just solution to the parties’ dispute. 
C. From Local Justice to Global Justice 
In the foregoing, it was demonstrated that the main goal of judicial proceedings is not to 
enforce the laws of a sovereign but to achieve a just result in a dispute between 
individuals. “Justice” is of course a very vague notion. It is crucial to make it more 
precise. When it comes to international cases with elements in different states, apparently 
two possible interpretations of the notion “justice” have to be distinguished: a local and a 
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global one. The local interpretation means that the case would have to be decided 
according to the rules that from the forum’s point of view would be the best to apply. 
This interpretation is designed to make the national policy prevail in conflicts. It is a 
possible attitude and the one that all the current approaches adopt.  
A more global interpretation of the notion “justice”, however, insists on the plurality 
of global law. It acknowledges that there are different versions of what constitutes a just 
legal system, and that each of them has as a matter of principle equal value. The judge 
has to make a decision as to which of these versions applies. In that decision, he must be 
guided by the general goal of doing justice to the individual parties, not furthering the 
interests of one or the other state.  
Now what can be the content of “global justice”? Obviously, the notion would remain 
empty if we were not able to point to any principles or rules that are part of it. As the 
methodology that is applied here is rather new, it is difficult to find any substantial or 
conflicts rules that are unequivocally agreeable on. But there is at least one fundamental 
axiom that must be followed to achieve global justice in any given case. This axiom is 
that courts should strive to avoid results in the same case that differ from each other. The 
proposition is immediately appealing. We can be quite sure that this is required by global 
justice because the opposite would be ultimate injustice: that the same relationship would 
be treated in different ways by different courts.83  
The precept that courts should strive for decisional harmony is of course formal and 
without any substantive content. But that fact does not render it subject to criticism. On 
the contrary, the very formality of the axiom is the condition for its neutrality. This, in 
turn, is key for its success because it guarantees that the axiom can be followed by the 
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courts in very different legal systems without hurting anybody’s interests more than that 
of others. It is a sort of a priori rule in the Kantian sense, one that one could wish that its 
maxim would become a general law and everybody would follow it. In other words, it is 
of universal validity, a type of modern “golden rule”. 
Of course, this rule is not new at all. As has been mentioned, it was already the goal 
of the conflicts theory in the 19th century, most artfully expounded by Savigny.84 But 
over time, the idea has lost its panache, giving way to more palpable state interests that 
the court should strive for. Even those authors and courts that still adhere to the old goal 
of choice of law assume that it can only be pursued through the conflicts rules of the 
forum. These rules have over the years become more elaborated, and by the same token 
more diverging. It is hence necessary to re-establish the true goal of the conflicts 
mechanism.  
This is done here under the new paradigm of the “global legal order”. In our 
globalized society, the goal to decide disputes in the identical way is more important than 
ever. It is indeed part of building up a global legal system, in which judges play a crucial 
part.  
D. Building a Global Legal Order 
1. Notion Explained 
The foregoing arguments contain a sea change. It was said that courts should not follow 
slavishly the conflict rules of their legislation. Instead, they should strive to achieve a sort 
of global justice. If the courts were to follow the precept that is given here, it is 
                                               
84 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 




submitted, the application of law within the world would become more coherent. There 
would be fewer contradictions, hence less limping relationships and less injustice. Judges 
could thus contribute to what can be called a “global legal order”. 
Now “global legal order” is a notion not much less abstract than “justice”. It can be 
illustrated by comparing the world to a house with a many different groups. Each group 
houses principally in one room, though they also move around. Every group has adopted 
its own rules. That is not per se problematic. The problem, however, is that they do not 
agree which rule applies when: Each of them has developed its own approach of 
determining when its rules or those of another group apply. That is because each thinks 
that it would hold a version of justice that is superior to that of the others. One can 
understand this attitude from the group’s individual perspective. If one looks at the house 
as a whole, however, the result is mere chaos. 
A global legal order can be conveniently apprehended as the opposite of the situation 
just described. It is a system in which there are diverse rules, but not chaos. That is 
because although the groups hold different views of justice, everybody agrees on when 
which rules apply. There is a consensus that conflicts between different rules have to be 
avoided. On the basis of this lies a common understanding that the gravest injustice 
would be if two groups apply different laws to the same event. It is something that has to 
be avoided at – almost – all cost. This can be achieved if none of the groups claims 
superiority of its version of justice over that of the other groups. It must recognize that 
the others’ systems of rules have an equal value. That does not mean that the differences 
between the groups’ rules must be negated. On the contrary, they can even be more fully 
developed if the instances to which they apply are clearly defined. In such a situation, 




everybody will know which rules she has to obey. Moreover, peace and harmony will 
reign within the house. A pluralistic society will flourish as long as everybody agrees to 
the applicability of the rules to certain situations. 
There are currently many books discussing the “global legal order”. They concern 
issues such as human rights85, global business regulation86 or climate preservation87. In 
these contexts, we like to adopt the view of the house rather than that of a particular 
room. But it is startling that for conflict of laws, no such global approach is undertaken.88 
Conflicts lawyers still argue on the basis of the old premise that the forum’s rules must be 
considered first. That is very surprising: when you build up a global legal order, one in 
which different legal systems can coexist, the first that you would do is to determine the 
situations to which one or the other applies. It is a fundamental question, worth to be put 
in the foundational text of any community. If it is not dealt with, innumerable frictions 
will occur. Thus, conflict of laws forms an essential part of a global legal order, it is its 
cornerstone. 
2. Why States are not Well-Positioned for the Task 
The claim that is made here is that judges should play a central part in building a global 
legal order. They should disregard the forum’s rules if necessary to ensure harmonious 
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86 See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation, Cambridge University Press, 
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of universal justice). 




decisions with their fellow courts in other countries. Thus, the central role for the solution 
of conflicts lies with the courts.89 Others take the diametrically opposite position. 
Brainerd Currie, for instance, argued that the task of finding solutions for conflicts cases 
should not be entrusted to judges.90 He preached instead in favor of legislatively made 
conflicts rules.  
Obviously, therefore, some explanation is needed why the courts are trusted here 
more than the legislators. This explanation must start from the idea that conflicts rules are 
part of a process that shall result in “global legal ordering”. Parliaments are not the best 
actors to rely on to achieve this result. That is because they are naturally biased towards 
their own constituency. They even have to be so. Their task is, above and before all 
others, to serve their citizens. It is from this perspective that they approach international 
relations, and they handle conflict of laws in this manner as well. Indeed, it would seem 
difficult for them to switch their personality and argue from a global viewpoint when 
dealing with conflict of laws.  
The existing legislative choice-of-law rules do confirm this conjecture. Just take the 
example of the German rules of private international law. Some of them are unilateral in 
character: they only deal with the reach of the forum’s rules and leave the question of the 
application of foreign law to the courts.91 Others give a clear preference to the substantive 
law of the forum.92 All of this, obviously, does not help building a global legal order. 
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Germany). 




This description of the legislators’ behavior is not meant as a reproach. Given the task 
that they have and the way they are composed, it is only natural that their attitudes are 
heavily biased towards their community. Moreover, considering the nature of the political 
process, it is not at all surprising that legislators extend the values cherish in domestic 
relations to international ones. They typically reason like this: If the forum condemns 
same sex marriages, why should they be recognized between foreigners?93 Or: Given that 
paternity of the former spouse is presumed by the forum law for a baby born within a 
certain delay after divorce, why should the same rule not apply to children of couples 
with different nationalities?94 
It is a fact that governments tend to follow their political convictions when dealing 
with conflict of laws. They constantly mix issues of domestic policy with private 
international law. It is close to impossible for them to strip off their values and assess 
trans-border relationships in a neutral way. To make matters even worse, if there is 
internal disagreement about the substantive policy to be followed, diverging conflicts 
rules will be suggested. An example is provided by the American discussion about the 
proper conflicts rule for torts, in which liberals and conservatives have clashed with one 
another over the issue of which law should apply.95 
This does by no means imply that states could never take responsibility for the global 
legal order. The large number of international conventions containing uniform conflicts 
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rules on which they have agreed demonstrates the contrary. One of the principal 
recommendations given here to the courts is to follow the international rules before 
making up a rule themselves.96 But there remains ample room in which there is no such 
agreement between states. That is because more often than not, governments will fail to 
find an agreement on the applicable law. The reasons are mainly political. They may 
seem dear to the politicians that hold them, yet they are insignificant when one takes into 
account the costs they produce on the world level. In these cases, it is suggested, judges 
should go forward and devise a rule that satisfies the exigencies of global legal ordering. 
They should leave behind the states embroiled in their disputes and strive for the just 
solution of the case. To paraphrase one of Currie’s aphorism, one could say that “we are 
better off without (differing) legislative conflict of laws rules”.97 
3. States as Rule Providers and Global Rule of Law 
If justice is the real goal of the judicial process, and if states are unwilling and even 
utterly incapable of achieving it in transnational cases, then why should courts take all the 
hassles of identifying global choice-of-law rules? Could they not make up the rules of 
law for cross-border relations?  
In fact, this idea extends the office of the judge too far. The courts’ task is to solve 
disputes according to the applicable rules of law. They do not have the power to just 
make those rules up. The global order is composed of – sometimes very – different 
versions of what justice requires. The judge has to accept this fact. She has to recognize 
the legislatures’ power to determine what justice required. They decide on “the rules of 
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the game”. In other words, they are the “rule providers” for the global legal system98. It is 
the obligation of the judge to follow the legislature-made substantive rules. This is 
required by the principle of the rule of law. The difference to the conventional version is 
that under the view expounded here, the court does not only have to follow the laws of 
the forum, but also those of other states. One could call this new paradigm the “global 
rule of law”.  
The global rule of law also explains why another suggestion cannot hold. Many 
writers have argued in favor of more substantive elements in choice of law. For instance, 
Robert A. Leflar’s “better law approach” has come to fame99. Under that approach, the 
judge would be called upon to decide which state’s law, under the circumstances at hand, 
would achieve the best results. Friedrich K. Juenger has argued as well for a “teleological 
approach”, which would allow the judge to select the applicable rules according to the 
results they would lead to.100  
In regard of this and other substantive theories, one cannot but endorse the opinion of 
Brainerd Currie, who stated: 
“Conflict-of-laws cases do not provide courts with a license which they do not otherwise have 
to condemn the law and policy of a state on the ground that it is archaic, or misguided, or 
socially and economically unwise”.101  
The reason is that otherwise the powers of the court would be nearly unlimited.102 The 
substantive approach would allow them to select the applicable law as a function of how 
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they want to decide a certain case. They could be tempted to abuse such a far-ranging 
power. To counter human weakness, it is not advisable to write judges a blank cheque.103 
It would inevitably lead to the kind of khadi-justice that was denounced before.104  
The principle of global rule of law is designed to countenance such perverse effects. 
It has the advantage of introducing a healthy division of tasks between the legislature and 
the judiciary: one branch makes the rules, the other applies them to disputes that may 
arise. That division is well known from domestic law. It should be maintained, but this 
time on the global level. This implies the following: Courts should be forced to respect 
the law of the state that is applicable, and which law that is should be decided according 
to a rule the content of which they are not able to influence. The only change is that the 
conflicts rule which determines the applicable law is no longer exclusively in the hands 
of one legislator, that of the forum. 
4. Is Judging Part of “Global Governance”? 
The objective of this article is to underline that judges play an important role in building a 
global legal order. Others have described courts as “performing global governance 
functions”105. On the face of it, this description may seem quite similar to what has been 
proposed here. In effect, however, it means something quite different. The major 
difference lies in the following: the “global governance theory” conceives the judiciary’s 
role from top down. It argues that domestic courts would “allocate governance 
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authority”.106 It asks courts to become aware of their special function to “determine the 
rights and obligations of transnational actors”.107  
The role that is given in this article to the court is much more restricted. It is to follow 
the law and to do justice in the individual case. True, by doing so, courts will 
unavoidably contribute to the creation of a global legal order. But they will do that by 
deciding individual cases and looking at particular facts before them, not by conceiving 
of their general task as “global regulators”. The courts’ role is not that of an eagle 
building its nest high in the mountains. They are more like ants that, by assiduously 
collecting the little parts, have to build an anthill from bottom up. 
The emergence of a global legal order from the chaos of national legal systems is not 
the main aim of the suggestion made here. It comes as a by-product of the judge’s 
activity, because later cases will be decided along the same lines. This view of the 
judge’s role is much more modest than that which assigns them an active role in global 
governance. The advantage of this modesty is that it does not require courts to tackle a 
completely new task. Judges are called upon to do precisely their job, which is to render 
justice. They do not therefore need to alter their position with regard to the other branches 
of government. Instead, they shall just do what they have always been charged with. That 
allows more realistically to achieve the goals than to call for a fundamental upheaval of 
the judge’s office in international cases.   
5. Judges and Arbitrators in the Global Legal Order 
It was argued that the court, when facing a conflict of laws, should not feel restricted by 
the commands of its legislator.108 The global methodology that is suggested here calls for 
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the judge to be concerned instead about the just resolution of the case at hand. In order to 
do so, he has to choose one of the rules of the world that guarantees such a result. In its 
choice, he should make sure that it is in conformity with the selection that other courts 
will make in the same or similar situation, in order to produce a harmonious result. 
One can compare this function of the judge to that of an arbitrator. He shall decide on 
equity-like principle which law applies. He shall not take sides. Like an arbitrator, he 
shall consider himself as not being committed to any particular legal system. He shall 
determine the applicable law in the interest of justice, not of his state. If all judges do so, 
they will smooth out clashes and conflicts between different states.  
It may seem somewhat mysterious why the courts shall leave the legislatively-made 
law aside when it comes to conflicts, but respect it in all other situations. The reason is 
provided by the paradigm of the global legal order: if all legal systems are considered to 
be part of one global order, then there is no reason to prefer one over the other. In such an 
order, judges are confronted with different laws of equal value. Functionally, they act as 
multistate decision-makers.109 They have to make a decision as to which rules shall 
apply. Logically, the rules of the forum cannot have any more influence on that decision 
than the rules of the other states.  
There is another striking reason why the judge should behave in international 
situations like an arbitrator. Arbitration nowadays plays an important role in transnational 
disputes. Given the shortcomings the states’ judiciaries which are suspected of leaning in 
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favor of their interests and their nationals, it is even the preferred method of settling those 
disputes.110 The literature generally accepts today that the arbitral tribunal is not bound to 
any particular system of conflicts rules.111 Courts, on the other hand, are thought to be 
bound by the conflict laws of the forum. This has led to a situation in which courts and 
arbitrators, even sitting in the same state, determine the applicable law in a different way. 
The result is paradoxical. It also gives the wrong incentives. If the parties, for instance, 
want to overcome the forum’s conflicts rules, they can do so by including an arbitration 
clause in their contract. The consequence is an unnatural preference for arbitration over 
adjudication by state courts. 
If the suggestion made here would be followed, judges and arbitrators would have to 
deal with choice-of-law issues in exactly the same manner. The same law would be 
applied not only by different courts of different states, but also by state judges and private 
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judges. That means that we would have killed two birds with one stone. Harmony within 
the global legal system would be achieved throughout all methods of dispute resolution. 
At the same time, unnatural incentives for the parties to choose one or the other would be 
eliminated. 
E. Counter-arguments 
There are important arguments against the suggestion made here. In the following, I will 
try to answer some of them. Although I will strive to present the counter-arguments as 
clear and sharp as possible, I can of course not exclude that the reader will have other, 
better reasons to refute my thesis. It is to be hoped that a debate will ensue that will bring 
these arguments to light. 
1. Theoretical vs. Empirical Decision-Making 
First, a very fundamental argument can be made against the structure of my proposition. 
Let me summarize what I was doing: I am about to develop a new – or rather recalibrated 
– approach to the question of how judges shall determine the applicable law. For that 
purpose, I have started from a premise, namely that disputes should be handled in the 
same manner no matter which court decides. I will later develop this into a more full-
fledged methodology.112 
Against this kind of theorizing, important objections have been made. In the past, 
many conflicts theories have been suggested that start from a general premise, like 
comity, the “seat” of the relationship, vested rights, governmental interests, better law, to 
name just a few. Writers that have introduced similar arguments were accused by Albert 
                                               
112 See infra V. 




A. Ehrenzweig of trying to create “superlaw”.113 He denounced this kind of reasoning as 
being circular, because it produces the very results it was intended to produce.114 Instead 
of bringing order into the system, it seems to be the recipe for more chaos. It was 
remarked that if six or seven hundred years of debate among the statutists of conflicts 
theory did not solve the unilateralist/multilateralist debate, differences of opinion on such 
fundamental questions are not likely to disappear.115  
I agree that a court faced with a specific conflicts question in real life will often find 
the better answer than a professor staring at the books on his writing desk. It is precisely 
for this reason that this contribution does not suggest any new rules on how the 
applicable law should be chosen. It merely provides judges with an axiom they should 
follow and some examples how it can be achieved. The rules are left for the courts to find 
out. It even explicitly asks them to follow the solutions to conflicts cases that have been 
found through adjudication.116 
But even making such a general proposition might be too much. Most writers in the 
U.S. have given up the search for any theoretical basis of conflict of laws. It would be 
better, they argue, to just observe what the courts do and distil rules from that.117 The 
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virtue of such method has been compared to finding the most convenient way over the 
faculty’s lawn: instead of long planning, it is better to just seed the entire area with grass 
and wait to see what ways will be worn by travelers in their daily round.118 
The argument, in its essence, means that theorists must keep their hands off conflicts 
of laws. This suggestion touches upon the basic relation between legal science and the 
courts. What is the proper role of academics in law? Shall they stay out and just observe 
what the courts do? Or shall they take a more active stand, trying to lead the way in some 
direction?  
Probably the majority of the U.S. conflicts writers today adopt the empirical 
approach. They think that conflicts law cannot be deducted from general premises or 
principles, but just in an inductive way by observing the courts’ practice. The future in 
conflicts is seen not in new in sweeping theoretical principles, but rather in an empirical 
approach.119 Even statistical analyses have been undertaken on how courts solve conflicts 
cases, with the intention to use them as guidelines for future decisions.120  
This attitude is deeply skeptical of the existence of any a priori principles in law.121 It 
has obvious connections to the “legal realists”, who thought that law is just a prediction 
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of what the courts will decide122. But as the legal realist attitude, it is exaggerated. On the 
heart of both the empirical method in conflict of laws and the realists’ theory that is its 
cornerstone lies a basic misunderstanding. Both confound legal science with natural 
sciences, in which “objective” rules would govern that one can find out through 
experiments.123 But law is different. Law is intimately connected to justice, and justice is 
part of ethics, as Aristotle made clear.124 Ethics is about finding out the good and the bad 
way of life. It is therefore never value free, and neither is law.125 In applying the law, 
courts need to be guided by axioms and principles. The task of legal science is to reveal 
them and make them better understood.  
Paradoxically, it is an empirical account of adjudication that confirms this view. One 
of the leading empiricists has remarked that 40 years after the choice-of-law revolution, 
the understanding of the conflicts issue by the bar and the bench has not improved.126 It 
was also observed that courts in the U.S. have produced an enormous amount of 
inconsistent case solutions.127 If we were to speak in the lawn-picture mentioned above, it 
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could be said that the judges have worn out myriad ways in the grass so that no real way 
is visible at all. Practice seems to need an axiom more than ever. It was even said that 
they would have a right for more guidance than has been provided so far.128 
This guidance is provided here. Courts are not told what solution to adopt in a precise 
conflicts case. Instead, they are just given an axiom to follow in devising their own 
solution. There is nothing presumptuous for law professors to do so. It is my 
understanding that the professions’ task precisely is to point out general axioms and 
principles of law that are too easily forgotten over the ephemeral details of the courts’ 
day-to-day practice. If there were no such axioms and principles, then we could simply 
stop legal research altogether.  
Still the quest for a general methodology might in the end prove worthless and 
without practical effect. Albert A. Ehrenzweig has ridiculed the efforts of conflicts 
scholars as “nicety”, “humanism”, “fiction” or “dreaming”.129 I am happy to be accused 
of “nicety” and “humanism”, if that shall really be an insult. I think it is the essence of 
what legal science is about. I can even live with the reproach that my theorizing will 
result in nothing more “fiction” or “dreaming”. After all, every improvement has to start 
with some fiction and dreaming, even in the law. 
2. Judges Not Apt 
A further argument that can be made against my position is that judges would not be apt 
for the task that was ascribed to them here. They would not be able to develop anything 
                                                                                                                                            
(“it is hard to read a lot of choice of law opinions without being terribly disappointed by the quality of the 
analysis, which tends to be unsophisticated, unthoughtful, and often unreasoned.”). 
128 Scoles, Hay, Borchers & Symeonides, supra note 9, p. 108, margin no. § 2.26 (“Courts need and are 
entitled to more guidance than the iconoclastic literature has provided.”) 
129 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 29, at pp. 93-94, margin no. 39. 




like a coherent approach to solving conflicts of laws. To hear the argument in full, it is 
worthwhile to quote one of its proponents. William Tetley writes:   
“When one studies the state of conflicts law today, one must conclude that broad, general 
advances and solutions will not come from the courts… The courts have less and less time for 
day-to-day commercial and civil matters, let alone the difficult problems of conflict of laws. 
Nor do most courts have the time to become familiar with, and expert in, these complicated 
and relatively rare problems. In consequence, only limited new direction can be expected 
from the Bench.”130 
This view is somewhat the counter-position of the empirical approach: while the latter 
puts all hopes for improvement in the courts, this opinion does not expect anything from 
them at all. But like the empirical approach, this skeptical position seems to be 
exaggerated. Normally, we put trust in the courts to make advances and find the right 
solution in all kinds of matters. There is no reason to think that they would not be able to 
do so in conflicts. On the contrary, they are especially fit for the task.131 That is because 
they see the intricacies of international cases and their problems in practice clearly. It is 
therefore safe to assume that they will find better solutions than professors or legislative 
committees.132 They are experts of justice; their daily job is to find the just solution to the 
case at hand. If guided by some general axiom of what the notion “just” means in the 
international setting, there are many grounds to presume that they will find the solution 
most in conformity with the requirements of justice.  
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There is another reason why courts are especially well positioned to create rules for 
the global legal order. That is because they are not biased towards their constituency as 
legislators are.133 Their focus is on the dispute and the individuals involved, not on some 
state interest. It is therefore likely that courts from different countries will agree more 
easily on the just solution of a case with cross-border elements than different legislators. 
Judges are not embroiled in conflicts wars. They can see the pressing need of global 
coordination. There are good reasons to think that they will submit the – ostensible – 
particular interests of their nations to the requirements of global legal ordering. Some 
instances where courts have done this will be cited later.134 
That being said, there are of course cases in which the courts can be expected to take 
diverging positions. Judges of different countries will sometimes disagree about the 
correct determination of the law to be applied or the quality of the substantive rules that 
pretend to govern a case. Such differences cannot even be excluded within the judiciary 
of a single state. They are much more likely to occur when courts of different nations are 
involved. Judges coming from a different background will often have diverging views of 
what is just. In a world that is split into states with their own body of courts, it will 
necessarily come to conflicting decisions as to the applicable law. Due to the 
decentralized system of adjudication, there is no supra-national or international court that 
could be called upon to overcome such differences. 
Does that call the idea of global legal ordering into question? I think not. The axiom 
that has been proposed here requires to be obeyed even if sometimes courts miss the 
mark. The reason for this is that it has no requirement of reciprocity built in. It appeals to 
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each judge to strive for a harmonious result, independent of whether the other judges do 
the same. That is because the judge has always to achieve justice in the individual case. 
Of course there may be some courts that will stand in the way of globally harmonious 
decision-making. But that should not inhibit the others to seek it. 
3. States Take an Interest in the Resolution of Private Disputes 
After these two more methodological counter-arguments, a different kind of criticism 
needs to be explored that will almost certainly be mounted against the proposal made. It 
was argued here that the judge should focus on achieving the just result in the individual 
case before him, leaving the rules of states and even of the forum aside if they inhibit a 
harmonious decision-making. But since the days of Brainerd Currie’s fundamental article 
on married women’s contracts, it has been recognized that states take an interest in the 
solution of private disputes.135  
It would be nonsense to deny that states have an interest in the application of their law 
to international cases. Governments do care about which individual wins in court. They 
must do so because they have a particular duty to protect their citizens against injustice. 
This duty applies not only to domestic disputes, but to cross-border cases as well. For 
instance, it may be as important for a government to protect a married woman or a 
fatherless child in a transnational setting as it is in a domestic situation, or even more 
important.  
Although I thus agree with the point that legislators have an interest in the solution of 
transnational cases, I totally disagree with the argument that the courts should recognize 
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this interest. On the contrary, my view is that they should ignore the states’ conflict rules 
precisely because they are inspired by an interest in the solution of the case. If you want a 
conflict to be solved in a just way, you do not ask the view of an interested party. This 
axiom is generally accepted in legal theory.136 It also applies to conflicts. Following the 
different governments’ pretence to determine the applicable law is pernicious for the 
global legal order. It produces more harm than it does any good. Suppose that a court 
would adopt its legislature’s view and apply the forum law to the validity of a married 
woman’s contract or to the determination of fatherhood of a child. That will be of little 
use for the woman or the child if the courts of other states apply a different law. It may 
even worsen their situation, because they might get caught in a judicial war between two 
states. This is hardly what they have wished for. Hence, it seems better for the court to 
disregard the forum’s rules in the determination of the applicable law. 
4. U.S. Conflicts Law 
A final objection has to be faced. It is derived from the situation of choice of law in the 
United States. The argument could go something along the lines of this: “In 200 years, 
American courts have not been able to solve conflicts of laws in a homogeneous way. 
There is no federal choice of law, and the states do not agree on a common approach. If 
thus there is not even within the United States uniformity in the determination of the 
applicable law, how can it seriously be argued that there would be a possibility for a 
world-wide conflicts methodology?” 
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The argument is apparently very powerful. Indeed, if within one and the same state of 
the world no consensus can be achieved on the way in which conflicts cases are solved, it 
is not only improbable that there could be world uniformity. It is even logically excluded. 
Now a very easy way out of that dilemma would be to criticize and dismiss the U.S. 
practice. American conflicts law has repeatedly being denounced for its “parochial” 
approach to choice of law, which would be inspired by the solution of domestic cases.137 
One author regretted that American choice-of-law no longer inspired by cosmopolitan 
ideas,138 and another even denounced it as “provincial”139. 
I will not join this “American conflicts law bashing”. Rather, I want to draw the 
attention to the unique way in which interstate cases in the U.S. present themselves and 
compare it with the challenges that international cases pose. The basic peculiarity of 
interstate conflicts laws is that the federal states have very similar legal systems. With the 
exception of Louisiana, all of them belong to the Common law family. Although they 
might differ in detail, it is a peculiar feature of these systems that they all are based on 
very similar legal institutions and principles. They are built on a “common grammar”.  
Given this basic understanding between the states’ legal systems, it is not at all 
surprising that conflicts theory in the U.S. has turned to the relatively sparse cases in 
which legislators have adopted peculiar rules that deviate from the Common law. 
Examples include the legislatively ordained invalidity of contracts by married women140, 
the statutory non-liability of drivers for damages inflicted upon passengers under a guest 
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statute,141 the codification of the car owner’s vicarious liability142, the survival of action 
after the death of a tort victim according to a specific law143, and workers compensation 
acts144. To be sure, these cases involve vital legal issues. Yet they only concern the spatial 
reach of a single statute. It was natural that under these circumstances theorists and 
courts started to ascertain and weigh the policies behind these laws. 
In the international arena, the question of conflicts is posed in a very different 
fashion. Here the whole legal systems that call for their application are completely 
different.145 For instance, the French and Chinese contract law or the Brazilian and 
Russian tort law might share some features, yet their theoretical principles and 
institutions radically diverge. It thus makes no sense to research the policy of a single 
statute to determine whether it does apply to a particular dispute.146 It would be futile and 
even ludicrous asking what the “policy” of French contract law is or which “interests” are 
underlying Russian in contrast to Brazilian tort law. Obviously, there are a great many of 
them. Such questions are too broad to be answered in any serious way.  
To this basic difference between interstate and international cases is added another: In 
the U.S. there are other devices that avoid conflicting decisions. For instance, the Full 
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Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution147 forces courts to recognize decisions from 
sister states even if the original court has applied the wrong law from their perspective. 
There is no equally forceful device that would apply to international cases. 
The consequence of these differences between interstate and international conflicts 
cases is that the challenges posed in both situations are not the same. This can be clearly 
seen when we examine the effects of the application of a different law by the courts of 
different states. In interstate conflicts, such diverging positions might result in one court 
granting a claim which another would not. In the international setting, the potential 
consequences are much more dramatic. The court of one state might for instance decide 
that a couple is not married or that X is not the father of the child, while the court of 
another state might take a different view. Examples have been treated under the name 
“limping relationships” above.148 In interstate conflicts, they have hardly been heard 
of.149 They are avoided because of the kinship between the Common law systems and the 
Full Faith and Credit clause.  
The result is thus that much bigger problems exist if courts take a diverging view in 
international cases than if they disagree on the applicable law in interstate cases. This is 
not to belittle interstate conflicts of laws. The costs that are created for the individuals by 
the disagreement among American courts as to the solution of conflicts may be 
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tremendous. But the problems that arise in interstate situations, in which quite similar 
legal systems collide, cannot be compared to those between legal systems that are 
complete strangers. The challenges are just not the same.  
It would be wrong to conclude from the foregoing argument that the new 
methodology which is suggested in this piece would not be suitable for interstate 
conflicts.150 If all courts of the United States would make decisional harmony their 
primary goal, then the current chaos of American conflicts law could be overcome. There 
is even good reason to think that this is the only way out of the present muddle: As long 
as the federal states’ courts follow selfish policies of the forum, conflicts between them 
will hardly disappear. Hence, it is certain that the remedy suggested here for international 
cases would also be a proper cure for the disease that has befallen U.S. interstate choice 
of law. But it is just not the main point of this article to suggest a solution for the internal 
affairs of the United States. The proposition made goes much further. Its success is 
independent of whether courts in America follow it in interstate cases or not.     
F. Examples of Judicial Global Legal Ordering 
An appeal is made in this piece that goes out to all judges of the world. It is: “Strive for 
consistent results, not cacophony.” The hope is that courts will be able to sort out the 
inertia choice-of-law theory is stuck in and which neither legal theory nor legislators have 
achieved to overcome. The premise that judges need to start from is the simple realization 
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that the world’s legal systems are not better or worse, but just different. In fulfilling their 
task of rendering justice, they should subdue the interests of their forum state to the needs 
of a global legal order. 
Expecting judges to adopt such an internationalist view today might seem little better 
than fantasizing. Which court has ever consciously and openly dismissed the rules of the 
forum for their lack of conformity with a global legal order? Whoever would make such a 
suggestion runs the risk of appearing eccentric. 
Yet as unlikely as it might seem to the “realist”, there are cases in which courts have 
taken a stance against the forum law on the basis that it would be counter-productive 
when seen from a global viewpoint. These were not just any courts, but the supreme 
courts of the United States and France.  
1. United States 
In M/S Bremen and Underweser v. Zapata Off-Shore151, a German company had agreed 
to tow a drilling rig belonging to Zapata, a Houston-based company, from Louisiana to 
Italy. The contract provided that any litigation should be settled by the High Court of 
Justice in London. However, after a dispute had arisen between the parties, Zapata 
brought suit against Underweser in Tampa. The Florida courts considered they had 
jurisdiction to hear the case despite the forum-selection-clause because the latter would 
be void. To reach that conclusion, the Court of Appeals pointed inter alia to another 
clause of the contract purporting to exculpate Underweser from any liability for damages 
to the drilling rig.152 Such a clause was clearly at variance with the public policy of the 
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(American) forum.153 But while it would be unenforceable in an American court, it would 
at the same time probably have been regarded as valid by the English judges. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals saw no other option than to declare the forum selection clause invalid in 
order to safeguard American interests.  
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded. The core of its 
decision is still worth being reproduced:  
“The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, 
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be 
resolved under our laws and in our courts. … We cannot have trade and commerce in world 
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and 
resolved in our courts.”154 
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, came to the surprise of many, not 
the least of Justice Douglas. In his dissent, he stressed that Zapata is a “citizen of this 
country” and that if it were remitted to the English court, “its substantive rights would be 
adversely affected”.155  
All of that did little to impress the rest of the court. The overwhelming majority of the 
Justices chose to base their decision not on the pervasive public policy of the forum, but 
rather on the needs of global trade and commerce. They came to the conclusion that it 
would clearly contradict these needs if the forum’s policies would be strictly followed in 
international cases. Hence, they chose to disregard the forum’s rules. 
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The judgment in the Zapata case is one of the prime examples of global legal 
ordering.156 The forum’s policies, however important they might be, are subordinated to 
the exigencies of reaching harmonious decisions with other courts. It is clear that a 
foreign court, for instance the English High Court which had be chosen by the parties, 
would have considered the forum-selection clause as valid. Its invalidation for 
idiosyncratic reasons of U.S. law would have produced the kind of chaos and legal limbo 
that the present approach tries to avoid. 
It is vital that Zapata was not an outlier. Later, the Supreme Court repeated the 
method of global legal ordering in a case that involved a field of law whose policies are 
most cherished by Americans: antitrust law. In Mitsubishi, the Justices upheld the 
validity of a clause that referred all disputes arising under the contract to arbitration in 
Japan.157 They did so in spite of the probability that the arbitrators sitting in Japan would 
not give effect to U.S. antitrust rules. Again, the court subordinated American policies to 
the interest in world-wide harmonious decision making. 
2. France 
Interestingly, the practice of U.S. courts is paralleled by similar developments in France. 
The most striking examples are to be found in the same area as the Mitsubishi decision: 
the validity of arbitration clauses. In 1966, the Cour de cassation had to decide on the 
following case158: A French public body had chartered a vessel from the Greek owner 
Galakis. Two months later, it terminated the contract. Galakis made use of an arbitration 
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clause provided in the contract and initiated arbitration proceedings in London, in which 
the French authority did not participate. After the arbitrators had handed down an award 
in its favour, Galakis tried to enforce the award in France. The French public body 
exhausted all remedies available against enforcement, taking the case up to the highest 
court in civil matters.  
The judges of the Cour de cassation had in front of them a clear text on which they 
could base their decision: Articles 1004 and 83 of the Code civil stated expressly that the 
French state and public bodies could not enter into a valid arbitration clause. Yet in spite 
of the strong command of its national legislator, the court held the arbitration clause to be 
valid. It reasoned – in the usual brevity of French decisions – that the prohibition of 
Article 1004 and 83 Code civil is limited to domestic contracts and does not apply to 
international contracts entered into for the needs and in conformity to the usages in 
international maritime commerce. In the last part, the same ideas resonate as in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Zapata and Mitsubishi. The Cour de cassation engaged in a 
similar kind of global legal ordering. Before its decision, practically no French lawyer 
would have given the provisions of the Code civil such a limited scope of application. 
The court radically broke with the text and the current methodology for interpreting the 
code. It established effectively a new rule for international cases under which arbitration 
clauses are presumed to be valid and cannot be attacked on grounds of national law. A 
similar ruling had been made a couple of years before with regard to the validity of gold 
clauses in international contracts.159 What is striking in both cases is that the court is 
willing to subordinate the interests of its own state, even though clearly expressed, to the 
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needs of international commerce. It is obvious that this kind of reasoning enhances 
decisional harmony, as foreign courts would also have come to the conclusion that the 
clauses are valid.  
3. Conclusion 
The examples cited clearly show that the Supreme courts of the U.S. and France are 
prepared to make the kind of daring advances that some think they would never do. But 
they also show something else: Judges do care about justice in international relations, and 
they are willing to enforce their conception of the just even against express legislative 
enactments of their own state. What is also striking is that the methodology that has been 
used is not a classic choice of law, but rather the creation of a new rule of substantive 
law. This shows that to attain the just result sometimes requires a lot of ingenuity on the 
part of the court. It is not enough to just disregard the forum rule. Something else has to 
be put in its place, and this might either be a uniform choice of law or a uniform 
substantive rule. 
Obviously, the cases cited do not establish a new system of choice of law, or a global 
legal order. It takes more than one swallow, or even two swallows, to make a summer. 
Yet they can be cited as prime examples in which judges have ventured to challenge the 
forum’s policies based on the needs of justice and harmony in international cases. Other 
courts should take them as an encouragement to embrace the task of global legal 
ordering. We need more of this kind of cosmopolitan judicial thinking, and less of the 
traditional nationalistic bickering. 





After the exposition of the theoretical backdrop of the new methodology, let us now 
examine a little closer its effect in practice. How will a court solve a case in conformity 
with the new paradigm that is advocated here? 
Implication No. 1: Respect the Parties Choice Regardless of The Choice-
of-Law Rules of the Forum 
The first thing that a court will do is to check whether the parties have agreed to a certain 
law. Respecting the parties’ choice of law is the best way to solve the insecurity as to the 
law that governs transnational relationships. The reason is simple: In the triangle between 
parties, the court, and states, the parties are the ones that are most affected by the 
application of a certain law.  
The suggestion to apply the law chosen by the parties is hardly new. It is called party 
autonomy and is today the most widely accepted principle of conflicts around the 
world.160 The difference of the conception presented here to the traditional principle is 
that under the latter, the court would have to check the validity of the parties’ choice 
following the rules of the forum. Each forum either designates a specific law or sets out 
specific substantive conditions under which the validity of choice-of-law agreements has 
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to be tested.161 These laws or rules often contain special restrictions for the freedom of 
the parties choice, for instance in contracts with consumers162 or cases that touch upon 
“public policy”163. These conditions and restrictions diverge from one country to another. 
They impair the efficiency of the parties’ choice. Thus, although party autonomy as a 
principle of domestic law promotes harmonious decision-making much better than any 
other rule, it does not lead to uniform results.  
The approach that is suggested here works in a very different way. It asks courts to 
follow party autonomy not because it is a national policy, but because it is useful as a tool 
for global legal ordering. This argument is totally independent of the forum law. As the 
courts do not have to base the recognition of choice-of-law clauses on a specific national 
rule, the principle of party autonomy is freed from inconsistent conditions and restrictions 
of domestic law. It can now fully perform its function of determining the applicable law 
in a globally uniform way. 
Surely party autonomy cannot be absolute. First of all, it needs to be bound to certain 
prerequisites, the most obvious of course being a sufficient agreement between the parties 
on the applicable law. Second, it needs to be excluded completely in some areas, for 
instance with regard to all questions involving the status of a person or third parties. Party 
autonomy as a principle of global legal ordering will not eliminate these conditions and 
restrictions. But what is new is that they can now be defined world-wide in the same vein, 
using only the conditions and restrictions that most of the states recognize. This approach 
makes party autonomy immune against any parochial limitations by domestic policy-
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makers. It can thus play a truly catalytic role for global legal ordering. If everybody 
accepts choice of law by the parties under the same conditions, there will be a 
convergence of results.164 
Some authors will not like this elevation of party autonomy because they view the 
principle with suspicion. For instance, it has been criticized that it would provide 
individuals with the possibility of a “regulatory lift-off” allowing them to avoid sovereign 
regulatory concerns and societal needs.165 In effect, the principle would be a “myth” 
developed to provide a visible legal basis for “auto-poëtic private ordering”.166 The 
various “legal fictions” underlying it would need to be “deconstructed” in order to render 
economic actors amenable to the governance principles of “accountability” and 
“transparency”.167  
This criticism ignores that party autonomy today is a reality. Due to its quasi-
universal recognition by governments and courts, the possibility for individuals to select 
the applicable law is no more mythical than taking one’s domicile abroad or choosing a 
spouse from another country. If one eliminates this misunderstanding, the crucial point 
that is at the core of the criticism must be taken seriously: Party autonomy indeed 
presents a serious challenge for the states’ legislative power. If individuals were free to 
select any law they like and courts would have to respect that selection under any 
circumstance, the concerns that national laws are designed to protect would be subject to 
the whim of the parties. That is not what is meant here. Rather, the goal of global legal 
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ordering is a new equilibrium between societal and private interests, one that is 
established on the global level and not on the national one. Concerns for the common 
weal should be respected in private law cases as far as they are shared by other nations. 
What has to be avoided, though, is that every legislator interferes with transnational 
private relationships, which by definition exceed its borders, for parochial purposes of 
domestic policy. This statement appears to undermine the regulatory power of the state. It 
has to be borne in mind, though, that its decision-making power is already factually 
restrained by the existence of other sovereign countries disposing of their own court 
system. All that is done here is to reflect this restriction on the legal level. The court 
deciding over a private dispute is thus liberated from the commands of its own state 
which forces them to hold the parties for ransom in the global war of different national 
policies. 
Implication No. 2: Give International Conventions a Paramount Role 
Regardless of the Forum’s Ratification 
The next advice following from the paradigm of global legal ordering is that courts 
should always look out for uniform substantive or conflicts rules. If there is an 
international agreement between the states, it significantly reduces the insecurity as to the 
applicable law. Thus, the courts should follow it.  
Again, this seems common sense. Under the current approaches, judges also have to 
respect international law. The condition, however, is that the state in which the court is 
sitting is a party to the treaty; otherwise, it cannot be applied. The methodology that is 
suggested here again is quite different. The court is advised to follow a treaty even if the 




forum state has not signed or ratified it. This suggestion will necessarily puzzle the 
reader: How can a convention be applied by the court of a state that is not bound by it? 
Would that not undermine the legislature’s grasp on its judicial system? 
The explanation again is the function of the court in achieving global justice that has 
been constantly emphasized here: The judiciary should follow the solution that is 
prevalent on the international level. That is because an international solution is better than 
any idiosyncratic rulemaking by national governments. Experience shows that often the 
signing or ratification of international instruments is inhibited for purely political reasons 
on the domestic level.168 The court should not care for them, but rather promote the 
substantive or conflicts rules that a major number of states agree upon. 
As a result of the suggestion made here, the court might find itself in the 
uncomfortable situation in which it has to apply a treaty although its own administration 
has refused to sign or ratify it. But that should not bother the judges too much. If need be, 
they may remind themselves that their primary task is not to fulfill the commands of their 
legislator, but to do justice to the parties in the individual case.169 Now it is clear that the 
application of a solution that has been agreed upon by a number of states provides the 
parties with much more certainty and predictability as to the results and inhibits the 
application of eccentric solution by a peculiar national law. 
A problem of this approach of course is how many states need to agree on an 
instrument in order to make it wise for the judge to follow it. This is indeed a hard 
question to which no clear answer can be given. Numbers as such are not decisive. 
Sometimes a treaty signed by only three or four states might provide an internationally 
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workable solution that is acceptable in principle also to other states. On the contrary, 
under certain conditions, even the ratification of a rather high number of states does not 
recommend it to others. That is the case, for instance, where all the parties to the treaty 
are from a peculiar region and the instrument corresponds to the views held there, while 
in the rest of the world a different opinion prevails. Thus, everything depends on the 
circumstances. But what should be clear, at least, is that a rule which has been agreed 
upon by independent states will often contain a solution more in line with the needs of the 
global order than just a particular national law. For this reason, it is only logical that 
international law takes a front seat in the search for a global legal order. 
Implication No. 3: Compare Conflicts Rules in Order to Find the Suitable 
One for Global Legal Ordering 
If there is neither a choice by the parties nor an international treaty, the court has to 
choose the applicable law itself. To do so, it should – in line with its function in legal 
ordering – use standards that are in conformity with global justice. The question is: How 
can such standards be found?  
The quest for universally acceptable conflict rules is not as difficult and hopeless as it 
might seem at first sight. There is a powerful tool to help the judge in the selection 
process: comparative choice of law. A comparison of different conflict rules followed 
around the world will lead the court to follow the selection method that is most in line 
with the goal of decisional harmony.170 If every court would follow this precept, 
eventually the applicable law would be determined in the same way all over the globe. To 
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employ comparative choice of law is thus in line with the Kantian maxim: "Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law".171  
Of course, finding out the principles that other countries follow in choice of law 
seems to be a formidable task for a court that has only limited time and information. But 
it is by no means impossible. Nor is it necessarily more complicated than applying the 
sometimes complex and entangled conflicts rules of national law. Given the sources that 
are available on the internet today, it is not difficult to find out about the choice-of-law 
systems of the world. There are a number of websites drafted in English and accessible 
from any point of the globe.172 Moreover, the transnational networks between courts that 
have been established over the past years might serve as platforms for information and 
discussion on choice-of-law issues.173 Finally, there is also scientific support. A number 
of scholars have already engaged in comparative private international law.174 Their works 
can be of immense use if put to practical service. At the same time, there is no question 
that more such comparisons need to be done.  
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Apart from the practical problems mentioned, which might eventually be overcome, 
there seems to be a more fundamental, conceptual weakness of the comparative approach 
suggested here. Very often, conflict of laws rules will diverge and not lead to the same 
result. That was precisely the reason of limping relationships and other shortcomings that 
were denounced in the first part.175 Obviously, if there is no unanimity on the applicable 
law, a thorny issue arises: How should the judge go about determining the “common 
rule”? If there is no convergence, how can a global solution be found? 
Although it seems unlikely, there is a solution to this problem. In determining the 
applicable conflicts rule, courts do not have to limit themselves to a pure, computer-style 
comparison of different conflict rules. In case of divergence, they should go forward and 
construct a rule that is most suitable for the global legal order. That is part of their special 
mission of rendering justice in transnational cases. This abstract conception will be 
illustrated in the following, taking up the examples that were given at the beginning.176 
First, let us reconsider the case of the limping marriage.177 The problem here was that 
German conflicts law required the judge to enforce the formal requirements of the 
domestic substantive law if the marriage was entered into within the territory of 
Germany.178 From a brief comparative survey of other choice-of-law rules it results that 
few other countries have similar provisions.179 Most of them adopt a more liberal 
approach: it suffices for the marriage to be valid if either the form of the place of 
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celebration or the national law of one of the future spouses is obeyed.180 Such an 
alternative reference rule, as it is called181, leads in more cases to the validity of the 
marriage and thus achieves a greater consistency of solutions. The contrary rule, which 
submits all marriages to the formal requirements of the forum regardless of whether they 
have an international element or not, serves a different end: it aims at treating all 
marriages celebrated on the country’s soil equally. This is a domestic policy issue which 
is dear to national lawmakers. It largely ignores the needs and specificities of 
international situations, suggesting that foreigners should just abide by their rules if they 
want to marry validly. The court that has to decide over the validity of a marriage cannot 
enforce this rule, but must instead calibrate its decision to the just result. It would be 
preposterous if it declared two people that have married 20 years ago in a country 
following the strict rule that they are unmarried. Thus, the strict choice-of-law rule 
presents itself as unfit for global legal ordering. The alternative reference rule serves that 
purpose much better. 
The second example to be taken up is the search for the father of the child that was 
described above.182 As we have seen, conflicts rules all over the world are very divergent 
in this respect.183 Two of the most widespread solutions are the application of the law of 
the potential parent and the law at the residence of the child. Which one is to be 
preferred? Once again, a look at the outcomes of applying the rules is helpful: If the law 
of the potential parent is applied, it might easily happen that one and the same baby has 
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two or more fathers, because the laws of different state might follow different tests to 
prove the lineage. This result could be considered as being better than having found no 
father at all. Some policymakers expressly favor it and even have introduced alternative 
reference rules that allow establishing parenthood under different laws.184 However, from 
a global order perspective, it is not acceptable that the child is supposed to have one 
father in some countries, while it has another in other parts of the world. It seems better 
to admit that parenthood cannot be proven in all cases than to grasp for every law that 
presumes such a link would exist. Alternative reference rules, which have been praised as 
a general tool for achieving multistate justice,185 are even worse here for they augment 
the chaos. Thus, they are no panacea for the differences that effectively exist between 
national conflicts rules.  
The best solution, it seems, is thus to use a criterion which leads to only one law. One 
such factor is the domicile of the child. If all courts of the world used it as decisive for 
determining the applicable law, we would end the current muddle of split parenthood. It 
is true that the criterion has its own weaknesses, for the domicile can be changed over 
time. If such a change had an influence on parenthood, we would have merely replaced 
the spatial with a temporal conflict of laws. But it is easily possible to avoid that result by 
“freezing” the applicable law to the domicile of the child at the time of birth. 
Taking up the third example, the applicable law to companies,186 it seems at first 
glance that the incorporation theory and the seat theory would be both equally capable of 
leading to harmonious decisions. If all courts in the world were to follow either of them, 
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the results achieved would be the same. A closer look, though, reveals that the seat theory 
has some deficiencies: First of all, it does lead to a serious temporal conflict of laws 
(French: “conflit mobile”) if the seat is transferred from one country to another. The 
effects can be disastrous, as the company might be considered to be dissolved under some 
laws or to have lost the privileges of incorporation under others. Thus, the seat theory is 
hampering the trans-border mobility of companies, something which is fatal in a 
globalized society. Moreover, it is not sure that the seat would be determined in the same 
way by all courts. Some may use the place of the head of the corporation, while others 
might refer to the place of its main factory or distribution centre. What is a “seat” of a 
company is thus not as easy to determine. As the theory truly hinges upon the criterion, it 
is unsuitable to achieve true global legal order. Judges should thus discard it, and they 
increasingly do.187  
The three examples prove that it is not impossible to achieve meaningful results from 
a comparative choice-of-law analysis. But they have also shown that judges cannot rely 
on a mere counting of legal systems to arrive at a just solution. They must make a rational 
choice as to which conflicts rule is best suited to fulfill the idea of harmonious decision-
making. This choice is not the same as the one they have to make when applying the local 
conflict-of-laws rule. It is much more similar to the choice that governments are 
confronted to when they draft international instruments on uniform conflicts law. In fact, 
the judge that has to decide a transnational case in the absence of such an instrument 
should put himself in the shoes of these governments because he is effectively filling a 
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gap which they have left. In doing so, he should evaluate the solutions that are currently 
prevailing in national conflicts law in light of the needs of the global legal order, which 
he must help to build. 
Implication No. 4: Intermediate Law is Possible 
Traditional choice of law presents the judge with an alternative: she has to follow either 
the law of state A or that of state B. Intermediate solutions, like awarding damages that 
are in between those foreseen by the two laws, are impossible. The reason has most 
clearly been expounded by Judge Richard Posner when rejecting the combination of 
claims governed by different laws in one class action: He said that the jury which would 
be charged in such a case could follow “no actual law of any jurisdiction”, but would 
rather have to receive a kind of “Esperanto instruction”.188 That statement truly reflects 
the orthodox qualms about combining several laws. From the point of view of domestic 
choice of law, the applicable legal system can only be that of the forum or that of another 
state. Tertium non est datur. 
From the viewpoint of global legal ordering, however, there is nothing heretic or 
frivolous in admitting that neither the legal system of state A nor state B exclusively 
governs a certain set of facts that touches both of them. On the contrary, it makes sense to 
combine the two laws in order to reflect the reality of the global legal system: Often a 
case exceeds the boundaries of national laws. A selection between them cannot be done 
by a geographical or another criterion unless it would result in some form of arbitrariness. 
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Intermediate or “average” law presents a viable solution to this conundrum. This is 
increasingly recognized.189 
However, this solution has inherent limits. While it works in actions for damages or 
maintenance, it cannot be followed with regard to questions such as the validity of a 
marriage or the existence of a company that were discussed before.190 These “status 
related” problems cannot be decided by a mathematical average, but only by a clear 
either-or. Thus, in many cases the distillation of comparative choice-of-law principles 
will remain unavoidable. 
Implication No. 5: Use Global Standards of Justice When Applying Any 
(Home or Foreign) Law 
The classic approach asks the judge to apply the foreign law as it is interpreted in the 
country of origin.191 He should enquire and construct foreign law in the same manner as 
the foreign court would do.  
In many if not most situations, this is a task that is close to impossible to fulfil. Judges 
will either not dispose of the necessary information about the foreign practice, or it would 
be too time-consuming to collect them.192 Moreover, the foreign law might be based on 
values that are quite singular and alien to the rest of the world. For these reasons, the 
judge will often consciously or unconsciously be guided by the principles and standards 
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that he considers to be of universal validity, such as equality of men and women or the 
respect of other basic human rights.  
For the traditional methodology, any interpretation of the foreign law that is untrue to 
its actual practice constitutes a technical error.193 The question is whether the recourse to 
universal principles and standards of interpretation should indeed be avoided or whether, 
on the contrary, the convictions of the judge with regard to the existence of such 
principles and standards should not have a stronger influence on his interpretation of 
foreign law.194 While the latter idea is alien to the orthodox methodology, it is fully in 
line with the idea that is expounded here. Global legal ordering asks the court to treat 
foreign law on the same footing as its national law, not worse, but also not better. In a 
domestic setting it is clear that the judge would not follow the words of the statutes and 
the decisions of the higher courts by their letter if they contradict fundamental 
requirements of justice. It is totally unpersuasive why this should change when it comes 
to the application of foreign law. Here as well, it is necessary for the court to use 
conscience in order to reach a result.  
The argument that questions of substantive justice should play a role when cases with 
a foreign element are decided has long been made. In particular, American authors were 
pressing the point.195 Although they were right in principle, they have committed two 
mistakes.  
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The first mistake was that they have adopted an internal perspective. They took issue 
with foreign law when it was at variance with the substantive justice requirements of the 
forum, thus opening the floodgates for more parochialism instead of less. A deviation 
from the law applicable to a dispute should not be allowed simply because the latter is not 
in line with the forum’s principles, but only if it contradicts global standard of justice.  
The second mistake was that the American writers have focused too much on the 
selection of the governing law. They have thereby neglected its application. This point, 
however, is much more important than the first. For the problem that the revolutionists 
had and many authors have with foreign law is not that it is applicable to a certain case. 
What is problematic is rather its content. It is because of the result that a case receives 
under a foreign legal system that the judge’s conscience does not allow him to follow it. 
If that is the case, he should grasp the bull by its horns and correct the unacceptable 
results by giving a different interpretation of that law, instead of pretending that it would 
not be applicable to the issue in question. 
Now it might be asked how this approach should work in practice. Can the judge 
really interpret foreign law in conformity with the requirements of global justice, or is he 
not inevitably bound to the interpretation given by the courts of the country of origin? 
The leeway that the judge has in the interpretation of foreign law is best illustrated by an 
extract from Ronald Dworkin’s seminal book “Law’s Empire”.196 In proving the 
multifarious meanings of the word “law”, Dworkin uses an imaginary judicial system 
which we disapprove of (it is not too hard to recognize the Nazi system). He describes 
different attitudes that we can take towards such a system. The first one is a very 
skeptical and basically consists of our conviction that the practices in this system do not 
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justify in any way state coercion. We would then recommend a judge to simply ignore the 
legislation and precedent altogether, as long as he can get away with it.197 A second 
method would be to consider the foreign system from the point of view of judge who, 
unlike us, is in general sympathy with it and counts it as a “flourishing example of 
law”.198 We would then have to ask “which interpretation of his country’s legal practices 
would put them into what we believe would be their least bad light”. Or finally, we could 
decide to put us fully in the shoes of the foreign judge and interpret “from the point of 
view of the full set of his political and social convictions”.199  
The classical approach would require the court to adopt the latter attitude. In contrast, 
global legal ordering paves the way for a less mechanical and more enlightened handling 
of foreign law, one that respects the diversity of different legal cultures while not 
sacrificing universal standard of justice. It may very well be that the result reached will 
not coincide with the interpretation that would statistically most probably have been 
given by the courts of the country from which the law originates. So be it. In a global 
legal order, the task of the judge is not to emulate the judiciary of the country from which 
the law originates. It is to decide transnational cases in a way that is most in conformity 
with the requirements of harmonious decision-making and substantive justice. 
One might object to this approach that a state’s law would be misinterpreted and even 
perverted by the approach that is recommended here. If the laws of a dictatorship, for 
instance, would be combined with ideas of equality and protection of minorities, this 
would lead to a kind of unnatural mongrel that contradicts the legislature’s intentions. Yet 
this argument ignores that the state which makes its laws available for the global legal 
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order acts as a “rule provider”.200 In the global order, national laws are not applied 
because of the authority of the state that is the author. The latter has therefore no right to 
the application of its law, even less in a certain interpretation. He is deemed to have 
released them to a global application. Thus, understanding the legal rules in a way 
different than the state-author intended cannot violate its privileges. 
It might also be objected that the solution advocated here would not further the goal 
of decisional harmony, as it makes the interpretation of foreign law dependent from the 
judge’s personal convictions. It is true that when it comes to substantive justice, the views 
often diverge. There is, however, reason to hope that the convictions of judges about 
justice do not deviate as much as the laws of the legislators of the world.201 They are 
professionally obliged to decide individual cases impartially, and they are less politically 
influenced than law-makers. Thus, it seems not unjustified to think that a U.S. and a 
Chinese judge would come more easily to the same result than Capitol Hill and the 
People’s Congress in Beijing. Moreover, differences of opinion between judges about 
how law shall be applied in conformity with substantive justice also appear within one 
legal system. They do not lead to its crackdown, but have to be tolerated. Indeed, if a 
majority of foreign courts comes to the conclusion that the law of a certain state is better 
interpreted in a certain sense, which deviates from the country’s own interpretation, this 
is as much global harmony that can be brought about as is possible without sacrificing the 
requirements of justice.  
A final objection against this approach is that at least the courts in the state of the 
dictator will apply their law differently from the foreign courts. Indeed, this point must be 
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granted. But the goal of harmonious decision-making is not sacrosanct, even in the global 
legal order. It has to give way to the requirements of substantive justice, under the 
condition that these requirements are shared by a large number of countries. Thus, judges 
should ensure that their interpretation is in line with values that are as universal as 
possible before they discard an interpretation that is likely to be given by the courts of the 
country of origin. In that way, the frictions are limited to the strictly necessary. One 
might even nourish the hope that the courts of the country of origin, in light of the 
rejection of their interpretation by other judiciaries, think over their practice and adapt it 
to that of their foreign counterparts. 
As we have seen, none of the objections truly holds. To the contrary, applying global 
standards has certain advantages: First, foreign law will be applied in a way that is in 
conformity with the requirements of substantive justice, even beyond those areas which 
are sensitive to public policy concerns. Second, courts will be spared the onerous task of 
inquiring how a court from the country of origin would interpret a certain provision, but 
instead can employ their own mind to come up with a workable solution. Third, the 
results will be a globally harmonious interpretation as far as it is in possible to bring it 
into conformity with the requirements of substantive justice. Finally, if an overwhelming 
majority of courts in the world comes to the conclusion that a state’s law is to be 
interpreted in a certain way in order to be in line with the requirements of justice this 
might ultimately have repercussions on the courts of the state of origin and could change 
their attitude. The last point is very idealistic. Yet it shows what a global legal order 
really means: it is not a one way street in which interpreting and applying the law of a 




state is a privilege exclusively entrusted to the courts of the country of origin. Rather, it is 
a discursive process in which many actors take their view on foreign and their own law.  
VI. Where to Go Next 
1. A Recipe for Judge-Made Universal Conflict Rules 
This article has shown that the way in which the applicable law is currently determined is 
more than unsatisfactory: It is an ailing system, unfit for the challenges of the globalized 
society of the 21st century. The differences between the national conflicts systems lead to 
multifarious inconsistencies and clashes. Perverse effects are produced on the global 
level, which defy most basic notions of justice.  
The fundamental illness that has been identified here is the sticking of the court to the 
choice-of-law mechanism of their forum. The divergences between these mechanisms are 
the root cause of the current disorder. Against this background, a new methodology has 
been proposed that liberates the judge from the commands of the forum state as well as 
from their own local practices. The judges should no longer obey politically influenced 
and provincial conflict rules that bear in them the grain of disagreement with other states’ 
judiciaries. Instead, they should follow principles that are universally recognized for the 
solution of a certain type of case. Thus, the original form of private international law will 
resuscitate from its grave: Judges will again search for the law that is appropriate to 
answer a certain question when seen from a global viewpoint instead of following 
peculiar domestic conceptions of conflict of laws.  
The freedom of the judge, it needs to be emphasized, is not unlimited. They are bound 
by the choice of the parties, by international agreements between states, and by the goal 




of providing a solution to conflicts cases that will be acceptable to other nations. 
Moreover, it has to be stressed that their task of “global legal ordering” concerns only the 
question of the choice of the applicable law. It does not comprise questions of substantive 
rules which still remain in the exclusive remit of the legislators and national case law. 
Thus, the future division of tasks will look like follows: States will supply the rules of the 
game, while courts, as “multinational decision-makers”, will determine their reach in 
international situations and seek harmonious solutions with their brethren in other 
countries. It is suggested that this approach could be worth to be called a “global legal 
order”. 
The position taken here is imbued by a deep distrust of national governments. The 
justification for this distrust lies in their utter failure in providing globally acceptable 
choice-of-law rules. Instead of striving for harmonious solutions, they tend to push 
through their domestic preferences in cases involving parties from other states. Courts in 
the United States have tried to identify the policies of domestic law and transpose them 
on the international level, while in the rest of the world different conflicts codes have 
been adopted that contributed as well to disharmony. It might seem idealistic to hope that 
the same judges who were embroiled in these disputes could overcome the current 
muddle. But they are at least to be in a better position than members of governments and 
national parliaments that are bound to domestic agendas. By their very task to decide the 
individual case before them in conformity with the requirements of justice, judges are 
obliged to seek for universal rather than nationalistic choice-of-law principles. 




2. The Need for an International Conference of Judges 
In order for courts to fulfill their job of global legal ordering, judges need to care about 
the practices followed in other courts. They have various sources at their disposal to 
inform them about choice-of-law approaches in other countries.202 More should be done 
to improve the knowledge of comparative choice of law. But judges also need to get into 
personal contact with each other. The informal networks they have created so far are 
helpful, but insufficient. What is needed is a global forum in which magistrates from 
different countries can converse with each other. Something similar to the Hague 
conference, UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT should be installed for judges. The EU seems 
to have understood the importance of the role that judges play in the administration of 
cross-border justice since it has created a judicial network for European judges in civil 
and commercial matters.203 Although it is far from perfect and still fraught with many 
problems, it sets an example. 
In such a platform, judges can cooperate on a variety of issues, not only of choice of 
law. Many procedural questions need to be addressed, such as practical problems of the 
notification of claims to foreign defendants, the taking of evidence abroad or the cross-
border enforcement of judgments. But choice of law should be a central topic. Members 
of national tribunals need to discuss the conditions and limits to the parties’ selection of 
the applicable law, about the determination of the applicable rules in the absence of such 
a selection, the requirements of substantive justice that should inform the interpretation of 
foreign law, and the latest trends in international law making. It is to be hoped that 
                                               
202 See supra V, implication No. 3. 
203 See its website: www.ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/index_en.htm (last visited November 22, 2010). 




through regular consultations, especially among the courts of last instance, a uniform 
practice of choice of law will eventually be brought about.  
The organization of such a forum will need money, time and skill. It is to be hoped 
that some benevolent government will take up the challenge, as the Netherlands did with 
the Hague conference. The cost should be split through an international organization, e.g. 
the United Nations. However, cash strapped as they are, this would also be a good project 
for some private benefactor who seeks to make his name inseparable from the beginnings 
of a global legal order. 
 
